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T.L.O., a Juvenile 
/ 
Cer t to Supreme Court of New 
Jersey (Wilentz, Clifford 
Handler, Pollock, O'Hern' 
Schr~ib~r. (.dissenting), Gari~ 




1. SUMMARY: The State contests the exclusion of evi-
dence seized by a public school official from a pup i 1 d u r in g ......_ 
school hours and on school property. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: In March 1980, a teacher 
at Piscataway High School in New Jersey saw 14 year old T.L.O. 
v 
(Resp) and some other girls smoking in the girls' restroom in 
violation of school rules. She demanded~that the girls accom-
pany her to the principal's office. There, the assistant princi-
pal asked the girls if they had been smoking in the restroom. 
All admitted that they had except for T.L.O., who said that she 
had not been smoking and that she did not smoke at all. The as-
sistant principal then asked T.L.O. to accompany him to his pri-
vate off ice. There he v{sked to see her purse. She gave it to 
him, he opened it and saw a package of Marlboro cigarettes on 
top. When he took them out of the purse to confront T.L.O. with 
the evidence, he saw rolling papers in the purse and began to 
search for other evidence of illegal drugs. He found some mari;~ 
j~a, 4~bills, and some index cards that indicat- ~-
ed t~tv;~d bee~ selling marijuana to other students. ~ 
The assistant principal called T : L.O. 's mother and the /~?t--: 
police. T.L.O., accompanied by her mother, was taken to the po-
1 ice station where she was read her Miranda rights. She then 
allegedly confessed to selling marijuana to other students. 1 In 
1T.L.O. y(ater denied that she ever confessed to selling 
marijuana. Her m~her al~nied that T.L.O. made any sort of 




Juvenile Court, T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence seized  
her purse and her confession. The ~uvenile Court denied the mo-
t ion to suppress. It found the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule applicable to school searches, but found the standard appli-
cable to such a search to be "reasonable cause to believe that 
the search is necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce 
school policies." 178 N.J. Super. at 341 It concluded that the 
assistant principal was justified in opening the purse because he 
had reason to believe that smoking, a violation of school policy, 
had occurred. Once he had opened the purse, the other contents 
of the purse were in "plain view." The Juvenile Court adjudicat-
ed T.L.O. a delinquent. 
On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of 
the suppression motion. However, it vacated the adjudication of 
delinquency and remanded for further proceedings to determine 
whether the juvenile had knowingly waived her constitutional 
rights before making the confession. T.L.O. appealed the denial 
/ 
of her motion to suppress to the N.J. Supreme Court. That court 
reversed the evidentiary ruling of the Juvenile Court. It held 
first that public school students retained Fourth Amendments 
rights while at school and that public school officials were 
st~fficials subject to the Fourth Amendment ban against un-
reasonable government intrusions. It then held that pursuant to 
duties under state law, public school officials may conduct rea-
confession. 
I 
sonable warrantless searches. Finally it held that if the search 
----- -----·· is not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the evidence is 
subject to the exclusionary rule and may not be used in any crim-
inal proceeding against the pupil. On the facts of this case, 
the ~ate supreme court found that the search of T.L.O. 's purse 
was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and thus that the 
- -----
evidence seized must be excluded. 2 
...._,_____- -
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr does not take issue with the 
state court's determination that the Fourth Amendment applies to 
protect public school students from unreasonable searches by pub-
lie school officials or its determination that the search in this 
case was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It argues only 
that the exclusionary rule should not apply to remedy such con-
stitutional violations where the search is performed by a public 
school official. Petr argues that because the school official is 
primarily interested in maintaining school discipline and not in 
securing criminal convictions, application of the exclusionary 
2In state court, 
case r nvolv f ng a searc - New Jersey v. 
Jeffrey Engerud. In that case, school officials were notified by 
the police that a father of a student had told them that Engerud 
was selling drugs to other students. School officials used a 
pass key to gain access to Engerud's locker. Their search of the 
locker revealed illegal drugs. The police were notified and 
criminal proceedings were begun. The lower courts denied the 
motion to suppress the evidence seized from the locker. In one 
opinion, the state supreme court reversed the evidentiary rulings 
made in both this case and the Engerud case. Jeffrey Engerud was 
killed in a motorcycle accident shortly after the state court 
handed down its opinion. Thus, his case is not currently before 
this Court. 
rule will have no deterrent effect. Petr argues that in recent 
years this Court has refused to apply the exclusionary rule un-
less it will further the goal of deterrence. See, e.g., United 
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (additional marginal deter-
renee provided by forbidding use in federal civil proceeding of 
evidence illegally seized by state officials does not outweigh 
cost to society of applying rule) • Petr argues that there is a 
conflict in the . state courts over application of the exclusionary 
rule to searches by public school officials and that this Court 
should grant cert. in this case to resolve that conflict. 
Resp argues that adequate and independent state grounds 
justify the decision below and thus that this Court lacks juris-
diction. She argues that under N.J. law juveniles are guaranteed 
the same right to be secure from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures as are adults. If this Court should determine that 
juvenil~e not entitled to the same protections under the Fourth 
Amendment as adults, the decision in this case would be unaffect-
ed because state law requires equal treatment. 
4. DISCUSSION: Petr is correct that there is a con-
flict concerning application of the Fo~rth Amendment, and espe-
cially the exclusionary rule, to searches conducted by public 
school officials. The state cases generally reflect four differ-
ent approaches to the subject: ( 1) the Fourth Amendment does not 
apply because a public school official stands in loco parentis 
and any search by the official in this capacity is a search by a 
private party rather than a government official: (2) the Fourth 
( 
Amendment applies but the exclusionary rule does not because ap-
plication of that rule has no deterrent effect; (3) both the 
Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule apply but the standard 
of reasonableness is lowered from probable cause to reasonable 
suspicion to allow school officials to perform their responsibil-
it ies of enforcing school discipline; ( 4) the Fourth Amendment 
and the exclusionary rule apply and the standard of reasonable-
ness is probable cause. 
v 
In this case, the N.J. court took the third option. It 
held that "w~ school official has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that a student possesses evidence of illegal activity or 
activity that would interfere with school discipline and order, 
the school official has the right to conduct a reasonable search 
for such evidence." It found that the search conducted in this ------
case was unreasonable and applied the exclusionary rule. There 
~------- ------
are some strong arguments that application of that rule is inap-
propriate in cases such as this. The primary if not the sole 
purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence. Before applying 
::!. 
that deterrent sanction·, it is important to identify the conduct 
sought to be controlled. In this case, it is the actions of 
school officials in carrying out their responsibilities under 
state law to preserve and enforce school discipline. School of-
....____. 
ficials are not responsible for enforcing the law through crimi-
nal proceedings. Thus, exclusion in criminal proceedings of evi-
dence seized by school officials in performance of their duties 
will do little to deter their conduct. Such conduct is better 
deterred by carefully drawn state laws establishing the authority 
of school officials in carrying out their duties. There is a 
split among the state courts on this issue. However, Petr has 
cited only one case besides this one in which the exclusionary 
rule has been applied. This Court denied cert. in that case. 
In State v. Mora, 307 So.2d 317 (La. 1975), the La. Su-
preme Court applied the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence 
discovered by school officials. This Court granted cert. and 
then vacated and remanded for the state court to clarify whether 
its decision was based on state or federal law. Louisiana v. 
Mora, 423 u.s. 1976 On remand, the state court held that under 
state law the school officials who had made the search were func-
tioning as governmental agents; that the search was unconstitu-
t ional under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 
i its equivalent in the state constitution; and that exclusion of 
the evidence was required under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 u.s. 643 
(1961). This Court then denied cert. 429 u.s. 1004 (1976) 
It seems clear from the opinion below that the decision 
on the only issue presented in this case was based on federal 
law: the state supreme court found that the search by the school -official violated the Fourth Amendment and that the exclusionary 
rule should apply under this Court's decision in Mapp. Resp's 
argument that the decision is based on state law is misplaced. 
The relevant state law does not provide that juveniles will be 
treated the same as adults for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
It merely provides that if the defendant in a state proceeding 
has a Fourth Amendment claim, it will be enforced regardless of 
( 
whether he is being tried under the state's criminal code or its 
juvenile code. See Cert. Petition Appendix A at 6a n.5 
There is a conflict in state courts concerning the prop-
er application of Fourth Amendment law to searches performed by 
school officials. Compare State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 
586 (Ga. 197 5) (Fourth Amendment applies but exclusionary rule 
does not), with In re w., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777 (1973): State v. 
Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. 1971) (Fourth Amendment & exclusionary 
rule apply but searches may be reasonable on lesser showing than 
probable cause) . However, only one other case has applied the 
exclusionary rule to exclude evidence seized in such a case from 
criminal proceedings. See Mora, supra. The Court may want to 
wait this controversy out a little longer.~ If not, this case is 
as good as any to take. L.fe ~ ~ 
f' v--.--/.d../4, .AL, __ ~~-
I recommend granting Resp's motion to proceed inforrna 
pauperis. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I tentatively recommend a grant. 
There is a response. 
November 14, 1983 Robinson Opin in petn 
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Dear Chief: 
I now vote to reverse this case. Whatever may be the 
arguments for and against this particular limitation on the 
Exclusionary Rule, my disagreement with ~ v. Ohio remains 
so fundamental that I will seize any opportunity to limit 
the damage done by that case. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES -~ ~ 
No. 83-712 
4;~ 
NEW JERSEY, PETITIONER v. T. L. 0. ~~~ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
NEW JERSEY 
[April -, 1984] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents a question concerning the admissibility 1 
in juvenile-delinquency proceedings of evidenc~ illegally ob- aLLuj ,;./.,. .1 
tained in an in-school search by a public-school official. Be- 1 
cause t at official was engaged in enforcing a school disciplin-
ary rule and was not acting with the participation of 
law-enforcement authorities, we hold that the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule does not require suppression 
of the evidence he obtained. 
I 
On March 7, 1980, a teacher in Piscataway High School in 
Middlesex County, N.J., observed 14-year-old T. L. 0. and 
another student smoking cigarettes in the girls' lavatory in 
violation of school regulations. The teacher escorted the 
girls to the vice-principal's office and accused them of violat-
ing the regulation prohibiting smoking in lavatories. In re-
sponse to the vice-principal's questions, T. L. O.'s companion 
admitted the infraction and was assigned to a three-day 
smoking clinic. T. L. 0., however, denied smoking in the 
lavatory and declared that she "didn't smoke at all." 
The vice-principal took T. L. 0. to a private office, closed 
the door, and requested her purse. He opened the purse 
and observed a package of cigarettes plainly visible. Saying 
that T. L. 0. had lied to him, he reached into the purse to 
remove the cigarettes and saw rolling papers, which in his 
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experience indicated that marihuana was probably involved. 
He then looked further into the purse and discovered mari-
huana, marihuana paraohernalia, a number of one-dollar 
bills, and index cards and papers containing language clearly 
indicating drug dealing by T. L. 0. 
The vice-principal notified T. L. O.'s parents. He also 
summoned the police and gave them the marihuana and para-
phernalia. In her mother's presence at police headquarters, 
T. L. 0. was advised of her rights and admitted to selling 
marihuana in school. T. L. 0. was suspended from school 
for three days for smoking cigarettes in a nonsmoking area 
and seven days for possessing marihuana. On T. L. O.'s mo-
tion in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, the latter sus-
pension was set aside on the ground that the suspension re-
sulted from evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. [T. L. 0.] v. Piscataway Board of Education, 
No. C.286&-79 (Super. Ct. N.J., Ch. Div., Mar. 31, 1980). 
The validity of that judgment is not before us. 
T. L. 0. was also charged in the Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court, Middlesex County, with delinquency based 
on possession of marihuana with the intent to distribute. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:4-44; 24:21-19(a)(1); 24:21-20(a)(4) 
(West Supp. 1983). T. L. 0. moved to suppress the physical 
evidence obtained in the search of her purse; she also sought 
suppression of her confession on the ground that it was 
tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. The juvenile court 
denied T. L. O.'s motion to suppress. State in Interest of 
T. L. 0., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 428 A. 2d 1327 (1980). The 
court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to school 
searches, but declared that 
"a school official may properly conduct a search of a student's 
person if the official has a reasonable suspicion that a crime 
has been or is in the process of being committed, or reason-
able cause to believe that the search is necessary to maintain 
83-712-0PINION 
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school discipline or enforce school policies." Id., at 341, 428 
A. 2d, at 1333 (emphasis in original). 
Applying this standard, the court concluded that the vice-
principal had reasonable cm . <:~e ~.o ;:Jelieve tl:Jat r!.' . .u. v. had 
violated the school's smoking regu.~ations. Once he had 
opened the purse, the court held, its contents were subject to 
the plain-view doctrine; having found marihuana and para-
phernalia, the vice-principal justifiably continued his search 
to determine the extent ofT. L. O.'s criminal activity. I d., 
at 343, 428 A. 2d, at 1334. 
A divided Appellate Division affirmed the denial of 
T. L. O.'s suppression motion with respect to the contents of 
the purse on the basis of the Juvenile Court's opinion, but va-
cated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for fur-
ther proceedings to determine whether T. L. 0. had know-
ingly waived her constitutional rights before confessing. 
State in Interest ofT. L. 0., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A. 2d 
493 (1982) (per curiam). The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
reversed the Appellate Division's judgment and directed that 
the physical evidence be suppressed. State in Interest of 
T. L. 0., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934 (1983). In response to 
I the c~ot tion that the exclusionary rule, which was applied 
V to the tates in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), should 
not g ern searches by school officials since its primary pur-
pose is to deter violations of constitutional rights by law-en-
forcement officials, the Supreme Court of New Jersey de-
clared that "the issue is settled by the decisions of the 
[United States] Supreme Court" and "accept[ed] the proposi-
tion that if an official search violates constitutional rights, the 
evidence is not admissible in criminal proceedings." 94 
N.J., at 341, 463 A. 2d, at 939 (footnote omitted). 1 
1 Although the court indicated that "[o]ur code of Juvenile Justice but-
tresses this conclusion," 94 N.J., at 342, n. 5, 463 A. 2d, at 939, n. 5, we 
agree with the State that the decision below concerning the admissibility of 
illegally obtained evidence in juvenile-delinquency proceedings does not 
rest on adequate and independent state grounds. It bears mentioning 
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey then held that school 
officials could conduct warrantless searches without violating 
the "Fourth Amendment, a.11d that, in the absence of police 
par'.,~dpatw.'l, suc>'h ::;.;d.rches should be assessed under a 
standard less stringent than probable cause. Like the Juve-
nile Court, the SupreJ1!e Court was 
"satisfied that when a school official has reasonable grounds 
to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal activity 
or activity that would interfere with school discipline and 
order, the school official has the right to conduct a reasonable 
search for such evidence." !d., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 941-942. 
The court concluded, with two justices dissenting, that the 
vice-principal's search could not pass muster under this 
standard. The contents of the purse had no direct bearing 
on T. L. O.'s infraction since mere possession of cigarettes 
did not violate the school's rules, and a desire to gather evi-
dence to impeach T. L. O.'s credibility could not justify the 
search. In any event, the vice-principal had no reasonable 
grounds to believe that T. L. O.'s purse contained cigarettes, 
but rather was acting on, "at best, a good hunch." !d. at 
347, 463 A. 2d, at 942. 
We granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certio-
rari. -- U. S. -- (1983). State and federal courts have 
disagreed on whether the Fourth Amendment applies to in-
school searches and seizures by public-school officials and 
teachers. 2 For present purposes, however, the State does 
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied T. L. O.'s motion-filed 
after this Court had granted a writ of certiorari-for clarification of its de-
cision to make clear that it was based on state law. State in Interest of 
T. L. 0., M-422 Q"an 17, 1984). 
2 State and federal courts have struggled to accommodate the interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment and the interest of the States in pro-
viding a safe environment conducive to education in the public schools. 
Some courts have resolved the tension between these interests by giving 
full force to one or the other side of the balance. Thus, in a number of 
cases it has been held that school officials conducting in-school searches of 
students are private parties acting in loco parentis who are not subject to 
• 
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not contest the holding that the Fourth Amendment protects 
students like T. L. 0. from being unreasonably searched by 
school principals or teachers, the standard of reasonableness 
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., D. R. C. v. State, 
646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982); In reG., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. 
Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 
(1969); People v. Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (1970); 
R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450 
S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). See also State v. Kappes, 26 Ariz. 
App. 567, 550 P. 2d 121 (1976) (student advisers in dormitory search); State 
v. Wingerd, 40 Ohio App. 2d 236, 318 N. E. 2d 866 (1974) (same); State v. 
Keadle, 277 S. E. 2d 456 (N.C. App. 1981) (same). At least one court has 
held, on the other hand, that the Fourth Amendment applies in full to in-
school searches by school officials and that a search conducted without 
probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.), 
vacated, 423 U. S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976), and 
others have made clear that the probable-cause standard applies where 
there is police involvement, seeM. v. Board of Education Ball-Chatham 
Community Unit School District No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill. 
1977); Picha v. Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976); State 
v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, -, 216 S. E. 2d 586, 594 (1975), or where the 
search is highly intrusive. SeeM. M. v. Anker, 607 F. 2d 588, 589 (CA2 
1979). Other courts have struck the balance by holding that the Fourth 
Amendment applies, but that the exclusionary rule developed to remedy 
violations of the Amendment does not. See, e. g., State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. 
App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976); State v. Young, supra. See also United 
States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (Maine 1969) (exclusionary rule would not 
deter search by administrative officer at Job Corps Center). 
The applicability of the exclusionary rule, however, is discussed in very 
few of the cases, for most courts that have considered challenges by stu-
dents to in-school searches or seizures by school officials have held that the 
officials' activity did not violate the Fourth Amendment. But see In re 
J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); People v. D., 34 N.Y. 
2d 483, 358 N. Y.S. 2d 403, 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974). These courts have 
rejected the view that school officials conducting in-school searches act as 
private individuals to which the Fourth Amendment does not apply. 
E. g.,Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 690 F. 2d 470, 
480 (CA5 1982); Jones v. Latexo Independent School District, 499 F. Supp. 
223, 229 (ED Tex. 1980); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 51 (NDNY 
1977); Picha v. Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1217-1218 (ND Ill. 1976); State 
v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976); People v. Ward, 62 
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against which the state court held that school officials' con-
duct is to be judged, or the state court's conclusion that 
T. L. O.'s purse had been searched contrary to the Fourth 
Amendment. The sole ue:sdo:u pre&t!uGb.J. uy v•le petition is 
whether the exclusiona rule shoul e app e so as o bar +t e use in · enile-delin uenc rocee mgs o evidence that 
has be_en_illegally seize-d by a school teacher 'thout...partici-
pation by law-enforcement officers. The State submits that 
tlie ru e s ould not apply in such circumstances. We agree 
with this submission and reverse the judgment of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court. 3 
Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State,-- N. M. --, 540 
P. 2d 827 (1975); State v. Walker, 19 Or. App. 420, 528 P. 2d 113 (1974). 
But they typically have held that school officials may act without a war-
rant, e. g., Bilbrey v. Brown, 481 F. Supp. 26, 27-28 (Or. 1979); In reG., 
11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970), and have relaxed the stand-
ard of suspicion necessary to justify in-school searches by school officials 
acting without the participation of law-enforcement officials. E. g., Hor-
ton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, supra; Stern v. New Ha-
ven Community Schools, 529 F. Supp. 31 (ED Mich. 1981); Jones v. Latexo 
Independent School District, supra; Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 
(ND Ind. 1979); Bellnier v. Lund, supra; In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 
Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino, 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); 
State v. Young, supra; In re J. A., supra; People v. Ward, supra; People 
v. D., supra; State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P. 2d 781 (1977); In 
re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979). In assessing the 
reasonableness of searches and seizures by school officials, the courts have 
looked to such factors as: (1) whether the officials acted alone or in concert 
with the police; (2) whether the search was undertaken to promote school 
discipline or to facilitate criminal prosecution; (3) the nature and extent of 
the search; (4) the child's age and disciplinary record; (5) the seriousness of 
the problem to which the search was addressed; (6) whether the official 
acted under exigent circumstances; and (7) the probative value and reliabil-
ity of the evidence on the basis of which the search was undertaken. See 
e. g., Bellnier v. Lund, supra; Doe v. State, supra; People v. D., supra; In 
re L. L., supra; Schiff, The Emergence of Student Rights to Privacy 
Under the Fourth Amendment, 34 Baylor L. Rev. 209, 213 (1982). 
3 In United States v. Leon,-- U. S. -- (1984), and Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, -- U. S. -- (1984), we held that the exclusionary rule 
should not be applied where, judged objectively, it cannot be said that offi-
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II 
Since the Fourth Amendment "has never been interpreted 
4-" ~r<'""~rii'" +~f' ~ .... t;r .... ~u~tion of illegally seized evidence in all 
proceedings or against all persons," Stone v. Powell, 428 
U. S. 465, 486 (1976), the State's concession that the vice-
principal's search of T. L. O.'s purse violated the Fourth 
Amendment only begins the inquiry in this case. We have 
repeatedly stressed that the Constitution itself does not re-
quire the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, United States v. Leon, -- U. S. --, 
-- (1984), and have emphasized that whether the judicially 
created exclusionary rule is appropriately applied in a par-
ticular case or class of cases is "an issue separate and apart 
from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of 
the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police 
conduct." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. --, -- (1983). 
The remedial question before us in this case, our decisions 
make clear, must be resolved by weighing the costs and bene-
fits of excluding from juvenile.:aelinquency proceedin s evi-
dence illegal y o tame b a scho 1 official who sou ht to en-
force sc oo 1sc1p mary rules and who acted without the 
paftlcipabon o aw-enforcement authorities. See United 
States v. Leon, supra, at --; United States v. Calandra, 
414 U. S. 338, 347-352 (1974). The primary, if not the only, 
justification for suppressing the fruits of illegal searches and 
seizures is the belief that the imposition of that severe rem-
edy will reduce the incentive to violate the Fourth Amend-
ment and deter future illegality. United States v. Leon, 
supra, at--; Stone v. Powell, supra, at 486; United States 
cers should have known that they were violating the Fourth Amendment. 
Here, as stated in the text, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the 
vice-principal had "no reasonable grounds" to believe that T. L. O.'s purse 
contained cigarettes. Hence, there is no occasion to vacate the judgment 
of the New Jersey court and remand the case for reconsideration in light of 
Leon and Sheppard. 
,. 
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v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 446 (1976). Accordingly, in light of 
the "substantial cost [imposed] on the societal interest in law 
enforcement by ... [excluding] ... what concededly is 
relevant evidence," United States v. JaMs, id., at 44~~:.,, 
we have restricted "the application of the [exci.usionary] rule 
... to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought 
most efficaciously served." United States v. Calandra, 
supra, at 348. Furthermore, in determining the applicabil-
i~ of the exclusionary rule, we must be convinced that_ an 
Vappreciable deterrent effect has been shown. Speculative 
benefits do not warrant the ''strong medicine" of the exclu-
sionary rule. United States v. Janis, supra, at 453; United 
States v. Calandra, supra, at 351-352. 
On the strength of this balancing test, we have held that 
the exclusionary rule does not apply in certain types of judi-
cial proceedings, see United States v. Janis, supra; United 
States v. Calandra, supra/ and does not prevent all possible 
uses of illegally obtained evidence in proceedings to which it 
is generally applicable. See, e. g., United States v. Havens, 
446 U. S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 
(1964). We also have concluded that the rule constitutes an 
inappropriate remedy for certain types of objectively reason-
able errors by law-enforcement officers. United States v. 
Leon, supra; Massachusetts v. Sheppard, -- U. S. --
(1984). 
We have not had occasion to consider the applicability of 
this approach to evidence obtained in unlawful searches or 
seizures conducted by state or federal governmental employ-
ees who do not work for law-enforcement agencies and who~e 
4 Although this Court has never addressed the question whether the ex-
clusionary rule applies in juvenile delinquency proceedings and we need 
not do so to resolve this case, state courts that have considered the issue 
have consistently held that the rule is applicable. E. g., In re K., 24 Cal. 
3d 395, 595 P. 2d 105, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 973 (1979); In re J. A., 85 Ill. 
App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); State v. Doe, 93 N. M. 143, 597 P. 2d 
1183 (App. 1979); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 
1979). 
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· ons do not fall within the realm of law enforcement. 
We are now confronted with such a case: assuming that there 
has been a Fourth Amendment violation-because the case 
comes to us m C.C~." position-th~ t:tut..,don is whether the evi-
dence seized from T. L. 0. by the vice-principal may be used 
against T. L. 0. in her juvenile-delin uency proceedings. 
In making this deternfination, tliere 1s no reason to epart 
from the general pr~nciples that have emerged in cases de-
cided over more than a decade. Guided by these principles, 
rwe conclude that applying the exclusionary rule, in the con-text of juvenile-delinquency or criminal proceedings, to ex-clude the fruits of in-school searches and seizures, made with-out the participation of law-enforcement officers, 5 is unlikely 
to "result in appreciable deterrence ... [and that] . . . its use 
in the instant situation is unwarranted." United States v. 
Janis, supra, at 454. 
It goes without saying that a duty to exercise care in pro-
moting the health and physical development of students and 
to maintain order and discipline is inextricably tied to a 
school's mission to educate. Although, as they were in this 
case, school authorities may be required to report to the po- ? 
lice what they perceive to be violations of the state or local 
criminal law, these officials cannot generally be classified as 
law-enforcement authorities. The unique relationship be-
tween schools and students gives rise to concerns that are 
largely unrelated to desires to obtain criminal convictions or 
adjudications of delinquency. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 
U. S. 309, 322-323 (1971). In-school searches ordinarily fur-
• There is no evidence in this record that the vice-principal searched 
T. L. O.'s purse at the behest of or in cooperation with law-enforcement {_.A) W ~ ~ 
authorities. The latter's participation in this case began only after the sei- 0  
zure had been made. The state agrees that suppression would be appro- w~ . &L . 'f-"-
priate if a school official had acted as an agent of the police. Brief for Peti- ~ fL  
tioner, 16-17. 
l 
6 We emphasize that the propriety of that decision is not before us in this ~ t:..L ? 
case and that our opinion is not intended to intimate any view concerning ' 
whether the exclusionary rule applies in school disciplinary proceedings. 
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ther purposes or interests entirely separate and distinct from 
those served by the criminal-justice system; prohibiting the 
use in the criminal-justice system of evidence obtained in 
such se&•:cues may well have none of the behavioral effects on 
either school officials or school boards that exclusion of ille-
gally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions generally is 
thought to have on the typical law-enforcement official. 
Whether viewed from the perspective of individual school 
officials or of school boards, "[t]he enforcement of school 
regulations, the safeguarding of students during school hours 
through confiscation of weapons and other contraband, and 
the maintenance of a drug-free learning environment ,12rovide 
substantial incentives to search that would not be lessened by 
~ SUppressiOn of evillence at a subsequent delinquenc;y pro-
cee mg. tr:R. C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 252, 258 (Alaska App. 
1982). School officials may search frequently enough to de-
velop an understanding of state and federal constitutional 
standards, and school boards may and should have bot~ th~ ..., ~0 
incentive and the means o s e uch an un erstandip.g~) ~ 
But a persuasive case can be made for the propositwri that 
local school officials are "primarily concerned with maintain-
ing internal discipline rather than obtaining convictions," id., 
at 258, n. 10, and that the admissibility of the evidence in a 
juvenile court or criminal proceeding is not a substantial con-
cern to them and hence will not appreciabl control their con-
<\u>t. See, e. g., United ta es v. oles, 30 . upp. 99, 
102-103 (1969); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 489-494, 216 
S. E. 2d 586, 588-591 (1975). 
It should also be recalled that, in reviewing the propriety 
of the disciplinary sanction imposed on T. L. 0. by her 
school, the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, 
_ el at she Q1L no uspended from school on the basis of 
~ 
;..::------- the evidence seized from her purse';-a holding consistent with 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision on the scope of 
the Fourth Amendment in the case now under review. To 











"'-~ .__!} ~ 
'#f--t:-1---!:;.. !_ ~ . 
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sion of evidence, that result will be effected by forbidding the 
use of the fruits of their searches in school disciplinary pro-
ceedings. lt is in those proceedings th~he acceptability of 
school officials' conduct will, in effect, be ., and 1t is in 
tneou come o t ose procee mgs t at they presumably are 
most interested. As long as the Chancery Division's ruling 
on T. L. O.'s suspension continues to govern the high 
1school-and particularly if it is or becomes the general rule in New Jersey-illegal searches and seizures by school oficials will be adequately deterred. We are quite convinced that 
also excluding the evidence from juvenile-delinquency pro-
ceedings, which fall "outside the offending [officials'] zone of 
primary interest," United States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at 458, 
would roduce only marginal deterrence, insufficient to jus-
tify the cost to law-enforcement efforts. Cf., id, at 453-454; 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 493-495; United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U. S., at 350-352. 
On the other hand, if in the long run, the Chancery Divi-
sion's holding that forbids the ·use of illegally seized evidence 
in school disciplinary proceedings does not retain its author-
ity, we have substantial doubt that teachers and other offi-
cials will be appreciably restrained in the future by a decision 
that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of probative 
but illegally obtained evidence in juvenile-delinquency pro-
ceedings. In such circumstances, school authorities would 
have little reason or incentive to forgo searches insofar as the 
utility of the evidence in school disciplinary proceedings is 
concerned. It may be that a teacher would be deterred from 
searching by school rules and policies governing such 
searches, violation of which may affect the assessment of his 
performance by his superiors, or even result in charges being 
filed against him. But if the evidence is admissible in inter-l 
nal proceedings against the student, it seems unlikely that · J suppressing the evidence in juvenile-delinquency or criminal r .cu,c~() 
proceedings would produce the appreciable deterrent conse- ~~-D.J.- c._.._--
quences necessary to outweigh society's interest in sanction- ~....Jl--f/'-
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ing crimes by students that unquestionably have been ex-
posed by school officials, albeit by officials acting contrary to 
the applicable constitutional, statutory, or administrative 
rules g<'"0 l'11ino- the ~arf"~""n.f' of the tasks for which they 
have been hired. 
Assuming, as we do, that the vice-principal violated 
T. L. O.'s Fourth Amendment rights, we do not hold that 
she should not have a remed for this violation, but only that 
e is not entitled to have the evidence suppresse m er ju-
vem e- e mquency procee · ary ru e 1s de-
signeo to deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment, 
particularly infringements on the rights of the innocent who, 
without the rule, might be subjected to an unacceptable re-
gime of unjustified searches. Under the rationale of the ex-
clusionary rule as it has developed, T. L. 0. herself, about 
whom reliable evidence has come to light showing that she 
was illegally selling drugs to her classmates, has little entitle-
ment to claim that the evidence should not be used against 
her. The violation, if it occurred, has already been com-
pleted. The admission of the evidence against T. L. 0. is 
not itself a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and exclud-
ing it would be a remedy designed not to benefit her, but to 
forestall similar lawless invasions of the rights of others. 
We do not leave T. L. 0., others like her, or wholly inno-
cent persons without remedies to vindicate their Fourth 
Amendment rights. T. L. 0. soug t judicial review of her 
suspension and successfully urge that her Fourth Amend-
ment rights had been violate We assume that resort to 
the courts will continue to be available to enforce any local, 
state, or federal standards applicable to searches and sei-
zures carried out by school authorities. Public-school teach-
ers and administrators who know or should have known that 
their conduct is contrary to the Fourth Amendment will also 
be subject to liability under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and they may 
be subject to action under state law as well. We do not, 
however, discern any satisfactory predicate for excluding 
83-712-0PINION 
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from state juvenile-delinquency or criminal proceedings the 
product of in-school searches carried out by school authorities 
without participation by law-enforcement personnel. 
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On p. 10, I suggest a revision of language in 
the middle paragraph, commencing with "School officials" as 
follows: 
"School officials may search frequently 
enough to develop some understanding of the 
importance and purpose of the privacy inter-
ests protected by the Fourth Amendment. It 
cannot reasonably be expected, however, for 
them to be familiar with the application by 
the courts of the exclusionary rule. As the 
cases decided at almost every Term of this 
Court illustrate, this is not an area of the 
law in which exactitude is a characteristic. 
Local school officials properly are 
'primarily concerned with maintaining inter-
nal discipline rather than obtaining convic-
tions,' id., at 258, n. 10, and the admissi-
bility oy-evidence in a juvenile court or 
criminal proceedings is not a substantial 
concern to them and hence is not likely ap-
preciably to control their conduct." 
'· 
April 21, 1984 
83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear Byron: 
Thank you for the opportunity to take a look at 
the proposed draft of your opinion in this case. For the 
most part I think it is fine. I am troubled by much of what 
is said from the bottom of p. 10 to the end. 
The opinion properly recognizes that a school 
search may result - as this case did - in two types of Court 
proceedings: the review by the Superior Court of the sus-
pension of T.L.O. (disciplinary proceedings), and the delin-
quency prosecution in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
Court. We are concerned here only with the latter. You 
commence the analysis (p. 7) by relying on decisions that 
require a "weighing [of] the costs and benefits" of exclud-
ing illegally seized evidence obtained by a school official 
' in enforcing school disciplinary rules. As you note, the 
only cost of not applying the exclusionary rule would be the 
absence - to a limited extent - of deterrence. Or as you 
put it, applying the rule would be unlikely to result in 
"appreciable deterrence". I agree. 
What troubles me is the portion of the draft that 




seems to be that the exclusionary rule applied in a delin-
quency ca~e would have little deterring effect because 
school authorities have no respon~'bilitv for the criminal 
laws, and I aqree. But you then imply that court deterrence 
i~ necessary to orotect Fourth ~endment rights, ana i.denti-
fy with apparent approval several types of judicial action 
that would constitute deterrence of a very different kind. 
You refer to t e ruling of the Superior Court that ~.L.O. 
could not properly be suspended on the basis of the search 
of her purse, and also say: 
"We as~urne that resort to the courts till 
continue to be available to enforce anv 
local, state or f~deral stand~rds applicable 
to searches and seizures carrted out by 
school authorities. Public school teachers 
and admini!-'3trators ••• will also be subject 
to liability under ~1983, and they rnay be 
subject to action under state law as well." 
(p. 12) 
These remedies will be available, but as they are 
not involved in this case I see no reason to address them. 
The result of this portion of the opinion Cpp. 10-12), if I 
read it correctly, could be to encourage recalcitrant and 
rebellious students to resort to the courts. Here, a 14-
year-old child - whose purse was searched - was found to be 
a marijuana "pusher". Yet, the Superior Court -on T.L.O.'s 
petition - overruled the school authorities' imposition of 
an extremely light disciplinary sentence. 
I do not suggest that a 14-year-old in school has 
no Fourth Amendment rights but I do think children in the 
school environment surrender a good deal of the expectation 
of privacy we emphasize in our cases. \'lith respect to re-
• viewing disciplinary action, I think courts should be re-
quired - in applying Fourth Amendment rights - to take into 
account the uniqueness of the school environment and partie-
ularly the importance of leaving disciplinary measures pri-
mary to the school authorities. On any cost/benefit analy-
sis, as I view it, deterring Fourth Amendment violations 
weighs far less in the scales than leaving the school au-
thorities with broad discretion to enforce disciplinary 
rules that are essential to the proper operation of the 
schools. The deterring influences I mentioned in Ingraham 
v. Wright ar.e adequate. 
Every recent study of the school discipline 
problem emphasizes its seriousness. It even affects the 
recruiting of people into the teaching profession. I saw an 
article recently to the effect that the combination of low 
salaries and the problem of maintaining discipline (includ-
ing threats of violence and actual violence), have resulted 
in public school teachers being drawn in large part from 
persons who graduate in the bottom fourth of their college 
classes. They can't find jobs elsewhere. Young people re-
sent being disciplined, and they will welcome any encourage-
ment to overrule or sue their teachers. 
We can avoid getting into a debate on this issue 




Amendment in schonls is not before us. Nor is availab\lity 
of other remedies. '}:I -'< 'i-~ 
With thP one change in the paragraph tn the middle 
of page 10 that ' I suggest in my memo attached to this let-
ter, I ~o~i.ll be happy to 'join your ooini.on throuqh the second 
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On p. 10, I suggest a revision of language in 
the middle paragraph, commencing with "School officials" as 
follows: 
"Schoo] officials may search frequently 
enough to develop some understanding of the 
importance and purpose of the privacy intPr-
ests protected by the Fourth Amendment. It 
cannot reasonably be expected, however, for 
them to be fami 1 i.ar w ;_ th the appl icilt ion by 
the courts of the exclusionary rule. As the 
cases decided at almoRt every Term of thiR 
Court illustrate, this is not an araa of thP 
law in which exactitude is a ch~racteristic . 
Local school officials properly are 
'primarily concerned with maintaining inter-
nal discipline rather than obtaining convic-
tions,' id., at 258, n. 10, and the admissi-
bility oy-evidence in a juvenile court or 
criminal procPe~inqR is not a substantial 
concern to the~ and hence is not likely ap-
preciably to control their conduct." 
... r; " ... 
lfP/ss 04/23/84 NJ3 SALLY-POW 
MC~ 
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Dear Byron: 
I agree with the first nine pages of your 
opinion, and with the holding that the exclusionary rule 
does not apply in a juvenile delinquency or criminal 
proceedings for the purpose of suppressing evidence 
obtained in in-school searches. 
The only issue before us is the one you decide, 
namely, the applicability of the rule in a criminal 
proceedings. You rely properly on the unlikelihood that 
enforcement of the rule would have any substantial 
deterrent effect on school authorities. They have no 
responsiblity for enforcing the criminal law. This is 
made clear in the first nine pages of the opinion • 
2. 
From about the middle of page 10) ~& tb9 eHd o~ 
the opinion discusses the applicability of 
~~~ 
the Fourth Amendment and the exclusion of evidence in a 
.1\ 
school disciplinary} as distinguished from delinquency ~ 
proceedings. You observe that to the extent~ "school 
officials may be deterred by the exclusion of evidence, 
that result will be effected by forbidding use of the 
.___./' 
fruits of their searches in school disciplinary 
proceedings." p. 11. 
You refer to the ruling of the Superior Court 
vacating T.L.O. 's seven-day suspension as an example of 
~ ~~ ~£&--' 
the deterrenc~ that your opinion seems to approve. You 
also say: 
"We assume that resort to the courts will 
continue to be available to enforce any local, 
.· 
state or federal standards applicable to 
searches and seizures carried out by school 
authorities. Public school teachers and 
administrators • • • will also be subject to 
liability under §1983, and they may be subject 
to action under state law as well." (p. 12) 
These remedies may be available in appropriate 
3. 
cases, but as they are not involved in this case I see no 
reason to address them. I am concerned that this portion 
of the opi~ will encourage rebellious students to~ 
~ 
court review of disciplinary action 2r~to institute §1983 
suit;!Here, a 14-year-old child - whose purse was searched 
-was found to be a marijuana "pusher". Yet, the Superior 
&~::6;zzb >(Ab 
Court - on her petition - overruled the school 
authorities' imposition of an extremely light disciplinary 
sentence. I 
I do not suggest that a 14-year-old has no 
Fourth Amendment rights but I do think children in the 
4. 
school environment surrender a good deal of the ~ 
u._J-~ ~ ~,~~M~-d -' 
expectation of privac~ we em~Raoise i A ~~ ca~es. With A 
~ 
respect to reviewingl\disciplinary a~tion, il ~ink~~o ~ 
~~~ ~"-'t~~~~Cf!!!:!!:j'*i 
should be required - injappl ~~ Fourth Amendment rights - ~ 
to take into account the uniqueness of the school 
environment and particularly the importance of leaving 
disciplinary measures primary to the school authorities. 
~ On any cost/benefit analysis, as I view it, deterring 
arguable Fourth Amendment violations weighs far less in 
the scales than the importance of leaving the school 
authorities with broad discretion to enforce disciplinary 
rules that are essential - particularly in view of the 
~oblem - to the proper operation of the schools. 
" The deterring influences of parents, P.T.A.s, and the 
community (mentioned in Ingraham v. Wright) are adequate 
l • 
5. 
to prevent serious or frequent abuse of Fourth Amendment 
74.-L ~ ~~h kJ ril2.,o ~ 
rights.~ h-1-LJJ-.L~~~~L.JM ~.-/ .. ~~ 
- ---- ~--:.7 ~ .J_ ___ ~a ~ 
~'1- a--~~6 ,_n ___ 7 
In the first full paragraph on page 10 you 
~ 
A 
suggest that school officials and school boards "may and 
should have both the incentive and the means to foster • . " 
~an understanding" of federal constitutional standards. 
'•' 
As a generality, this statement is unexceptional. But the 
implication is that school officials can and should become 
familiar with the application by the courts of the 
exclusionary rule. 
~r-
I suppose such officials understand 
-'\ 
generally that searches should not be conducted in the 
~ 
absence of reasonable cause, but this is a standard that 
even judges have difficulty applying. And certainly 
school officials cannot reasonably be expected to follow 
and understand the numerous court decisions on the 
~~~8-f~·~ 
~~~~~ i.vvd-~) J 
~4'@: ?···1p;zt:. ~-vz-r~~ ~'\.~ 
~A-~A-~i-c:J <Zaas s:£ .. ..- · ~~ 
.~~~~. 0/ 
6. 
exclusionary rule. Consider, for example, the variety of 
cases involving the rule before us at this Term. 
In sum, Byron, the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule in a criminal proceeding is the only 
issue before the Court. I would find it difficult to join 
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JusTicE sYRoN R . wH ITE April 23, 1984 
No. 83-712: New Jersey v. T.L.O 
Dear Lewis, 
Thank you for your suggestions about the draft 
that I am circulating today. I am reluctant to delete 
the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 10 and 
the two following paragraphs. I think they contain the 
strongest arguments for not applying the exclusionary 
rule in T.L.O. 's juvenile court proceedings. They 
neither decide nor imply that the Chancery Decision was 
correct in holding that the exclusionary rule is 
applicable in school disciplinary proceedings. That 
question is not before us. 
I could dispense with the penultimate paragraph if l 







JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.iln:prmu <lf!tlttt "f tift ~ttittb ,iltatts 
'JluJtinghtn. ~.<!f. 20,?~~ 
April 23, 1.984 
Re: 83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear Byron: 
./ 
Although the Court has identified deterrence as 
the primary rationale for the exclusionary rule, this 
case suggests that more is at stake. we must also be 
interested in providing an appropriate judicial 
response to egregious due process violations, as well 
as a concern for the example that is set by school 
administrators. Perhaps my thoughts will not write 
out, but I shall try my hand at a dissent that does not 
confront you squarely on the deterrence rationale. 
Respectfully, 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.ilnpunu Clt411lrl ~f tlrt ~ttittb .ilhttt.tr 
-.u.fringtou. ~. <If. 2ll,?'l' 
April 23, 1984 
Re: 83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear Byron: 
Although the Court has identified deterrence as 
the primary rationale for the exclusionary rule, this 
case suggests that more is at stake. we must also be 
interested in providing an appropriate judicial 
response to egregious due process violations, as well 
as a concern for the example that is set by school 
administrators. Perhaps my thoughts will not write 
out, but I shall try my hand at a dissent that does not 
confront you squarely on the deterrence rationale. 
Respectfully, 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~tqtrtmt Qf1tttrl af t4t ~~~ ~tait.tr 
Jla.-ftingt.on, ~. Of. 2ll~'!~ 
April 23, 1984 
Re: No. 83-712 New Jersey v. T.L. O. 
Dear Byron, 




Copies to the Conference 
.. 
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83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear Byron: 
r~ioiuu, a~with the holding that the exclusionary rule 
/ 
does not apply in a juvenile delinquency or criminal 
proceedings for the purpose of suppressing evidence 
obtained in in-school searches. 
The only issue before us is the one you decide, 
namely, the applicability of the rule in a criminal 
proceeding~ You rely properly on the unlikelihood that 
enforcement of the rule wou~ ~~tantial 
WL. 
deterrent effect on school authoritiesA Jhey have no 
responsiblity for enforcing the criminal law. This is 
made clear in the first nine pages of the opinion. 
From about the middle of page 10, the opinion 
discusses the applicability of the Fourth Amendment and 
-1$1 
the exclusion of evidence under the rule in afchool 
disciplinary as distinguished from delinquency 
proceedings. You observe that to the extent "school 
officials may be deterred by the exclusion of evidence, 
that result will be effected by forbidding use of the 
fruits of their searches in school disciplinary 
proceedings." p. 11. 
You refer to the ruling of the Superior Court 
vacating T.L.O.'s seven-day suspension as an example of 
the deterrence in disciplinary cases that your opinion 
seems to approve. You also say: 
"We assume that resort to the courts will 
continue to be available to enforce any local, 
2. 
state or federal standards applicable to 
searches and seizures carried out by school 
authorities. Public school teachers and 
administrators • • • will also be subject to 
liability under §1983, and they may be subject 
to action under state law as well.n (p. 12) 
These remedies may be available in appropriate 
3. 
cases, but as they are not involved in this case I see no 
reason to address them. I am concerned that this portion 
of the opinion will encourage rebellious students to seek 
court review of disciplinary action and to institute §1983 
-- ------ - ------Here, a 14-year-old child - whose purse was 
searched -was found to be a marijuana npushern. Yet, the 
Superior Court - on her petition - found a Fourth 
Amendment violation, and overruled the school authorities' 
imposition of an extremely light disciplinary sentence. 
-----
----·~--------------------· ---
I do not suggest that a 14-year-old has no 
Fourth Amendment rights but I do think children in the 
4. 
~ ~= -.Jo ~ /'7~2> ~ ~ ~ 
tu~~ k> a..d~ .vu..~~ Wjo ~ 
~ ~ -.1-u cJ.._ ~
0
" 1-w_ c._vD-J..c..L-..Jt; ~ ~ 19~3 
school environment surrender a good deal of the ~..L> 
~~ )-J ~ ~~cL-. ~,_)- ~<.L -J.o ~ ;C,.~3 ~ 
expectation of privacy that underlies Fourth Amendment 
~ 
..reason~. 
U:~ ~ =5t'l~ 
With respect to reviewin~ school~~ 
into 
account the uniqueness environment and 
particularly the leaving disciplinary 
measures the school authorities. 
On any cost/benefit analysis, as I view it, 
~ .y-} 
\}~-\-- L..-1.-~ deterring arguable Fourth Amendment violations weighs far 
lJ-vY W'- . ~0 
~- Mr ~~ less in the scales than the importance of leaving the 
school authorities with broad discretion to enforce 
disciplinary rules that are essential - particularly in 
view of the pervasive drug problem - to the proper 
operation of the schools. The deterring influences of 
5. 
parents, P.T.A.s, and the community (mentioned in Ingraham 
v. Wright) are adequate to prevent serious or frequent 
abuse of Fourth Amendment rights. The courts have enough 
to do without overseeing every seven-day suspension of a 
teenage drug pusher. 1 
In the first full paragraph on page 10 you also 
suggest that school officials and school boards "may and 
should have both the incentive and the means to foster . . 
• an understanding" of federal constitutional standards. 
As a generality, this statement is unexceptional. But the 
implication is that school officials can and should become 
familiar with the application by the courts of the 
\ 
1where evidence of pervasive drug use exists 
in a school, I would not foreclose the right of school 
~ authorities to screen every child entering the school. We 
~ screen every person who enters the Courtroom. 
,.. 
6. 
exclusionary rule. I suppose most such officials 
understand generally that searches should not be conducted 
in the absence of reasonable cause, but this is a standard 
that even judges have difficulty applying. And certainly 
school officials cannot reasonably be expected to follow 
and understand the numerous court decisions on the 
exclusionary rule. Consider, for example, the variety of 
cases involving the rule before us at this Term. 
~ 
/ . 
In sum, Byron, the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule in a criminal proceeding is the only 
issue before the Court. I would find it difficult to join 
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83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear Byron: 
I agree with the first nine pages of your 
opinion, and with the holding that the exclusionary rule 
does not apply in a juvenile delinquency or criminal 
proceeding for the purpose of suppressing evidence 
obtained in in-school searches. 
The only issue before us is the one you decide, 
namely, the applicability of the rule in a criminal 
proceeding. You rely properly on the unlikelihood that 
enforcement of the rule would 
a.._,_, 
have .Jle substantial 
deterrent effect on school authorities .. bQeattse fuy have 
no responsiblity for enforcing the criminal law. This is 
made clear in the first nine pages of the opinion. 
Much of the subsequent discussion seems 
unnecessary. Beginning with the last paragraph on page 
10, the opinion considers of the 
exclusionary rule to roceedin s as 
distinguished from the 
here. The New Jerse Superior Court excluded on federal 
constitutional g unds the challenged evidence from the 
school disciplinary proceeding, thereby vacating T.L.O. 's 
2. 
seven-day suspension. Your note 6 states that the Court 
intimates no view as to the propriety of that decision. 
It seems to me, however, that the subsequent discussion of 
e:::... ~4#1.4-IU., 
the potential deterrent effect of such exelwo~on can be 
1\ 
read to encourage students to litigate. This is 
particularly true in view of your statement on page 12 
that "We assume that resort to the courts will continue to 
be available to enforce any federal standards 
applicable to searches and seizures carried out by school 
authorities." 
I also find c~a~y unnecessary the reference on 
page 12 to potential §1983 and unidentified state 
remedies. These remedies may be available in appropriate 
cases, but as they are not involved in this case I see no 
reason to ~ern. I am concerned that this portion 
of the opinion in particular will encourage students to 
seek court review of disciplinary action and to institute 
§1983 suits. 
I do not suggest that a 14-year-old has no 
Fourth Amendment rights, but I do think children in the 
school environment surrender a good deal of the 
expectation of privacy that underlies Fourth Amendment 
reasoning. Courts should take into account the uniqueness 
3. 
of the school environment and particularly the importance 
of leaving disciplinary measures primarily to school 
authorities. 
In sum, Byron, the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule in a criminal proceeding is the only 
issue before the Court. I therefore see little reason to 
include the portion of your opinion I identify above, and 







JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR . 
Dear Byron: 
~nm <!fmtrl nf tift ~b .itatts 
)laslrtttgbnt, ~. <If. 21l~~~ 
April 24, 1984 
83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
I agree with the first nine pages of your opinion, 
and with the holding that the exclusionary rule does not 
apply in a juvenile delinquency or criminal proceeding for 
the purpose of suppressing evidence obtained in in-school 
searches. 
The only issue before us is the one you decide, 
namely, the applicability of the rule in a criminal proceed-
ing. You rely properly on the unlikelihood that enforcement 
of the rule would have any ·substantial deterrent effect on 
school authorities. They have no responsiblity for enforc-
ing the criminal law. This is made clear in the first nine 
pages of the opinion. 
Much of the subsequent discussion seems unneces-
sary. Beginning with the last paragraph on page 10, the 
opinion considers the applicability of the exclusionary rule 
to school disciplinary proceedings as distinguished from the 
delinquency proceedings challenged here. The New Jersey 
Superior Court excluded on federal constitutional grounds 
the challenged evidence from the school disciplinary pro-
ceeding, thereby vacating T.L.O.'s seven-day suspension. 
Your note 6 states that the Court intimates no view as to 
the propriety of that decision. It seems to me, however, 
that the subsequent discussion of the potential deterrent 
effect of such a decision can be read to encourage students 
to litigate. This is particularly true in view of your 
statement on page 12 that "We assume that resort to the 
courts will continue to be available to enforce any ••• fed-
eral standards applicable to searches and seizures carried 
out by school authorities." 
I also find unnecessary the reference on page 12 to 
potential §1983 and unidentified state remedies. These rem-
edies may be available in appropriate cases, but as they are 
not involved in this case I see no reason to mention them. 
I am concerned that this portion of the opinion in particu-
lar will encourage students to seek court review of disci-
plinary action and to institute §1983 suits. 
f ! , 
2. 
I do not suggest that a 14-year-old has no Fourth 
Amendment rights, but I do think children in the school en-
vironment surrender a good deal of the expectation of priva-
cy that underlies Fourth Amendment reasoning. Courts should 
take into account the uniqueness of the school environment 
and particularly the importance of leaving disciplinary 
measures primarily to school authorities. 
In sum, Byron, the applicability of the exclusion-
ary rule in a criminal proceeding is the only issue before 
the Court. I therefore see little reason to include the 
portion of your op1n1on I identify above, and I probably 
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CHAMBERS Or 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL 
.:§u:p-rtmt C!fcu:rt cf tfrt ~tlt .:§hrltg 
'JlagJrht.gt.ctt. :!9. (!f. 21l.;J'!.;t 
April 24, 1984 
Re: No. 83-712-New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear Byron: 





cc: The Conference 
---------------- ~ 
April 24, 1984 
83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear Byron: 
I agree with the first nine pages of your opinion, 
and with the holding that the exclusionary rule does not 
apply in a juvenile delinquency or criminal proceeding for 
the purpose of suppressing evidence obtained in in-school 
searches. 
~he only issue before us is the one you decide, 
namely, the applicability of the rule in a criminal procP.ed-
ing. You rely propP.rly on the unlikeli.hood that enfor:c-=-ment 
of the rule would have any subgtantial deterrent effect on 
school authorities. They have no responsiblity for enforc-
ing the criminal law. This is made clear in the first nine 
pages of the opinion. 
Much of the subsequent discussion seems unneces-
sary. Beginning with the last paragraph on page 10, the 
opinion considers the applicability of the exclusionary rule 
to school disciplinary proceedings as distinguished from the 
delinquency proceedings challenged here. The New Jersey 
Superior Court excluded on fedP.ral constitutional grounds 
the challenged evidence from the school disciplinary pro-
ceeding, thereby vacating T.L.O.'s seven-day suspension. 
Your note 6 states that the Court intimates no view as to 
the propriety of that decision. It seems to me, however, ~\ 
that the subsequent discussion of the potential deterrent 
effect of such a decision can be read to encourage students 
to litigate. This is particularly true in view of your 
statement on page 12 that "We assume that resort to the 
courts will continue to be available to enforce any ••• fed-
eral standards applicable to searches and seizures carried 
out by school authorities.• 
I also find unnecessary the ref~rence on page 12 to 
potential §1983 and unidentified state remedies. These rem-
edies may be available in appropriate cases, but as they are 
not involved in this case I see no reason to mention them. 
I am concerned that this portion of the opinion in particu-
lar will encourage students to seek court review of disci-
plinary action and to institute Sl983 suits. 
_j 
2. 
I do not suggest that a 14-year-old has no Fourth 
Amendment rights, but I do think children in the school en-
vironment surrender a good deal of the expectation of priva-
cy that underlies Fourth Amendment reasoning. Courts should 
take into account the uniqueness of the school environment 
and particularly the importance of leaving disciplinary 
measures primarily to school authorities. 
In sum, Byron, the applicability of the exclusion-
ary rule in a criminal proceeding is the only issue before 
the Court. I therefore see little reason to include the 
portion of your opinion I identify above, and I probably 
will write s~~arately. 
Justice White 
lfp/ss 








JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.ittprtutt <!}o-urt o-f tfrt ~tb .itatts 
~hts frin-ghm. ~. <!}. 2ll.;t~ ~ 
April 30, 1984 
Re: No, 83-712 New Jersey v. T.L,G. 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely'.,/ 
Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.SttpTtntt aftturlttf tlrt Jni±~ .Sta!tg 
~~.~·Of· zn~~~ 
April 30, 1984 
Re: 83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear Lewis, 
In response to your letter of April 24, it seems 
to me that the paragraph beginning at the bottom of 
page 10 and the following paragraph are relevant and 
persuasive in negating a deterrence justification for 
applying the exclusionary rule to juvenile court or 
criminal proceedings. The paragraph following those 
two does not seem to me to be subject to the objections 
you state in your letter. These three paragraphs I 
would hope to retain. The penultim&te paragraph of the 1 
draft, however, I would be quite willing to delete. _J 
The draft was of course written against the 
background of the present law, or lack thereof, 
relating to the pertinence of the exclusionary rule to 
civil proceedings. If INS v. Lopez-Mendoza is 
announced before T.L.O. is finally acted upon by the 
Court, and if Lopez-Mendoza rules that the exclusionary 
rule never applies in civil cases, the two paragraphs 
in the T.L.O. draft discussing school disciplinary 
proceedings would be changed to reflect the newly 
announced constitutional ruling. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 





School drug tests 
Arkansas policy challenged 
Two youths met their deaths in a 
drug-related automobile accident on a 
snowy night two years ago in 
Arkadelphia, Ark. Another time, a shot-
gun blinded one of three men who were 
illegally growing marijuana. Suddenly, 
Arkadelphians knew their quiet town of 
10,000 was not immune from the hazards 
of drug and alcohol abuse. 
That's when school officials decided 
to get tough. The school board adopted 
a policy that calls for students in grades 
5 through 12 who are suspected of using 
drugs and alcohol to take breath and 
urine tests. Students who say they have 
been falsely accused can take a lie 
detector test to clear their names. 
This hardline policy and a similar one 
established last fall in nearby Hope have 
been challenged by some parents and 
the American Civil Liberties Union. 
ACLU officials, who filed a lawsuit in 
federal court in February on behalf of 
parents who challenge the Arkadelphia 
policy, maintain that the policy violates 
the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. (Patsy Ezell v. James 
Ford, 84-6033). 
"Students do have Fourth Amend-
ment rights," said Sandra Kurjiaka, 
executive director of the ACLU in Little 
Rock. "We see clear constitutional vio-
lations." The policy may also violate due 
process rights, she added. 
But school officials say they have no 
intention of violating students' rights. 
"We hope it will be a deterrent and serve 
to caution students that drugs and alco-
hol are not accepted in school," said 
Dale Franks, superintendent of the 
3, 100-student Hope district. Since the 
Hope school board approved the policy 
in November, no students have been 
asked to take the tests. Parents have 
generally been supportive. 
In the Arkadelphia district, urine and 
breath tests have been given to 16 stu-
dents since the policy began in the 
1982-83 school year, said James Ford, 
the superintendent. The results indicated 
that nine students h~d taken illegal sub-
stances. Students found to possess or 
use alcohol and drugs must withdraw 
from school for a semester and lose all 
credits, or else be expelled . Repeated 
violations bring stronger penalties. 
The police and sheriff's departments, 
the prosecuting attorney, municipal 
judge, civic organizations and parents 
36 American Bar Association 
r".o. ~ 
tilL 
"I know drugs in school are a problem ... but this is ridiculous." 
were asked for input , Ford said, and law 
enforcement officials had no problem 
with the idea. Parents are asked to sign a 
copy of the policy to show that they 
have read it and are aware of it. 
"The school attorney said ... [the 
testing] was a risk, but it depended on 
how the plan was implemented," Ford 
said. Urine samples are sent to a labora-
tory and police officers administer the 
breath tests , he added. 
"We may have to go to court," Ford 
said, "but if we're going too far, our kids 
are worth protecting." 
Clean out your lockers: Arkadelphia 
Deputy Don Nix shows Ben, a drug-
sniffing dog, to parents and students. 
is police report success in 
ld program of videotaping 
victims of child abuse: 
st a case, and no child 
the defense to testify. 
Last year v 
cases, and about 
guilty as soon as 
views . If a defend 
guilty, the tapes are 
The young victims 






m. They are 
dolls with 
ult. This 
a setting like a living 
given anatomically cor 
which to describe the a 
spares the children the trau 
traditional interrogation, 
Dowson said. 
Loren Goldman of the In 
Association of Chiefs of Po ice 
sure about another use of Vl•l' IPn,T<IT"" 
evidence in drunk driving cases, 
that some people don't look drunk 
when breath tests show high blood-a! 
hoi levels. 
Some California police departments 
have stopped the taping, in part because 
juries were confused when the tapes 
seemed to contradict breath tests. On 
the other hand, a new Texas law 
requires most counties to buy videotape 
equipment for use in drunk driving 
cases. -Sta./freport 
err 05/09/84 
May 9, 1984 
RE: No. 83-712, New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Cammie 
Here is a rough draft of a concur renee in T. L. 0. Is 
this what you had in mind? The New Jersey Superior Court's deci-
sion to apply the exclusionary rule to school disciplinary pro-
ceedings was based on federal law and thus could not be dismissed 
as merely a peculiar rule of state law. I think that the Court 
makes clear in n. 6, page 10 that it is not endorsing this deci-
sion. Thus, the Court may be criticized for discussing the issue 
only on the grounds that the discussion is unnecessary and may 
unnecessarily prejudge an issue that is not before the Court. 
As Justice White mentioned in his letter to you, if INS 
v. Lopez-Mendoza, No. 83-491 (the exclusionary rule/deportation 
hearing case), holds that the exclusionary rule is never applica-
ble to civil proceedings, the Court's opinion should be revised. 
This probably means that Justice White would eliminate the para-
graph on pp. 10-11 to which you object. This would make a con-
currence unnecessary. This assumes of course that Lopez-Mendoza 
will come down before T.L.O. 






.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
Dear Byron: 
.hprtmt Qlouri of tltt~tb .itatts 
-a\\fringhnt, ~. Of. 20'"~ 
May 15, 1984 
83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
At last, I now have had an opportunity to get back 
to this case. 
In your letter of April 10, circulated to the Con-
ference, you suggested your willingness to eliminate the 
penultimate paragraph. This helps me. I continue to think, 
however, that a good deal of what you have said on pages 10 
and 11 is unnecessary, and carries implications with which I 
would find it difficult to agree. 
Accordingly, I am circulating a brief opinion that 
concurs in your opinion with the exception of your discus-
sion of the deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary 




cc: The Conference 
•·t 
May 15, 1984 
114 ' 
' .~' !t;-tz;,._. 
83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
~ ' 
Dear Byron: ·ft 
At last, I now have had an opportunity to get back 
to this case. 
In your letter of April 10, circulated to the Con-
ference, you suggested your willingness to eliminate the 
penultimate paragraph. This helps me. I continue to think, 
however, that a good deal of what you have said on pages 10 
and 11 is unnecessary, and carries implications with which I 
would find it difficult to agree. 
Accordingly, I am circulating a brief opinion that 
c~ in your opinion with the excepti~ of your discus-
sion of the deterrent effect orapplying the exclusionary 
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.iu.prtutt <Ironri Df tlft ~b .itaftg 
~ulfinght~ ~. ar. 21lp,., 
CHAMI!!IERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Re: 83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear Byron: 
May 22, 1984 
I join. I may add a couple of words (well chosen 
of course) about turning the management of the schools 
over to the students. Then again, I may restrain myself 
to cut the flow of needless "concurs." 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
.inprtmt Qfttnrl ttf tfrt ~lt .§hdtg 
Jfa,g~ ~. (!}. 2!lc?~~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE w ... J. BRENNAN, JR. 
No. 83-712 
June 4, 1984~ 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear John, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
,u;trtmt <qnrt Df titt ~~~ ,bdt.tr 
JIR#lfington. ~. <q. 20~,.~ 
June 11, 1984 
No. 83-712 New Jersey v. T. L. o. 
Dear Byron, 
As you know, at Conference I had indicated I 
thought the exclusionary rule was applicable to the evidence 
in this case. I am still of that view. I will not be 
joining John's dissent and will try to circulate something 
separately as promptly as possible. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.§upt".ttttt Q}LTU:rl d tfrt ~ittb ;§fattg 
'~lbtgitUtghtn. ~. <!}. 2.0~)1.~ 
June 12, 1984 
Re: 83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear Sandra: 




Copies to the Conference 
I 
;§upr.-nu <!Jourt ttf Ur.-~~;§taUs 
'masfringfttn:. ~. <!J. 2llgi'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 12, 1984 
Re: No. 83-712-New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear John: 




cc: The Conference 
,. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
;§u.prtmt <!fcutt cf tqt 1J!nittb j)taftg 
~ttillfht.gion. tJJ. <!f. 20,?'!$ 
Memorandum to the Conference 
Re: No. 83-712, New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
June 13, · 1994 
My vote is the last one out in this difficult case. 
This is of no consequence, however, because the several 
opinions cite Leon, Sheppard, and Lopez-Mandoza, which are 
not yet out. 
It looks as though none of the circulating opinions 
will command a Court. Sandra correctly points out that the 
difficulty with the case is that New Jersey has not chal-
lenged its Supreme Court's ruling that the search here was 
unreasonable. Thus, the case comes to us in a disjointed 
posture. 
After some soul-searching, I have concluded to vote to 
DIG the case. I realize that this is not the usual DIG 
situation when, after oral argument, the case appears in a 
different light. It seems to me, however, that our dispo-
sition otherwise will tend only to confuse and not to as-
sist. 





.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.ilt:pftmt <lfonrt .n tift )tnittb .ita.tt# 
Jlu~ ~. Of. 21lbf'l~ 
June 14, 1984 
Re: 83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear Harry, 
My circulating draft in this case expresses the 
conference vote, but without your join, it will not 
fly. You suggest a DIG and there are 4 votes to 
affirm. I suggest that in the light of Leon, neither 
disposition is the preferable one and that the case 
should be held for Leon and then GVR'D. 
The trial court in this case admitted the evidence 
after canvassing the disparate decisions around the 
country with respect to the applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment to school officials. There was no 
authoritative New Jersey precedent until the New Jersey 
Supreme Court's decision in this case, and I have 
substantial doubt that the school official should have 
known that his conduct was in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. The state did not challenge the holding of 
a Fourth Amendment violation, but it does contend that 
the evidence is nevertheless admissible. Leon has a 
direct bearing on that issue and I doubt that the case 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
~lt.Vl"tlltt Qlltltd d tltt 'Jnittb ~bdt,e' 
:.auJrUtgt.on. ~. <q. 21lc?'!~ 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
June 26, 1984 
No. 83-712 New Jersey v. T. L. o. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
After conferring with Byron, the proposed order 
for reargument in this case is set forth below: 
"This case is restored to the calendar 
for reargument. In addition to the question 
presented in the petition for writ of 
certiorari and previously briefed and argued, 
the parties a re requested to address the 
following quest ion: 
Did the assistant principal violate the 
Fourth Amendment in opening 
respondent's purse in the facts and 
circumstances of this case?" 
Your suggestions are welcome. 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
~u:prtntt <!fond of tqt ~t~ ~taftg 
'mae-fringtrn. IB. <!f. 2ll~J!.~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 29, 1984 
Re: No. 83-712. - New Jersey v~ T.L.O. 
Dear John: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
cJJt1 . . 
T.M. 
Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
1-' ~r ... 
> 
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.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
~mtt (!}curl of flrt~~ ~talt.s­
~as~~. Q}. 2ll&f~~ 
July 2, 1984 
No. 83-712 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear John, 
Please add me to your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
./ .. 
··c I j ,_--.: 1 i 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
/_ 
CHAMI!I£RS 0,.. 
~ttpTtmt <lfltltrl of tltt 'Jnittb ~tafts 
'JTulfinghtn. ~. <!f. 21lp'!~ 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
/ 
July 2, 1984 
Re: 83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Dear John: 
I am puzzled by your June 29 draft "dissent" supplanting your 
dissent of June 14. 
Are you really dissenting against the Court's vote to reargue 
this case? 
Will that forever foreclose you from voting to reargue a case? 
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-To: Mr. Justice Powell September 25, 1984 
From: Lee 
No. 83-712, State of New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Did the assistant principal violate the Fourth Amendment in 
opening T.L.O. 's purse in the facts and circumstances of this 
case? 
BACKGROUND 
I. Factual Background 
,, ... 
2. 
On the morning of March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway 
High School entered the girls' restroom and found T.L.O., a 
fourteen-year-old, and another g ir 1 holding lighted cigarettes. 
Because school regulations prohibited smoking in the restrooms, 
the teacher took the two girls to the principal's office. 
Theodore Choplick, the assistant principal, asked the two girls 
whether they had been smoking. T.L.O.'s companion admitted that 
she had been smoking, and Choplick assigned her to a three-day 
clinic. T.L.O., however, denied the teacher's allegations. In 
fact, T.L.O. claimed that she did not smoke at all. 
Following T.L.O. 's denial of guilt, she accompanied 
Choplick into his office. Inside the office, Choplick asked to 
see T.L.O.'s purse, and she gave it to him. When the assistant 
principal opened the purse, a package of Marlboro cigarettes was 
visible. Choplick took the cigarettes out of the purse, and 
said, "You lied to me." After the cigarettes were removed from 
the purse, Choplick could see a package of rolling papers. 
Because Choplick knew that the rolling papers probably were used 
for smoking marijuana, he decided to search the purse and to 
examine all of its contents . Inside the purse, the assitant ........__ ___ _ 
principal found marijuana, a metal pipe, written documentation of 
T.L.O.'s sale of marijuana to other students, and forty dollars 
in cash. 
Choplick immediately called T.L.O. ·~ mother and the --
police. T.L.O. was then taken to police headquarters for --
questioning. The fourteen-year-old admitted to the police that 
she had been selling mari 'uana at school, receiving $1.00 per 
... 
3. 
"joint." She stated that she had sold about twenty joints 
shortly before she was discovered smoking in the rest room. 
T.L.O. wasv charged with possession of marijuana with 
the intent to distribute it, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§24:21-19(a) (1) and 24:21-20(a) (4). At her trial, T.L.O. moved 
to suppress the evidence taken from her purse, claiming that it 
,-.... 
had been seized in violation of her fourth amendment rights. The 
fourteen year old student also contended that her confession was ----
inadmissible because it was "tainted" by the unconstitutional 
-------------------------- ------ ~---------' 
search and seizure. --------
II. The Dec~· ions Below 
I 
Th Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for Middlesex 
County, New Jersey, denied T.L.O. 's motion to suppress. The 
juvenile court stated that a search by a teacher, if it is based 
upon "reasonable suspicion," does not violate a student's fourth 
amendment rights. Choplick had "reasonable cause" to believe 
that T.L.O. had been smoking in violation of school rules, and 
therefore was justified in opening her purse to look for 
cigarettes. The rolling papers, which were in "plain view" 
following the removal of the cigarettes, gave the assistant 
principal reasonable cause to continue his search of the purse. 
Following the denial of the suppression motion, T.L.O. 
was tried and found to be a delinquent. She was sentenced to ----- ---------------------------probation for one year, with the special conditions that she 
observe a reasonale curfew, attend school regularly, and 
successfully complete a drug therapy program. 
' . 
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The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New '~ 
Jersey affirmed the denial of T.L.O. 's motion to suppress. The ~ 
case was remanded to the trial court, however, 
~ 
for further 
~ :; .. , I 
determine proceedings. The juvenile court was instructed to 
I~ 
whether T.L.O. had knowingly waived her Miranda rights. ~·' 
T.L.O. appealed the denial of her suppression motion to 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The state supreme court 
reversed, holding that the assistant principal had seized the 
evidence in violation of T.L.O. 's fourth amendment rights. The 
"probable cause" standard is inappropriate for school searches ..__---....._ 
when the teacher is not acting in concert with police officers. 
A school official therefore may conduct a search whenever he has 
"reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence 
of illegal activity or activity that would interfere with school 
discipline." The state supreme court found, however, that 
• . f Choplick did not ~e "reasonable grounds" for searching the 
~purse. According to the majority, Choplick had, at best, a "good 
~ hunch" that the purse contained cigarettes. Therefore, T.L.O. 's 
~ 
1
1r fourth amendment rights were violated when the assistant 
~r· ipal opened her purse to search for cigarettes • 
..: The state supreme court held that because the evidence 
~- d been seized in violation of T.L.O. 's fourth amendment rights, 
1t should have been excluded at trial pursuant to Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 u.s. 643 (1961). The court stated that it was necessary to 
suppress the evidence in order to deter future violations of 
students' fourth amendment rights. According to the majority, it 
was "of little comfort" to T.L.O. that the evidence had been 
5. 
seized by a school administrator rather than a law enforcement 
officer. Therefore, the court ordered the exclusion of the 
illegally seized evidence from any future proceedings against 
T.L.O. in juvenile court. 
Judge Schreiber dissented from the court's holding that 
T.L.O. 's fourth amendment rights had been violated. He stated 
that he did not know whether the majority's "reasonable grounds 
to believe" standard differed from the "reasonable suspicion" 
standard. If there was a functional difference, the dissenting 
judge preferred the "reasonable suspicion" standard, for it has 
been "applied by the Supreme Court." In any event, Judge 
Schreiber found that the search was proper under either test. 
On October 7, 1983, the State of New Jersey filed a 
petition for certiorari with this Court. The state did not seek 
review of the finding that T.L.O. 's fourth amendment rights 
been violated. Instead, the state challenged only 
applicability of the exclusionary rule to searches conducted by 
------------------------ -school officials. The Court granted cert., and the case was 
argued on March 28, 1984. On July 5, 1984, the Court restored 
the case to the calender for reargument. The Court's order 
stated that the parties were to brief and argue the following the 
question: "Did the assistant principal violate the Fourth 
Amendment in opening respondent's purse in the facts and 




I. The Applicability of the Fourth Amendment to Searches by 
Teachers 
The state contends that the fourth amendment does not 
apply to searches by teachers and school officials. The Framers 
clearly intended for the amendment to apply only to 
investigations conducted by law enforcement officers. A teacher 
or school official has no greater responsibility for the 
detection of penal law violations than does an ordinary citizen. 
A school search is ordinarily conducted solely to protect the 
health of the students and to facilitate discipline. Therefore, 
according to the state, the fourth amendment should not apply to 
searches by school officials such as Choplick, at least when they 
are not acting in cooperation with the police. 
The state's argument might have some force if the Court 
were writing on a clean slate. In the past, however, the Court 
consistently has refused to limit the applicability of the fourth 
A.. ~ - ......,________ 
'L '-' amendment to law enforcement officers. In Camara v. Municipal 
Court of San Francisco, 387 u.s. 523 (1967), the Court held that 
the fourth amendment provides protection against warrantless 
searches b~ous~~~i~~ Subsequently the Court held that 
the fourth amendment applies to searches by ~uilding inspectors ] 
See v. Seattle, 387 u.s. 541 (1967), lOSHA inspectors J Marshall v. 
Barlow's, Inc., 436 u.s. 307 (1978), and l firefi~_hters 
v. Tyler, 436 u.s. 499 (1978). 
the contrary in the briefs, Hudson v. 
(1984), did not hold the fourth inapplicable to 
searches by prison guards. The 
'< 
7. 
prisoner does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
ce11. 1 
The state further argues that the fourth amendment has 
no applicability to searches conducted in the schools. This 
argument must fail, however, for the Court has recognized that 
constitutional rights at the T~ 
---------------- -students do not "shed their schoolhouse -:ate. '~nker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, 393 u.s. 503 (1969). In Tinker, three students 
were suspended because they wore black armbands to protest u.s. 
involvement in Viet Nam. Because there was no showing that the 
forbidden conduct would "materially and substantially interfere 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline," the 
that the suspensions violated the students' first amendment 
rights. Similarly, in~oss v. Lopez, 419 u.s. 565 (1975), the 
Court held that the Due Process Clause protected students from 
school disciplinary action without notice and a hearing. The 
Court noted that the "informal give and take" required by the 
fourteenth amendment would not unduly interfere with discipline 
in the schools. It would not "materially and substantially 
interfere with the the requirements of appropriate discipline" to 
hold that the fourth amendment applies to school searches, at 
least to some extent. Therefore, as in Tinker and Goss, there is 
no reason to deprive schoolchildren of their constitutional right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 2 
1The fourth amendment still applies to searches that implicate 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages. 
8. 
There are at least two other reasons why this Court 
should hold that the fourth amendment applies to school searches, 
at least to some extent. First, there are a number of reported 
decisions documenting extreme invasions of schoolchildren's 
privacy. In Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977}, 
for example, an entire fifth grade class was strip-searched after 
one student told the teacher that three dollars were missing from 
his coat pocket. The fourth amendment probably should be 
interpreted so as to prohibit school officials from conducting 
such outrageous searches. Furthermore, this Court has recognized 
161---r 
~~ 1 that if students are denied all constitutional protections, they 
~· may "discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes." West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 
319 u.s. 624 (1943}. 
In summary, the fourth amendment should apply to school 
searches, at least to some extent. 
~ --------------~ 
II. The Proper Standard: Probable Cause or Reasonable Suspicion 
"legitimate" privacy interests, such as body cavity searches. 
2The eighth amendment's prohibition of cru~and unusal 
punishment does not apply to the schools. Ingraham v. Wright, 
430 u.s. 651 (1977}. This does not suggest, however, that the 
fourth amendment should have no applicability to school searches. 
The eighth amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted." The Ingraham Court noted that bail, 
fines, and punishment traditionally have been associated with the 
criminal process. Therefore, the Court was unwilling to extend 
the eighth amendment beyond the criminal context. The fourth 
amendment contains no such limiting language, as it protects all 
"people" from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
9. 
Ordinarily, a search or seizure is "unreasonable" within 
the meaning of the fourth amendment, in the absence of "probable 
cause." In a number of cases, however, the Court has balanced 
the public interest against the individual's right to personal 
sec5_!,ty, and concluded that a lesser standard is appropriate. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1 (1969), for example, the Court held 
that when a policeman has "reason to believe" that he is dealing 
with an armed and dangerous individual, he may conduct a limited 
"pat-down" search for weapons. Similarly, in United States v. 
~gnoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 873 (1975), the Court found that if a 
border patrolman has a "reasonable suspicion" that a car contains 
illegal aliens, he may stop the car and ask a few questions of 
its occupants. 
In deciding whether a school search may be justified on 
the basis of "reasonable suspicion," the Court must examine the 
"public need" for a departure from the "probable cause" standard. 
It appears that there is a substantial need for a lower standard 
in the schools. In each month of 1978, approximately two and a 
half million students had their personal property stolen, and 
about 300,000 others were physically attacked. NIE, U.S. Dept. 
of Education, 1 Violent Schools-Safe Schools: The Safe School 
Study Report to the Congress iii, 74-75 (1978). Moreover, there 
is a well-documented drug problem in the public schools, and many 
teachers have a difficult time maintaining order in the 
classroom. Teachers and school officials will find it much 
easier to maintain order in the classroom, and to protect the 
students from drugs and violence, if they are able to conduct 
10. 
searches on the basis of "reasonable suspicion." Therefore, 
there appears to be a substantial public need for a standard less 
demanding than "probable cause." 
The application of the "reasonable suspicion" standard 
to school searches cannot be justified soley on the basis of 
public need. The Court must balance this public need against the 
"individual's right to personal security." United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. at 878. In this case, unlike others 
where the Court has found that a departure from probable cause 
was warranted, there are substantial privacy interests at stake. 3 
In Terry, the Court approved of a limited "pat-down" search for 
weapons. Similarly, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 
873 (1975), the Court stressed that the intrusion involved was 
"modest." The border patrolmen were not allowed to search the 
vehicle or its occupants, and the visual inspection was limited 
to those parts of the vehicle that could be seen by anyone 
standing alongside. Therefore, it would be virtually 
unprecedented to allow a full search 4 on the basis of 
3A five-year-old public kindergarten student might not have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in his person or effects. I 
find it difficult to believe, however, that a fourteen-year-old, 
such as T.L.O., does not have an expectation of privacy in her 
person and effects, that society is willing to recognize as 
reasonable. See Katz v. United States, 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
4There are at least two situations in which full searches of a 
person are allowed, even in the absence of "reasonable 
suspicion." Anyone may be searched as he crosses the border, and 
a person may be searched immediately following his arrest. The 
.Jborder search exception" has been justified as necessary to our 
~"national self-protection." Carrol v. United States, 267 u.s. 
132 (1925). The "search incident to arrest" exception is needed 




"reasonable suspicion." 5 
Although the balancing mandated by Terry and Brignoni-
Ponce is inconclusive, it appears that a departure from the 
probable cause standard is justified in the case of school 
searches. There is a "commonality of interest" between the 
public school teacher and the student. Goss v. Lopez, 419 u.s. 
565, 593 (1975) (Powell,J., dissenting). Because the relationship 
is "rarely adversary in nature," schoolchildren do not need the 
same protection from arbitrary and intrusive searches that the 
fourth amendment usually provides. Moreover, the "openness of 
the public school and its supervision by the community afford 
significant safeguards against" 
LA"""~~. 
students. ·;\~re, this Court 
unreasonable searches of 
probably should hold that a 
teacher may search his student on the basis of "reasonable 
suspicion." 6 
III. Was the Search of T.L.O. 's Purse Based Upon "Reasonable 
Suspicion"? 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the assistant 
to protect the arresting officer and to avoid the destruction of 
contraband. See United States v. Robinson, 414 u.s. 218 (1973). 
5Noone has suggested that strip searches should be allowed on 
the basis of "reasonable suspicion." 
6The majority of federal and state courts to consider the issue ~~ 
have held that a teacher may search a student in the absence of 
probable cause. These courts have required that the teacher h~ve 
"reasonable cause" or "reasonable suspicion." See, e.g., Horton 
v. Goose Creek Ind. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 103 s.ct. 3536 (1983). 
12. 
principal had no more than a "good hunch" that cigarettes were in 
T.L.O. 's purse. It is clear, however, that Choplick's decision ~ 
to open the purse was justified by "reasonable suspicion." a.,.c.J~ 
1..-<.... 7 
Choplick was "aware of specific articulable facts, together with • 
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant[ed] 
suspicion" that cigarettes were in the purse. See United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 873, 884 (1975). The state court's 
suggestion that the cigarettes "had no direct bearing on the 
infraction" is ridiculous. T.L.O. had denied that she smoked at 
all, and the assistant principal was testing her credibility. 
The fourth amendment clearly does not prohibit a search for 
probative evidence, simply because it is not dispostive. 
Given that the assistant principal's decision to open 
the purse was reasonable, his "seizure" of the cigarettes did not 
violate T.L.O. 's fourth amendment rights. Although the 
possession of cigarettes was not prohibited by school rules, a 
teacher had seen T.L.O. smoking in a non-designated area. 
Therefore, confiscation of the cigarettes was justified. Once 
the cigarettes were removed, the rolling papers were in plain 
view. The rolling papers gave Choplick "reason to believe" that 
there might be marijuana and drug paraphernalia in the purse. 
Hence, the remainder of the assistant principal's search was 
justified under the "reasonable suspicion" standard. 
SUMMARY 
Although the fourth amendment should apply to school 
searches, there are reasons for departing from the probable cause 
requirement in this setting. The public schools are open 
• !,;'. 
13. 
institutions, and there is a "commonality of interest" between 
students and teachers. Therefore, school officials should be 
allowed to search students on the basis of "reasonable 
suspicion." Choplick had a "reasonable suspicion" that T.L.O. 's 
purse contained evidence that she had violated a school rule. 






Like the dissenting justice, I am unable to determin
whether the state supreme court intended to apply the "reasonablec;t ~~/" 
suspicion" standard. The parties and the amicii all appear to 44 
assume that there is no difference between "reasonable grounds to 
believe," the standard applied by the state court, and 
"reasonable suspicion." I think it possible, however, that the 
court intended to adopt a standard that is somewhere between 
"reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause." Therefore, this 
Court could hold that the state court: (1) used the proper 
standard, but misapplied it to the facts of the case; or (2) used 
an improper standard. -------
. , ' 
lfp/ss 09/27/84 NJ SALLY-POW 
83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
This memo records reactions after reading Lee 
Bentley's helpful bench memo of September 25. 
None of the cases cited in support of a Fourth 
Amendment right in the school house for elementary and 
high school students is more than marginally relevant. 
Three categories of cases are cited. 
Administrative Searches. Camara v. 
Municipal Court involved searches by housing officials. 
See v. Seattle (searches by building inspectors). 
Marshall v. Barlow (OSHA inspectors). Michigan v. Tyler 
(fire inspectors interested in ascertaining whether there 
was arson) • 
In each of these cases there were searches of 
buildings by government inspectors seeking to ascertain 
whether laws were being violated. The duty of these 
officials was to "inspect" (i.e. search). 
2. First Amendment. Tinker v. DeMoines upheld 
First Amendment right to wear black arm bands in the 
absence of any showing that this would 





3. Other School Cases. Goss v. Lopez involved 
tl'-
only procedural due process claim to notice and some sort 
/\ 
of hearing prior to suspension. Ingraham v. Wright, on 
the other hand, declined to apply the Eighth Amendment to 
the use of physical punishment to maintain discipline in a 
school. Of all the cases, Ingraham is the most relevant. 
* * * 
School Environment 
This is unique in many respects. Unlike the 
"administrative search" cases, only immature children are 
involved. The problem of maintaining order and discipline 
in our schools is abundantly documented in the SG's brief. 
It simply cannot be compared with the situation in any of 
the cases cited in Lee's memorandum. The educational 
purpose of schools in our country often is frustrated by 
the absence of discipline and of means to enforce 
legitimate school rules. The physical well being of 
pupils and teachers, as well as their personal belongings, 
are constantly in jeopardy where adequate means to 
maintain discipline do not exist. It is unrealistic also 
to compare the capability of 
judgments required ~ trained 
teachers to make 




Fourth Amendment requirements. Although the Fourth 
Amendment, by its terms, is not limited to the criminal ----
law, its origin and history make clear that this was its --basic purpose. History surely teaches that no one would 
have thought at the time of the Constitution that the 
Fourth Amendment was being adopted to protect immature 
children in the classroom. 
The difficulty of drawing lines - particularly 
to meet exigent circumstances - between "probable cause", 
"reasonable grounds", and "reasonable suspicion" is 
~-~-~. --tc...,.-~_ 
In my view, theA t....Q.acher Ahad illustrated by this case. 
probable cause, as respondent was caught in the act of 
smoking by a teacher in violation of school rules and lied 
about it. What else would a teacher have to know to be 
justified in searching a 14-year-old 's purse? The 
Juvenile Court held that the assistant principal "had 
reasonable cause" to search the purse. Inexplicably, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed that "probable cause 
need not be shown for school searches", agreed with the 
Juvenile Court that "reasonable grounds" for a search is 
the appropriate standard, but concluded no such grounds 
existed in this case! 
* * * 
4. 
I can agree that the Fourth Amendment protects 
children in school from wholly unreasonable searches. 
Rather than create a new standard, perhaps "reasonable 
suspicion" should be adopted but making clear that 
teachers and school officials are not trained (and really 
cannot be adequately trained) to make the distinctions 
that prove so difficult even 41::- lawyers and judges. 
Therefore, application of the standard should be less 
stringent where reasonable lay minds could differ as to 
whether the suspicion that prompted a search was 
reasonable. Moreover, we should make clear that 
reasonable school rules and regulation may specific 
circumstances in which searches lawfully may be made. For 
example, I would have no doubt that metal detectors - such 
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TO: Justice Powell 
FRO : Lee 
RE: New Jerse v. T.L.O., the applicability of the exclusionary 
~-~ to j~~nil_~-- ~:~~-~~uency proceedings { ~  
~~~~~) 
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the state supreme court held 
~that T.L.O. 's purse had been searched in violation of her fourth 
amendment rights, an~hat the evidence that had been seized 
should have been excluded from her trial in juvenile court. The 
state did not challenge the court's holding that T.L.O.'s fourth 
amendment rights had been violated. Instead, the state asked 
this Court to consider only whether the exclusionary rule barred 
the use in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence that has 
been illegally obtained by a school teacher. The Court granted 
cert. on this issue, and it was argu~d on March 28, 1984. 
At the conference, the Court split 5-4 on the 
applicability of the exclusionary rule. You, CJ, BRW, HAB, and 
WHR voted to reverse, holding that the exclusionary rule did not 
apply in this context. WJB, TM, JPS, and SO'C voted to reverse. 
Justice White was assigned to write the majority opinion, and 
Justice Stevens was to write the dissent. 
Justice White's majority opinion was circulated, and ~ 
he was joined by CJ and WHR. Justice White assumed that T.L.O. 's 
·---= . -:-~----
fourth amendment rights had been violated by the assistant 
principal's search. Nevertheless, he stated that the 
------------
exclusionary rule should not bar the illegally seized evidence 
~-----~------~--~--~------------~ 
from juvenile delinquency proceedings. Deterrence is the 
"primary, if not the only" justification for suppressing the 
fruits of illegal searches and seizures. Justice White argued 
that the application of the exclusionary rule in this context 
would not deter teachers from conducting illegal searches. 
Teachers have a strong interest in enforcing school rules, and in 
keeping drugs and weapons out of the classroom. In contrast, few 
teachers have an interest in the criminal justice system. 
Therefore, applying the exclusionary rule to juvenile delinquency 
proceedings would not have "behavioral effects" upon teachers. 
Justice White went on to add that the New Jersey courts 
had held that illegally seized evidence should be excluded from 
h ~~ 
school disciplinary proceedings. He thought that this ruling ___________, 
would deter teachers from violating the fourth amendment rights 
of schoolchildren, for teachers do have a strong interest in such 
internal proceedings. He also pointed 
rights were violated could bring §1983 
teachers. 
out that students whose J ~. 
actions against their 
You asked Justice White to remove the discussion about 
school disciplinary proceedings from his opinion. Although he 
did not state that the exclusionary rule necessarily should be 
applied in this context, he certainly implied that it should. 
There was no reason to reach the issue in this case. Justice 
-------------------------------------------------~ 
White, however, refused to delete this discussion from his 
opinion. You also asked Justice White to remove the reference to 
the availability of §1983 actions. Although he agreed to remove 
this language from the ·opinion, he subsequently circulated drafts 
containing this objectionable language. 
You joined most of BRW's opinion, but in a short 
concurrence you pointed out that it was unnecessary to discuss 
the applicability of the exclusionary rule to school disciplinary 
proceedings. You also pointed out that "it was unrealistic to 
extend the subtleties of the Fourth Amendment to t~i school 
classroom." 
Justice Stevens dissent was short and unpersuasive. He 
argued that there was no reason to believe that teachers would 
not be deterred by the application of the exclusionary rule to 
proceedings in juvenile court. Moreover, the exlcusionary rule 
should be applied in this context, so as to let students know 
that "our society attaches serious consequences to violations of 
constitutional rights." WJB and TM joined this dissent. Justice 
O'Connor filed a separate dissent in which she stated that there 
was no reason to depart from ~ v. Ohio in this context. Rhe 
pointed out that in no other case had the Court held that 
illegally seized evidence could be introduced in the state's 
case-in-chief. JPS joined her separate dissent. 
'--- -- -----·----... 
HAB refused to join Justice White's opinion. He was 
troubled ~~ the state's failure to challenge the finding of a 
fourth amendment violation. He thought the case should be 
DIG'ed. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-712 
NEW JERSEY, PETITIONER v. T. L. 0. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI , TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
NEW JERSEY 
[April -, 1984] 
JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents a question concerning the admissibility 
in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence illegally ob-
tained in an in-school search by a public-school official. Be-
cause that official was engaged in enforcing a school disciplin-
ary rule and was not acting with the participation of law 
enforcement authorities, we hold that the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the 
evidence he obtained. 
I 
On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in 
Middlesex County, N.J., observed 14-year-old T. L. 0. and 
another student smoking cigarettes in the girls' lavatory in 
violation of school regulations. The teacher escorted the 
girls to the vice-principal's office and accused them of violat-
ing the regulation prohibiting smoking in lavatories. In re-
sponse to the vice-principal's questions, T. L. O.'s companion 
admitted the infraction and was assigned to a three-day 
smoking clinic. T. L. 0., however, denied smoking in the 
lavatory and declared that she "didn't smoke at all." 
1 The vice-principal took T. L. 0. to a private office, closed 
the door, and requested her purse. He opened the purse 
and observed a package of cigarettes plainly visible. Saying 
that T. L. 0. had lied to him, he reached into the purse to 
remove the cigarettes and saw rolling papers, which in his 
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experience indicated that marihuana was probably involved. 
He then looked further into the purse and discovered mari-
huana, marihuana paraphernalia, a number of one-dollar 
bills. ;:~ nd index cards and papers containing language clearly 
indicating drug dealing by T. L. 0. 
The vice-principal _notified T. L. O.'s parents. He also · 
summoned the police and gave them the marihuana and para-
phernalia. In her mother's presence at police headquarters, 
T. L. 0. was advised of her rights and admitted to selling 
marihuana in school. T. L. 0. was suspended from school 
for three days for smoking cigarettes in a nonsmoking area 
and seven days for possessing marihuana. On T. L. O.'s mo-
ti0n in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, the latter sus-
pension was set aside on the ground that the suspension re-
sulted from evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. [T. L. 0.] v. Piscataway Board of Education, 
No. C.2865-79 (Super. Ct. N.J., Ch. Div., Mar. 31, 1980). 
The validity of that judgment is not before us. 
T. L. 0. was also charged in the Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court, Middlesex County, with delinquency based 
on possession of marihuana with the intent to distribute. 
N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:4-44; 24:21-19(a)(1); 24:21-20(a)(4) 
(West Supp. 1983). T. L. 0. moved to suppress the physical 
evidence obtained in the search of her purse; she also sought 
suppression of her confession on the ground that it was 
tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. The juvenile court 
denied T. L. O.'s motion to suppress. State in Interest of 
T. L. 0., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 428 A. 2d 1327 (1980). The 
court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to school 
searches, but declared that 
"a school official may properly conduct a search of a stu-
dent's person if the official has a reasonable suspicion 
that a crime has been or is in the process of being com-
mitted, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is 
necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school 
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policies." Id., at 341, 428 A. 2d, at 1333 (emphasis in. 
original). 
Applying this standard, the court c .. ~:.Idl...: the:.., ~h-- ...... c · 
principal had reasonable cause to believe that T. L. 0. had 
violated the school's smoking regulations. Once he had 
opened the purse, the-court held, its contents were subject to 
the plain-view doctrine; having found marihuana and para-
phernalia, the vice-principal justifiably continued his search 
to determine the extent ofT. L. O.'s criminal activity. I d., 
at 343, 428 A. 2d, at 1334. 
A divided Appellate Division affirmed the denial of 
T. L. O.'s suppression motion with respect to the contents of 
the purse on the basis of the Juvenile Court's opinion, but va-
cated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for fur-
ther proceedings to determine whether T. L. 0. had know-
ingly waived her constitutional rights before confessing . . 
State in Interest ofT. L. 0., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A. 2d 
493 (1982) (per curiam). The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
reversed the Appellate Division's judgment and directed that 
the physical evidence be suppressed. State in Interest of 
T. L. 0., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934 (1983). In response to 
the contention that the exclusionary rule, which was applied 
to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), should 
not govern searches by school officials since its primary pur-
pose is to deter violations of constitutional rights by law en-
forcement officials, the Supreme Court of New Jersey de-
clared that "the issue is settled by the decisions of the 
[United States] Supreme Court" and "accept[ed] the proposi-
tion that if an official search violates constitutional rights, the 
evidence is not admissible in criminal proceedings." 94 
N.J., at 341, 463 A. 2d, at 939 (footnote omitted). 1 
1 Although the court indicated that "[o]ur code of Juvenile Justice but-
tresses this conclusion," 94 N.J., at 342, n. 5, 463 A. 2d, at 939, n. 5, we 
agree with the State that the decision below concerning the admissibility of 
illegally obtained evidence in juvenile delinquency proceedings does not 
rest on adequate and independent state grounds. It bears mentioning 
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey then held that school 
officials could conduct warrantless searches without violating 
the Fourth . A rnendment~ 3.nd t.h3.t., iP the absence of police 
participation, such searches should be assessed under a 
standard less stringent than probable cause. Like the Juve-
nile Court, the Supre!Jle Court was 
"satisfied that when a school official has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of 
illegal activity or activity that would interfere with 
school discipline and order, the school official has the 
right to conduct a reasonable search for such evidence." 
Id., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 941-942. 
The court concluded, with two justices dissenting, that the 
vice-principal's search could not pass muster under this 
standard. The contents of the purse had no direct bearing 
on T. L. O.'s infraction since mere possession of cigarettes 
did not violate the school's rules, and a desire to gather evi-
dence to impeach T. L. O.'s credibility could not justify the 
search. In any event, the vice-principal had no reasonable 
grounds to believe that T. L. O.'s purse contained cigarettes, 
but rather was acting on, "at best, a good hunch." I d. at 
347, 463 A. 2d, at 942. 
We granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certio-
rari. 464 U. S. -- (1983). State and federal courts have 
disagreed on whether the Fourth Amendment applies to in-
school searches and seizures by public-school officials and 
teachers. 2 For present purposes, however, the State does 
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied T. L. O.'s motion-filed 
after this Court had granted a writ of certiorari-for clarification of its de-
cision to make clear that it was based on state law. State in Interest of 
T. L. 0., M~22 Q"an 17, 1984). 
2 State and federal courts have struggled to accommodate the interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment and the interest of the States in pro-
viding a safe environment conducive to education in the public schools. 
Some courts have resolved the tension between these interests by giving 
full force to one or the other side of the balance. Thus, in a number of 
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not contest the holding that the Fourth Amendment protects 
students like T. L. 0. from being unreasonably searched by 
school principals or teachers, the standard of reason;:~bleneR!'l. 
cases it has been held that school officials conducting in-school searches of 
students are private parties acting in loco parentis who are not subject to · 
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., D. R. C. v. State, 
646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982); In reG., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. 
Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 
(1969); People v. Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (1970); 
R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450 
S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). See also State v. Kappes, 26 Ariz. 
App. 567, 550 P. 2d 121 (1976) (student advisers in dormitory search); State 
v. Wingerd, 40 Ohio App. 2d 236, 318 N. E. 2d 866 (1974) (same); State v. 
Keadle, 277 S. E . 2d 456 (N.C. App. 1981) (same). At least one court has 
held, on the other hand, that the Fourth Amendment applies in full to in-
school searches by school officials and that a search conducted without 
probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.), 
vacated, 423 U. S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976), and 
others have made clear that the probable-cause standard applies where 
there is police involvement, seeM. v. Board of Education Ball-Chatham 
Community Unit School District No. 5, 429 F . Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill. 
1977); Picha v. Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976); State 
v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S. E. 2d 586, 594 (1975), or where the 
search is highly intrusive. SeeM. M. v. Anker, 607 F. 2d 588, 589 (CA2 
1979). Other courts have struck the balance by holding that the Fourth 
Amendment applies, but that the exclusionary rule developed to remedy 
violations of the Amendment does not. See, e. g., State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. 
App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976); State v. Young, supra. See also United 
States v. Coles, 302 F . Supp. 99 (Me. 1969) (exclusionary rule would not 
deter search by administrative officer at Job Corps Center). 
The applicability of the exclusionary rule, however, has been discussed 
in very few of the cases, for most courts that have considered challenges by 
students to in-school searches or seizures by school officials have held that 
the officials' activity did not violate the Fourth Amendment. But see In re 
J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); People v. D., 34 N.Y. 
2d 483, 358 N. Y.S. 2d 403, 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974). These courts have 
rejected the view that school officials conducting in-school searches act as 
private individuals to which the Fourth Amendment does not apply. 
E. g., Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 690 F. 2d 470, 
480 (CA51982); Jones v. Latexo Independent School District, 499 F. Supp. 
223, 229 (ED Tex. 1980); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F . Supp. 47, 51 (NDNY 
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against which the state court held that school officials' con-
duct is to be judged, or the state court's conclusion that 
T. L. O.'s purse had been Rearcherl contranr t0 thP. Fourth 
Amendment. The sole q·..t~!:"cion prese:nte<! Ly che petition is 
whether the exclusionary rule should be applied so as to bar 
the use in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence that · 
has been illegally seized by a school teacher without the par-
ticipation of law enforcement officers. The State submits 
that the rule should not apply in such circumstances. We 
agree with this submission and reverse the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 3 
1977); Picha v. Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1217-1218 (ND Ill. 1976); State 
v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976); People v. Ward, 62 
Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N. M. 827, 540 P. 
2d 827 (App. 1975); State v. Walker, 19 Or. App. 420, 528 P. 2d 113 (1974). 
But they typically have held that school officials may act without a war-
rant, e. g., Bilbrey v. Brown, 481 F. Supp. 26, 27-28 (Or. 1979); In reG., 
11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970), and have relaxed the stand-
ard of suspicion necessary to justify in-school searches by school officials 
acting without the participation of law enforcement officials. E. g., Hor-
ton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, supra; Stern v. New Ha-
ven Community Schools, 529 F. Supp. 31 (ED Mich. 1981); Jones v. Latexo 
Independent School District, supra; Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 
(ND Ind. 1979); Bellnier v. Lund, supra; In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 
Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino, 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); 
State v. Young, supra; In re J. A., supra; People v. Ward, supra; People 
v. D., supra; State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P. 2d 781 (1977); In 
re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979). In assessing the 
reasonableness of searches and seizures by school officials, the courts have 
looked to such factors as: (1) whether the officials acted alone or in concert 
with the police; (2) whether the search was undertaken to promote school 
discipline or to facilitate criminal prosecution; (3) the nature and extent of 
the search; (4) the child's age and disciplinary record; (5) the seriousness of 
the problem to which the search was addressed; (6) whether the official 
acted under exigent circumstances; and (7) the probative value and reliabil-
ity of the evidence on the basis of which the search was undertaken. See 
e. g., Bellnier v. Lund, supra; Doe v. State, supra; People v. D., supra; In 
re L. L., supra; Schiff, The Emergence of Student Rights to Privacy 
Under the Fourth Amendment, 34 Baylor L. Rev. 209, 213 (1982). 
3 In United States v. Leon, -- U. S. -- (1984), and Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, -- U. S. -- (1984), we held that the exclusionary rule 
83-712-0PINION 
NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0 . 7 
II 
Since the Fourth Amendment "has never been interpreted 
to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all 
prvcetJings or agai:.Jst all persons," Stone v. Powell, 428 
U. S. 465, 486 (1976), the State's concession that the vice-
principal's search of _T. L. O.'s purse violated the Fourth -
Amendment only begins the inquiry in this case. We have 
repeatedly stressed that the Constitution itself does not re-
quire the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, United States v. Leon,-- U.S.--, 
-- (1984), and have emphasized that whether the judicially 
created exclusionary rule is appropriately applied in a par-
ticular case or class of cases is "an issue separate and apart 
from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of 
the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police 
conduct." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. --, -- (1983). 
The remedial question before us in this case, our decisions 
make clear, must be resolved by weighing the costs and bene-
fits of excluding from juvenile delinquency proceedings evi-
dence illegally obtained by a school official who sought to en-
force school disciplinary rules and who acted without the 
participation of law enforcement authorities. See United 
States v. Leon, supra, at --; United States v. Calandra, 
414 U. S. 338, 347-352 (1974). The primary, if not the only, 
justification for suppressing the fruits of illegal searches and 
seizures is the belief that the imposition of that severe rem-
edy will reduce the incentive to violate the Fourth Amend-
ment and deter future illegality. United States v. Leon, 
supra, at--; Stone v. Powell, supra, at 486; United States 
should not be applied where, judged objectively, it cannot be said that offi-
cers should have known that they were violating the Fourth Amendment. 
Here, as stated in the text, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the 
vice-principal had "no reasonable grounds" to believe that T. L. O. 's purse 
contained cigarettes. Hence, there is no occasion to vacate the judgment 
of the New Jersey court and remand the case for reconsideration in light of 
Leon and Sheppard. 
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v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 446 (1976). Accordingly, in light of 
the "substantial cost [imposed] on the societal interest in law 
enforcement by . . . [excluding] . . . what <'""'"~de~ly i"" 
relevant evidence," id., at 448-449, we have restricted "the 
application of the [exclusionary] rule ... to those areas 
where its remedial obiectives are thought most efficaciously 
served." United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. Fur-
thermore, in determining the applicability of the exclusionary 
rule, we must be convinced that an appreciable deterrent ef-
fect has been shown. Speculative benefits do not warrant 
the "strong medicine" of the exclusionary rule. United 
States v. Janis, supra, at 453; United States v. Calandra, 
supra, at 351-352. 
On the strength of this balancing test, we have held that 
the exclusionary rule does not apply in certain types of judi-
cial proceedings, see United States v. Janis, supra; United 
States v. Calandra, supra,4 and does not prevent all possible 
uses of illegally obtained evidence in proceedings to which it 
is generally applicable. See, e. g., United States v. Havens, 
446 U. S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 
(1964). We also have concluded that the rule constitutes an 
inappropriate remedy for certain types of objectively reason-
able errors by law enforcement officers. United States v. 
Leon, supra; Massachusetts v. Sheppard, -- U. S. --
(1984). 
We have not had occasion to consider the applicability of 
this approach to evidence obtained in unlawful searches or 
seizures conducted by state or federal governmental employ-
ees who do not work for law enforcement agencies and whose 
• Although this Court has never addressed the question whether the ex-
clusionary rule applies in juvenile delinquency proceedings and we need 
not do so to resolve this case, state courts that have considered the issue 
have consistently held that the rule is applicable. E. g., In re K., 24 Cal. 
3d 395, 595 P. 2d 105, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 973 (1979); In re J . A., 85 Ill. 
App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); State v. Doe, 93 N. M. 143, 597 P. 2d 
1183 (App. 1979); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 
1979). 
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functions do not fall within the realm of law enforcement. 
We are now confronted with such a case: assuming that there 
has been a Fourth Am,,r1ment vi"l~ti(l"'--hP"a'Ise the case 
comes to us in that posture-the question is whether the evi-
dence seized from T. L. 0. by the vice-principal may be used 
against T. L. 0. in her juvenile delinquency proceedings. In 
making this determination, there is no reason to depart from 
the general principles that have emerged in cases decided 
over more than a decade. Guided by these principles, we 
conclude that applying the exclusionary rule, in the context 
of juvenile delinquency or criminal proceedings, to exclude 
the fruits of in-school searches and seizures, made without 
the participation of law enforcement officers, 5 is unlikely to 
"result in appreciable deterrence ... [and that] ... its use in 
the instant situation is unwarranted." United States v. 
Janis, supra, at 454. 
It goes without saying that a duty to exercise care in pro-
moting the health and physical development of students and 
to maintain order and discipline is inextricably tied to a 
school's mission to educate. Although, as they were in this 
case, school authorities may be required to report to the po-
lice what they perceive to be violations of the state or local 
criminal law, these officials cannot generally be classified as 
law-enforcement authorities. The unique relationship be-
tween schools and students gives rise to concerns that are 
largely unrelated to desires to obtain criminal convictions or 
adjudications of delinquency. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 
U. S. 309, 322-323 (1971). In-school searches ordinarily fur-
ther purposes or interests entirely separate and distinct from 
those served by the criminal-justice system; prohibiting the 
5 There is no evidence in this record that the vice-principal searched 
T. L. O.'s purse at the behest of or in cooperation with law enforcement 
authorities. The latter's participation in this case began only after the sei-
zure had been made. The State agrees that suppression would be appro-
priate if a school official had acted as an agent of the police. Brief for 
Petitioner 16-17. 
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use in the criminal-justice system of evidence obtained in 
such searches may well have none of the behavioral effects on 
~ithP-~ schnnl l)ff\f'i:> ls or school boards that exclusion of ille-
gally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions generally is 
thought to have on the typical law enforcement official. 
Whether viewed from the perspective of individual school 
officials or of school boards, "[t]he enforcement of school 
regulations, the safeguarding of students during school hours 
through confiscation of weapons and other contraband, and 
the maintenance of a drug-free learning environment provide 
substantial incentives to search that would no ess by 
suppression of evidence at a subseque delin uency o-
ceeding." D. R. C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 2 2 25 a App. 
1982). School officials may search frequently enough to de-
velop an understandin of state and federal constitutional 
standards, and school boar s may and should have both the 
incentive and the means to foster such an understanding. 
But a persuasive case can be made for the proposition that 
local school officials are "primarily concerned with maintain-
ing internal discipline rather than obtaining convictions," id., 
at 258, n. 10, and that the admissibility of the evidence in a 
juvenile delinquency or criminal proceeding is not a substan-
tial concern o em an ence W1 no appreciably control 
their conduct. See, e. g., United States v. Coles, 302 F. 
Supp. 99, 102-103 (1969); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 
489-494, 216 S. E. 2d 586, 588--591 (1975). 
It sho d-als recalled that, in reviewing the propriety 
of the disciplinar sanction imposed on T. L. 0. by her 
school, w Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, 
held that she could not suspended from school on the basis of 
the evidence seized from her purse, a holding consistent with 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision on the scope of 
the Fourth Amendment in the case now under review. 6 To 
6 We emphasize that the propriety of that decision is not before us in this 
case and that our opinion is not intended to intimate any view concerning 
whether the exclusionary rule applies in school disciplinary proceedings. 
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the extent that school officials may be deterred by the exclu-
sion of evidence, that result will be effected by forbidding the 
use of the fruits of their searches in E"hfln1 di~dplh,~:p~r Il'""-
ceedings. It is in those proceedings that the acceptdl.>ility of 
school officials' conduct will, in effect, be judged, and it is in 
the outcome of those proceedings that they presumably are 
most interested. As long as the Chancery Division's ruling 
on T. L. O.'s suspension continues to govern the high 
school-and particularly if it is or becomes the general rule in 
New Jersey-illegal searches and seizures by school oficials 
will be adequately deterred. We are quite convinced that 
also excluding the evidence from juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings, which fall "outside the offending [officials'] zone of 
primary interest," United States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at 458, 
would produce only marginal deterrence, insufficient to jus-
tify the cost to law enforcement efforts. Cf. id., at 453-454; 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 493-495; United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U. S., at 350-352. 
On the other hand, if in the long run, the Chancery Divi-
sion's holding that forbids the use of illegally seized evidence 
in school disciplinary proceedings does not retain its author-
~. we have substantial doubt that teacliers and other offi-
cials will be appreciably restrained in the future by a decision 
that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of probative 
but illegally obtained evidence in juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings. In such circumstances, school authorities would 
have little reason or incentive to f0rgo searches insofar as the 
utility of the evidence in school disciplinary proceedings is 
concerned. It may be that a teacher would be deterred from 
searching by school rules and policies governing such 
searches, violation of which may affect the assessment of his 
performance by his superiors, or even result in charges being 
filed against him. But if the evidence is admissible in inter-
nal proceedings against the student, it seems unlikely that 
suppressing the evidence in juvenile delinquency or criminal 
proceedings would produce the appreciable deterrent conse-
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quences necessary to outweigh society's interest in sanction-
ing crimes by students that unquestionably have been ex-
posed by s~ho0l offici3J<;, , albeit b~' 0~cials acting contrary to 
the applicalJ:e constitutional, statutory, or administrative 
rules governing the performance of the tasks for which they 
have been hired. 
Assuming, as we do, that the vice-principal violated 
T. L. O.'s Fourth Amendment rights, we do not hold that 
she should not have a remedy for this violation, but only that 
she is not entitled to have the evidence suppressed in her ju-
venile delinquency proceeding. The exclusionary rule is de-
signed to deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment, 
particularly infringements on the rights of the innocent who, 
without the rule, might be subjected to an unacceptable re-
gime of unjustified searches. Under the rationale of the ex-
clusionary rule as it has developed, T. L. 0. herself, about 
whom reliable evidence has come to light showing that she 
was illegally selling drugs to her classmates, has little entitle-
ment to claim that the evidence should not be used against 
her. The violation, if it occurred, has already been com-
pleted. The admission of the evidence against T. L. 0. is 
not itself a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and exclud-
ing it would be a remedy designed not to benefit her, but to 
forestall similar lawless invasions of the rights of others. 
We do not leave T. L. 0., others like her, or wholly inno-
cent persons without remedies to vindicate their Fourth 
Amendment rights. T. L. 0. sought judicial review of her 
suspension and successfully urged that her Fourth Amend-
ment rights had been violated. We assume that resort to l 
the courts will continue to be available to enforce any local, 
state, or federal standards applicable to searches and sei-
zures carried out by school authorities. Public-school teach-
ers and administrators who know or should have known that 
their conduct is contrary to the Fourth Amendment will ~ 
be subject to liability under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and they may 
be subject to action under state law as well. We do not, 
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however, discern any satisfactory predicate for excluding 
from state juvenile delin uency or criminal proceedings the 
product of in-schoo searches carne ou y sc oo authorities 
w\ho1 ~ r- ...... iicipation by law enforcement personnel. 
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JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents a question concerning the admissibility 
in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence illegally ob-
tained in an in-school search by a public-school official. Be-
cause that official was engaged in enforcing a school disciplin-
ary rule and was not acting with the participation of law 
enforcement authorities, we hold that the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the 
evidence he obtained. 
I 
On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in 
Middlesex County, N. J., observed 14-year-old T. L. 0. and 
another student smoking cigarettes in the girls' lavatory in 
violation of school regulations. The teacher escorted the 
girls to the vice-principal's office and accused them of violat-
ing the regulation prohibiting smoking in lavatories. In re-
sponse to the vice-principal's questions, T. L. O.'s companion 
admitted the infraction and was assigned to a three-day 
smoking clinic. T. L. 0., however, denied smoking in the 
lavatory and declared that she "didn't smoke at all." 
The vice-principal took T. L. 0. to a private office, closed 
the door, and requested her purse. He opened the purse 
and observed a package of cigarettes plainly visible. Saying 
that T. L. 0. had lied to him, he reached into the purse to 
remove the cigarettes and saw rolling papers, which in his 
experience indicated that marihuana was probably involved. 
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He then looked further into the purse and discovered mari-
huana, marihuana paraphernalia, a number of one-dollar 
bills, and index cards and papers containing language clearly 
indicating drug dealing by T. L. 0. 
The vice-principal notified T. L. O.'s parents. He also 
summoned the police and gave them the marihuana and para-
phernalia. In her mother's presence at police headquarters, 
T. L. 0. was advised of her rights and admitted to selling 
marihuana in school. T. L. 0. was suspended from school 
for three days for smoking cigarettes in a nonsmoking area 
and seven days for possessing marihuana. On T. L. O.'s mo-
tion in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, the latter sus-
pension was set aside on the ground that the suspension re-
sulted from evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. [T. L. 0.] v. Piscataway Board of Education, 
No. C.2865-79 (Super. Ct. N. J., Ch. Div., Mar. 31, 1980). 
The validity of that judgment is not before us. 
T. L. 0. was also charged in the Juvenile and Domestic Re-
lations Court, Middlesex County, with delinquency based on 
possession of marihuana with the intent to distribute. N. J. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:4-44; 24:21-19(a)(1); 24:21-20(a)(4) (West 
Supp. 1983). T. L. 0 . moved to suppress the physical evi-
dence obtained in the search of her purse; she also sought 
suppression of her confession on the ground that it was 
tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. The juvenile court 
denied T. L. O.'s motion to suppress. State in Interest of 
T. L. 0., 178 N. J. Super. 329, 428 A. 2d 1327 (1980). The 
court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to school 
searches, but declared that 
"a school official may properly conduct a search of a stu-
dent's person if the official has a reasonable suspicion 
that a crime has been or is in the process of being com-
mitted, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is 
necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school 
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policies." !d., at 341, 428 A. 2d, at 1333 (emphasis in 
original). 
Applying this standard, the court concluded that the vice-
principal had reasonable cause to believe that T. L. 0. had 
violated the school's smoking regulations. Once he had 
opened the purse, the court held, its contents were subject to 
the plain-view doctrine; having found marihuana and para-
phernalia, the vice-principal justifiably continued his search 
to determine the extent ofT. L. O.'s criminal activity. !d., 
at 343, 428 A. 2d, at 1334. 
A divided Appellate Division affirmed the denial of 
T. L. O.'s suppression motion with respect to the contents of 
the purse on the basis of the Juvenile Court's opinion, but va-
cated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for fur-
ther proceedings to determine whether T. L. 0. had know-
ingly waived her constitutional rights before confessing. 
State in Interest ofT. L. 0., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A. 2d 
493 (1982) (per curiam). The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
reversed the Appellate Division's judgment and directed that 
the physical evidence be suppressed. State in Interest of 
T. L. 0., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934 (1983). In response to 
the contention that the exclusionary rule, which was applied 
to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), should 
not govern searches by school officials since its primary pur-
pose is to deter violations of constitutional rights by law en-
forcement officials, the Supreme Court of New Jersey de-
clared that "the issue is settled by the decisions of the 
[United States] Supreme Court" and "accept[ed] the proposi-
tion that if an official search violates constitutional rights, the 
evidence is not admissible in criminal proceedings." 94 
N. J., at 341, 463 A. 2d, at 939 (footnote omitted). 1 
1 Although the court indicated that "[o]ur code of Juvenile Justice but-
tresses this conclusion," 94 N. J., at 342, n. 5, 463 A. 2d, at 939, n. 5, we 
agree with the State that the decision below concerning the admissibility of 
illegally obtained evidence in juvenile delinquency proceedings does not 
rest on adequate and independent state grounds. It bears mentioning 
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey then held that school 
officials could conduct warrantless searches without violating 
the Fourth Amendment, and that, in the absence of police 
participation, such searches should be assessed under a 
standard less stringent than probable cause. Like the Juve-
nile Court, the Supreme Court was 
"satisfied that when a school official has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of 
illegal activity or activity that would interfere with 
school discipline and order, the school official has the 
right to conduct a reasonable search for such evidence." 
Id., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 941-942. 
The court concluded, with two justices dissenting, that the 
vice-principal's search could not pass muster under this 
standard. The contents of the purse had no direct bearing 
on T. L. O.'s infraction since mere possession of cigarettes 
did not violate the school's rules, and a desire to gather evi-
dence to impeach T. L. O.'s credibility could not justify the 
search. In any event, the vice-principal had no reasonable 
grounds to believe that T. L. O.'s purse contained cigarettes, 
but rather was acting on, "at best, a good hunch." I d., at 
347, 463 A. 2d, at 942. 
We granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certio-
rari. 464 U. S. -- (1983). State and federal courts have 
disagreed on whether the Fourth Amendment applies to in-
school searches and seizures by public-school officials and 
teachers. 2 For present purposes, however, the State does 
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied T. L. O.'s motion-filed 
after this Court had granted a writ of certiorari-for clarification of its de-
cision to make clear that it was based on state law. State in Interest of 
T. L. 0., M-422 (Jan. 17, 1984). 
2 State and federal courts have struggled to accommodate the interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment and the interest of the States in pro-
viding a safe environment conducive to education in the public schools. 
Some courts have resolved the tension between these interests by giving 
full force to one or the other side of the balance. Thus, in a number of 
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not contest the holding that the Fourth Amendment protects 
students like T. L. 0. from being unreasonably searched by 
school principals or teachers, the standard of reasonableness 
cases it has been held that school officials conducting in-school searches of 
students are private parties acting in loco parentis who are not subject to 
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., D. R. C. v. State, 
646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982); In reG., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. 
Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 
(1969); People v. Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (1970); 
R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450 
S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). See also State v. Kappes, 26 Ariz. 
App. 567, 550 P. 2d 121 (1976) (student advisers in dormitory search); State 
v. Wingerd, 40 Ohio App. 2d 236, 318 N. E. 2d 866 (1974) (same); State v. 
Keadle, 277 S. E. 2d 456 (N. C. App. 1981) (same). At least one court has 
held, on the other hand, that the Fourth Amendment applies in full to in-
school searches by school officials and that a search conducted without 
probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.), 
vacated, 423 U. S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976), and 
others have made clear that the probable-cause standard applies where 
there is police involvement, seeM. v. Board of Education Ball-Chatham 
Community Unit School District No . 5, 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill. 
1977); Picha v. Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976); State 
v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S. E. 2d 586, 594 (1975), or where the 
search is highly intrusive. SeeM. M. v. Anker, 607 F. 2d 588, 589 (CA2 
1979). Other courts have struck the balance by holding that the Fourth 
Amendment applies, but that the exclusionary rule developed to remedy 
violations of the Amendment does not. See, e. g., State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. 
App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976); State v. Young, supra. See also United 
States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (Me. 1969) (exclusionary rule would not 
deter search by administrative officer at Job Corps Center). 
The applicability of the exclusionary rule, however, has been discussed 
in very few of the cases, for most courts that have considered challenges by 
students to in-school searches or seizures by school officials have held that 
the officials' activity did not violate the Fourth Amendment. But see In re 
J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); People v. D., 34 N. Y. 
2d 483, 358 N. Y. S. 2d 403, 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974). These courts have 
rejected the view that school officials conducting in-school searches act as 
private individuals to which the Fourth Amendment does not apply. 
E . g., Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 690 F. 2d 470, 
480 (CA5 1982); Jones v. Latexo Independent School District, 499 F. Supp. 
223, 229 (ED Tex. 1980); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F . Supp. 47, 51 (NDNY 
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against which the state court held that school officials' con-
duct is to be judged, or the state court's conclusion that 
T. L. O.'s purse had been searched contrary to the Fourth 
Amendment. The sole question presented by the petition is 
whether the exclusionary rule should be applied so as to bar 
the use in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence that 
has been illegally seized by a school official without the par-
ticipation of law enforcement officers. The State submits 
that the rule should not apply in such circumstances. We 
1977); Picha v. Wilgos, supra, at 1217-1218; State v. Lamb, supra; People 
v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N. M. 
827, 540 P. 2d 827 (App. 1975); State v. Walker, 19 Or. App. 420, 528 P. 2d 
113 (1974). But they typically have held that school officials may act with-
out a warrant, e. g., Bilbrey v. Brown, 481 F. Supp. 26, 27-28 (Or. 1979); 
In reG., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970), and have relaxed 
the standard of suspicion necessary to justify in-school searches by school 
officials acting without the participation of law enforcement officials. 
E. g., Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, supra; Stern v. 
New Haven Community Schools, 529 F. Supp. 31 (ED Mich. 1981); Jones 
v. Latexo Independent School District, supra; Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. 
Supp. 1012 (ND Ind. 1979, aff'd in part and remanded in part, 631 F. 2d 91 
(CA5 1980), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 1022 (1981)); Bellnier v. Lund, supra; 
In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino, 
282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); State v. Young, supra; In re J. A., supra; 
People v. Ward, supra; People v. D., supra; State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 
2d 75, 558 P. 2d 781 (1977); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 
(App. 1979). In assessing the reasonableness of searches and seizures by 
school officials, the courts have looked to such factors as: (1) whether the 
officials acted alone or in concert with the police; (2) whether the search 
was undertaken to promote school discipline or to facilitate criminal pros-
ecution; (3) the nature and extent of the search; (4) the child's age and disci-
plinary record; (5) the seriousness of the problem to which the search was 
addressed; (6) whether the official acted under exigent circumstances; and 
(7) the probative value and reliability of the evidence on the basis of which 
the search was undertaken. See e. g., Bellnier v. Lund, supra; Doe v. 
State, supra; People v. D., supra; In re L. L., supra; Schiff, The Emer-
gence of Student Rights to Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 34 
Baylor L. Rev. 209, 213 (1982). 
00 In United States v. Leon,-- U. S. -- (1984), and Massachusetts v. 
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agree with this submission and reverse the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 3 
II 
Since the Fourth Amendment "has never been interpreted 
to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all 
proceedings or against all persons," Stone v. Powell, 428 
U. S. 465, 486 (1976), the State's concession that the vice-
principal's search of T. L. O.'s purse violated the Fourth 
Amendment only begins the inquiry in this case. We have 
repeatedly stressed that the Constitution itself does not re-
quire the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, United States v. Leon, -- U. S. --, 
-- (1984), and have emphasized that whether the judicially 
created exclusionary rule is appropriately applied in a par-
ticular case or class of cases is "an issue separate and apart 
from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of 
the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police 
conduct." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. --, -- (1983). 
The remedial question before us in this case, our decisions 
make clear, must be resolved by weighing the costs and bene-
fits of excluding from juvenile delinquency proceedings evi-
dence illegally obtained by a school official who sought to en-
force school disciplinary rules and who acted without the 
participation of law enforcement authorities. See United 
States v. Leon, supra, at --; United States v. Calandra, 
414 U. S. 338, 347-352 (1974). The primary, if not the only, 
justification for suppressing the fruits of illegal searches and 
Sheppard, - U. S. - (1984), we held that the exclusionary rule 
should not be applied where, judged objectively, it cannot be said that offi-
cers should have known that they were violating the Fourth Amendment. 
Here, as stated in the text, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the 
vice-principal had "no reasonable grounds" to believe that T. L. O.'s purse 
contained cigarettes. Hence, there is no occasion to vacate the judgment 
of the New Jersey court and remand the case for reconsideration in light of 
Leon and Sheppard. 
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seizures is the belief that the imposition of that severe rem-
edy will reduce the incentive to violate the Fourth Amend-
ment and deter future illegality. United States v. Leon, 
supra, at --; Stone v. Powell, supra, at 486; United States 
v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 446 (1976). Accordingly, in light of 
the "substantial cost [imposed] on the societal interest in law 
enforcement by ... [excluding] ... what concededly is 
relevant evidence," id., at 448-449, we have restricted "the 
application of the [exclusionary] rule ... to those areas 
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
served." United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. Fur-
thermore, in determining the applicability of the exclusionary 
rule, we must be convinced that an appreciable deterrent ef-
fect has been shown. Speculative benefits do not warrant 
the "strong medicine" of the exclusionary rule. United 
States v. Janis, supra, at 453; United States v. Calandra, 
supra, at 351-352. 
On the strength of this balancing test, we have held that 
the exclusionary rule does not apply in certain types of judi-
cial proceedings, see United States v. Janis, supra; United 
States v. Calandra, supra, 4 does not render per se admissi-
ble all evidence that came to light through a chain of causa-
tion beginning with an illegal search or arrest, see, e. g., 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 (1978); Brown v. Il-
linois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975), and does not prevent all possible 
uses of illegally obtained evidence in proceedings to which it 
is generally applicable. See, e. g., United States v. Havens, 
446 U. S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 
(1964). We also have concluded that the rule constitutes an 
• Although this Court has never addressed the question whether the ex-
clusionary rule applies in juvenile delinquency proceedings and we need 
not do so to resolve this case, state courts that have considered the issue 
have consistently held that the rule is applicable. E. g., In re K., 24 Cal. 
3d 395, 595 P. 2d 105, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 973 (1979); In re J. A., 85 Ill. 
App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); State v. Doe, 93 N. M. 143, 597 P. 2d 
1183 (App. 1979); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 
1979). 
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inappropriate remedy for certain types of objectively reason-
able errors by law enforcement officers. United States v. 
Leon, supra; Massachusetts v. Sheppard, -- U.S. --
(1984). 
We have not had occasion to consider the applicability of 
this approach to evidence obtained in unlawful searches or 
seizures conducted by state or federal governmental employ-
ees who do not work for law enforcement agencies and whose 
funct"ons do noC a within the ream o aw enforcement. 
we are now confronted with such a case: assu!ning that there 
has been a Fourth Amendment violation-because the case 
comes to us in that posture-the question is whether the evi- 7l-<. /~ 
dence seized from T. L. 0. by the vice-principal may be used L-1 
against T. L. 0. in her juvenile <(lelinq_uenc;y- proceedings. In 
making this determination, there is no reason to depart from 
the general principles that have emerged in cases decided 
over more than a decade. Guided by these principles, we 
conclude that ap lying the exclusiona rule, in the context 
of juveru e e nquency or criminal proceedings, to exclude 
the fruits of in-school searches and seizures, made wit out 
the pa 1c1pa 1on of aw e orcemen officers, 5 is unlikely to 
"result in appreciable deterrence ... [and that] ... its use in 
the instant-si ua ion Is unwarranted." United States v. 
Janis, supra, at 454. 
It goes without saying that a duty to exercise care in pro-
moting the health and physical development of students and 
to maintain order and discipline is inextricably tied to a 
school's mission to educate. Although, as they were in this 
case, school authorities may be required to report to the po-
lice what they perceive to be violations of the state or local 
5 There is no evidence in this record that the vice-principal searched 
T. L. O.'s purse at the behest of or in cooperation with law enforcement 
authorities. The latter's participation in this case began only after the sei-
zure had been made. The State agrees that suppression would be appro-
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criminal law, these officials cannot generally be classified as t 
law enforcement authorities. The unique relationship be-
tween schools and students gives rise to concerns that are 
largely unrelated to desires to obtain criminal convictions or 
adjudications of delinquency. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 
U. S. 309, 322-323 (1971). In-school searches ordinarily fur-
ther purposes or interests entirely separate and 1stinct om 
those serve y the ~Ice s stem; prohibiting the 
use m Ehe crimmal-justice system of evidence obtained in 
such searches may well have none of the behavioral effects on 
either school officials or school boards that exclusion of ille-
gally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions generally is 
thought to have on the typical law enforcement official. 
Whether viewed from the perspective of individual school 
officials or of school boards, "[t]he enforcement of school 
regulations, the safeguarding of students during school hours 
through confiscation of weapons and other contraband, and 
the maintenance of a drug-free learning environment provide 
substantial incentives to search that would not be lessened by 
suppression of evidence at a subsequent delinquency pro-
ceeding." D. R. C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 252, 258 (Alaska App. 
1982). School officials may search frequently enough to de-
velop an understanding of state and federal constitutional 
standards, and school boards may and should have both the 
incentive and the means to foster such an understanding. 
But a persuasive case can be made for the proposition that 
local school officials are "primarily concerned with maintain-
ing internal discipline rather than obtaining convictions," id., n 
at 258, n. 10, and that the admissibility of the evidence in a 
juvenile delinquency or criminal proceeding is not a substan-
tial concern to them and hence will not appreciably control 
their conduct. See, e. g., United States v. Coles, 302 F. 
Supp. 99, 102-103 (1969); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 
489-494, 216 S. E. 2d 586, 588-591 (1975). 6 
• The dissenters would prefer that the effectiveness of the exclusionary 1 
rule as a deterrent be determined by empirical evidence. At bottom, how-
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It should also be recalled that, in reviewing the propriety 
of the disciplinary sanction imposed on T. L. 0. by her school, 
the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, held that 
she could not suspended from school on the basis of the evi-
dence seized from her purse, a holding consistent with the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision on the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment in the case now under review. 7 To the 
extent that school officials may be deterred by the exclusion 
of evidence, that result will be effected by forbidding the use 
of the fruits of their searc es in school disc1p nary proceed-
----~=-----------~------
ever, the Court's faith in the exclusionary rule has been grounded not so 
much on empirical evidence, which is flawed and inconclusive, see United 
States v. Janis, supra, at 452, n. 22, as on an informed judgment concern-
ing the rule's behavioral effects. "[T]his Court has opted for exclusion in 
the anticipation that that law enforcement officials would be deterred from 
violating Fourth Amendment rights. Then, as now, the Court acted in the 
absence of convincing empirical evidence and relied, instead, on its own as-
sumptions of human nature and the interrelationship of the various compo-
nents of the law enforcement system." !d., at 459 (emphasis added). Un-
like the dissenters, we are aware of no ersuasive reason for concluding 
that the relevant jud ent should not vary epending on the identit du-
ties, an res ons1 1 1es of the overnmen a o c1a w o conducted the 
search in question. Just as "common sense dictates that the deterrent ef-
fect of the exclusion of relevant evidence is highly attenuated when the 
'punishment' imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement officer is 
the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or against a different sov-
ereign," id., at 457-458, common se se and reasoned analysis suggest that 
the benefits of the exclusionary rule do no ou we g 1 cos s 1 cases like 
this one. Tlie subs antfai pi'tor jUatc~al expefience With searches and sei-
zures undertaken by public-school officials provides, in our view, an ade-
quate basis for concluding that, whether or not evidence that public-school 
officials obtain illegally from students in in-school searches is admissible in 
a school's internal disciplinary proceedings, the roles and duties of these 
officials are such that excluding the fruits of their illegal actions in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings will have no appreciable deterrent effect in the 
absence of police instigation or involvement. 
7 We emphasize that the propriety of that decision is not before us in 
this case and that our opinion is not intended to intimate any view concern-
ing whether the exclusionary rule applies in school disciplinary 
proceedings. 
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ings. It is in those proceedings that the acceptability of 
school officials' conduct will, in effect, be judged, and it is in 
the outcome of those proceedings that they presumably are 
most interested. As long as the Chancery Division's ruling 
on T. L. O.'s suspension continues to govern the high 
school-and particularly if it is or becomes the general rule in 
New Jersey-illegal searches and seizures by school officials 
will be adequately deterred. We are quite convinced that 
also excluding the evidence from juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings, which fall "outside the offending [officials'] zone of 
primary interest," United States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at 458, 
would produce only marginal deterrence, insufficient to jus-
tify the cost to law enforcement efforts. Cf. id., at 453-454; 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 493-495; United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U. S., at 350-352. 
On the other hand, if in the long run, the Chancery Divi-
sion's holding that forbids the use of illegally seized evidence 
in school disciplinary proceedings does not retain its author-
ity, we have substantial doubt that teachers and other offi-
cials will be appreciably restrained in the future by a decision 
that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of probative 
but illegally obtained evidence in juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings. In such circumstances, school authorities w~mld 
have little reason or incentive to forgo searches insofar as the 
utility of the evidence in school disciplinary proceedings is 
concerned. It may be that a teacher would be deterred from 
searching by school rules and policies governing such 
searches, violation of which may affect the assessment of his 
performance by his superiors, or even result in charges being 
filed against him. But if the evidence is admissible in inter-
nal proceedings against the student, it seems unlikely that 
suppressing the evidence in juvenile delinquency or criminal 
proceedings would produce the appreciable deterrent conse-
quences necessary to outweigh society's interest in sanction-
ing crimes by students that unquestionably have been ex-
posed by school officials, albeit by officials acting contrary to 
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the applicable constitutional, statutory, or administrative 
rules governing the performance of the tasks for which they 
have been hired. 
Assuming, as we do, that the vice-principal violated 
T. L. O.'s Fourth Amendment rights, we do not hold that 
she should not have a remedy for this violation, but only that 
she is not entitled to have the evidence suppressed in her ju-
venile delinquency proceeding. The exclusionary rule is de-
signed to deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment, 
particularly infringements on the rights of the innocent who, 
without the rule, might be subjected to an unacceptable re-
gime of unjustified searches. Under the rationale of the ex-
clusionary rule as it has developed, T. L. 0. hers lf, about 
whom reliable evidence has come to light showing that she 
was illegally selling drugs to her classmates, has little entitle-
ment to claim that the evidence should not be used a ainst 
her. - The vi6Iafwn, 1 1t occurre , as already been com-
pleted. The admission of the evidence agams T. L. o:Tsnot 
itselfa violation of the Fourth Amendment; and excluding it 
would be a remedy designed not to benefit her, but to fore-
stall similar lawless invasions Of the rights of others. 
We do not leave T. L. 0., others like her, or wholly inno-
cent persons without remedies to vindicate their Fourth 
Amendment rights. T. L. 0. sought judicial review of her 
suspension and successfully urged that her Fourth Amend-
ment rights had been violated. We assume that resort to 
the courts will continue to be available to enforce any local, 
state, or federal standards applicable to searches and sei-
zures carried out by school authorities. Public-school teach-
ers and administrators who know or should have known that 
their conduct is contrary to the Fourth Amendment will also 
be subject to liability under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and they may 
be 'SuQ.ject to acboil~eTI. We do not, 
however, discern any satisfactory predicate for excluding 
from state juvenile delinquency or criminal proceedings the 
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product of in-school searches carried out by school authorities 
without participation by law enforcement personnel. 
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JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted certiorari in this case to examine the appropri-
ateness of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for searches car-
ried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment by public 
school authorities. Our consideration of the proper applica-
tion of the Fourth Amendment to the public schools, how-
ever, has led us to conclude that the search that gave rise to 
the case now before us did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. AcC'Oraingly, we here address o.!!!y the questions of 
the proper standard for assessmg the legality of searc es 
coiiOucted ~ puoiiC sChool officials and the application of that 
standard tothe facts of thfs case. 
I 
On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in 
Middlesex County, New Jersey, discovered two girls smok-
ing in a lavatory. One of the two girls was the respondent 
T. L. 0., who at that time was a 14-year-old high school 
freshman. Because smoking in the lavatory was a violation 
of a school rule, the teacher took the two girls to the princi-
pal's office, where they met with Assistant Vice Principal 
Theodore Choplick. In response to questioning by Mr. 
Choplick, T. L. O.'s companion admitted that she had vio-
lated the rule. T. L. 0., however, denied that she had been 
smoking in the lavatory and claimed that she did not smoke at 
all. 
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Mr. Choplick asked T. L. 0. to come into his private office 
and demanded to see her purse. Opening the purse, he 
found a pack of cigarettes, which he removed from the purse 
and held before T. L. 0. as he accused her of having lied to 
him. As he reached into the purse for the cigarettes, Mr. 
Choplick also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers. 
In his experience, possession of rolling papers by high school 
students was closely associated with the use of marihuana. 
Suspecting that a closer examination of the purse might yield 
further evidence of drug use, Mr. Choplick proceeded to 
search the purse thoroughly. The search revealed a small 
amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, 
a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index 
card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T. L. 0. 
money, and two letters that implicated T. L. 0. in marihuana 
dealing. 
Mr. Choplick notified T. L. O.'s mother and the police, and 
turned the evidence of drug dealing over to the police. At 
the request of the police, T. L. O.'s mother took her daugh-
ter to police headquarters, where T. L. 0. confessed that she 
had been selling marihuana at the high school. On the basis 
of her confession and the evidence seized by Mr. Choplick, 
the state brought delinquency charges against T. L. 0. in the 
Juvem e an omes · e a Ions Court of Middlesex 
County. 1 Contending that Mr. Choplick's search of her 
purse violated the Fourth Amendment, T. L. 0. moved to 
suppress the evidence found in her purse as well her confes-
sion, which, she argued, was tainted by the allegedly unlaw-
ful search. The juvenile court denied the motion to sup-
'T. L. 0. also received a three-day suspension from school for smoking 
cigarettes in a nonsmoking area and a seven-day suspension for posses-
sion of marihuana. On T. L. O.'s motion, the Superior Court of New Jer-
sey, Chancery Division, set aside the seven-day suspension on the ground 
that it was based on evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
[T. L. 0 .] v. Piscataway Bd. of Educ., No. C.2865-79 (Super. Ct. N. J ., 
Ch. Div. , Mar. 31 , 1980). The Board of Education apparently did not ap-
peal the decision of the Chancery Division. 
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pr~ss. State in the Interest ofT. L. 0., 178 N.J. Super. 
· 329, 428 A. 2d 1327 (1980). Although the court concluded 
that the Fourth Amendment did apply to searches carried 
out by school officials, it held that 
Applying this standard, the court concluded that the 
search conducted by Mr. Choplick was a reasonable one. 
The initial decision to open the purse was justified by Mr. 
Choplick's well-founded suspicion that T. L. 0. had violated 
the rule forbidding smoking in the lavatory. Once the purse 
was open, evidence of marihuana violations was in plain view, 
and Mr. Choplick was entitled to conduct a thorough search 
to determine the nature and extent ofT. L. O.'s drug-related 
activities. I d., at 343, 428 A. 2d, at 1334. Having denied 
the motion to suppress, the court on March 23, 1981 found 
T. L. 0. to be a delinquent and on January 8, 1982 sentenced 
her to a year's probation. 
On appeal from the final judgment of the juvenile court, a 
dividedAppellate Division affirmed the trial court's finding 
that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation, but va-
cated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for a 
determination whether T. L. 0. had knowingly and volun-
tarily waived her Fifth Amendment rights before confessing. 
State in the Interest ofT. L. 0., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A. 
2d 493 (1982). T. L. 0. again appealed the Fourth Amend-
ment ruling, and the Supreme Court of New J~sey reversed 
the judgment of the Appellate Division and ordered the sup-
pression of the evidence found in T. L. O.'s purse. State in 
the Interest ofT. L. 0., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934 (1983). 
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The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the lower 
courts that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches con-
ducted by school officials. The court also rejected the State 
of New Jersey's argument that the exclusionary rule should 
not be employed to prevent the use in juvenile proceedings of 
evidence unlawfully seized by school officials. Declining to 
consider whether applying the rule to the fruits of searches 
by school officials would have any deterrent value, the c_Qurt 
held simply that the precedents of this Court estaOlish that 
"ifan oTfiClaTSearcn violates constitutional rights, the evi-
dence is not admissible m cnmina procee mgs. ' 94N":3., 
at 341, 463 , a 939 ootnote om1 e . 
With respect to the question of the legality of the search 
before it, the court agreed with the Juvenile Court that a 
warrantless search y a school offic1al does not vio ate the 
Fou~ me ment so ong as the official "has reasonable 
groun s o e 1eve t at a s udent possesses evidence of illegal 
activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline 
and order." ld., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 941-942. However, 
the court, with two justices dissenting, sharply disagreed 
with the Juvenile Court's conclusion that the search of the 
purse was reasonable. According to the majority, the con-
tents of T. L. O.'s purse had no bearing on the accusation 
against T. L. 0., for possession of cigarettes (as opposed to 
smoking them in the lavatory) did not violate school rules, 
and a mere desire for evidence that would impeach T. L. O.'s 
claim that she did not smoke cigarettes could not justify the 
search. Moreover, even if a reasonable suspicion that 
T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse would justify a search, 
Mr. Choplick had no such suspicion, as no one had furnished 
him with any specific information that there were cigarettes 
in the purse. Finally, leaving aside the question whether 
Mr. Choplick was justified in opening the purse, the court 
found that the evidence of drug use that he found inside did 
not justify the extensive "rummaging" through T. L. O.'s pa-
pers and effects that followed. !d., at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942. 
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We granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certio-
rari. 464 U. S. -- (1983). Although the State had argued 
in the Supreme Court of New Jersey that the search of 
T. L. O.'s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the 
petition for certiorari raised only the question whether the 
exclusionary rule should operate to bar consideration in juve-
nile delinquency proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by 
a school official without the involvement of law enforcement 
officers. When this case was first argued last Term, the 
State conceded for the purpose of argument that the stand-
ard devised by the New Jersey Supreme Court for determin-
ing the legality of school searches was appropriate and that 
the court had correctly applied that standard; the State con-
tended only that the remedial purposes of the exclusionary 
rule were not well served by applying it to searches con-
ducted by public authorities not primarily engaed in law 
enforcement. 
Although we originally granted certiorari to decide the 
issue of the appropriate remedy in juvenile court proceedings 
for unlawful school searches, our doubts regarding the wis-
dom of deciding that question in isolation from the broader 
question of what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places 
on the activities of school authorities prompted us to order 
reargument on that question. 2 Having heard argument on 
2 State and federal courts considering these questions have struggled to 
accommodate the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment and the 
interest of the States in providing a safe environment conducive to educa-
tion in the public schools. Some courts have resolved the tension between 
these interests by giving full force to one or the other side of the balance. 
Thus, in a number of cases courts have held that school officials conducting 
in-school searches of students are private parties acting in loco parentis 
and are therefore not subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. 
See, e. g., D. R. C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982); In reG., 11 
Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 
2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); R . C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. 
App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). At 
least one court has held, on the other hand, that the Fourth Amendment 
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the legality of the search ofT. L. O.'s purse, we are satisfied 
that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
II 
In determining whether the search at issue in this case vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment, we are faced initially with the 
applies in full to in-school searches by school officials and that a search con-
ducted without probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So. 
2d 317 (La.), vacated, 423 U. S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 
1976); others have held or suggested that the probable-cause standard is 
applicable at least where the police are involved in a search, see M. v. 
Board of Educ. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No.5, 429 F. 
Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill. 1977); Picha v. Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 
1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S. E. 2d 
586, 594 (1975), or where the search is highly intrusive, see M. M. v. 
Anker, 607 F. 2d 588, 589 (CA2 1979). 
The majority of courts that have addressed the issue o..f_ tl}_e Fourth 
Amendment in the schoo s ave, I e t e Supreme Court of New Jersey in 
this case, reached a middle position: the Fourth Amendment applies to 
searches coiiducte(fliySchOoTalrthorities, but the special needs oL the 
school environmen!_ req_uire as~essment of the legality of such se~rches 
agantst a st anaar"ir ss cfmg 1lian €Fiat or probable cause. These courts 
have, and arge, uphe warran ool authorities pro5 
vided that they are supported by a asonable sus icion that the search will 
uncover evidence of an infraction o oo disciplinary rule~ violation 
of the law. See, e. g., Tarter v. Raybuck No. 83-3174 ~_;Aug. 31, 
1984); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F. 2d 1462 (~984); Horton v. Goose Creek 
Independent School Dist., 690 F. 2d 470 Mi 982); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 
F. Supp. 47 (NDNY 1977); M. v. Board o due. Ball-Chatham Commu-
nity Unit School Dist. No.5, supra; In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. 
Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); State v. 
D. T. W., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Young, 
supra; In re J . A. 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); People v. 
Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N. M. 
827, 540 P. 2d 827 (App. 1975); People v. D., 34 N. Y. 2d 483, 358 N. Y. S. 
2d 403, 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P. 
2d 781 (1977); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979). 
Alth~w have considered the matter, courts have also split over 
whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for Fourth 
Amendment violauOnS committed by school authorities. The Georgia 
courts have held that although the Fourth Amendment applies to the 
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question whether that Amendment's prohibition on unrea-
sonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted / _,~ 
// P'_'-- /7 ~ .L / . ~ by public school officials. We hold that it does. --r-- ....---,.--r~ 
It is now beyond dispute that "the. Federhl Constitution, 
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreason-
able searches and seizures by state officers." Elkins v. 
~
United States, 364 U. S. 206, 213 (1960); accord Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 
(1949). Equally indisputable is the proposition that the 
FourteenthAmendment protects the rights of stude'irts 
againstencroa&mellt bypublics chool of cials: - -
'--- - --------· ---..__ ·-
"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the 
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and 
all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. 
These have, of course, delicate, and highly discretionary 
functions, but none that they may not perform within the 
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the 
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection 
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not 
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to 
discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943). 
These two propositions-that the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
that the actions of public school officials are subject to the 
limits placed on State action by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment--;-might appear sufficient to answer the suggestion that 
the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe unreasonable 
schools, the exclusionary rule does not. See, e. g., State v. Young, supra; 
State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S. E . 2d 51 (1976). Other jurisdic-
tions have applied the rule to exclude the fruits of unlawful school searches 
from criminal trials and delinquency proceedings. See State v. Mora, 
supra; People v. D., supra. 
83-712-0PINION 
8 NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0. 
searches by school officials. On reargument, however, the 
e Jersey ha ar ed that the history of the 
Fou Amendment indicates t at the Amendment was in-
tended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out by 
law enforcement officers; accordingly, although public school 
officials are concededly State agents for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment creates no 
rights enforceable against them. 3 
It may well be true that the evil toward which the Fourth 
Amendment was primarily directed was the resurrection of 
the pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants or 
"writs of assistance" to authorize searches for contraband by 
officers of the Crown. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 
624-629 (1886). But this Court has never limited the 
Amendment's prohibition on unr so le ea es and sei-
zures to opera 1ons con ucted by the police. Rather, the 
Court ~1-h Amendment's strictures 
as restraints imposed upon "governmental action"-that is, 
"upon the activities of sovereign authority." Burdeau v. 
McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 475 (1921). Accordingly, we have 
held the Fourth Amendment applicable to the activities of 
yivil as well as criminal authorities: building inspectors, see 
)/Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967), 
OSHA inspectors, see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 
307, 312-313 (1978), and even firemen entering privately 
owned premises to battle a fire, see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 
uj s. 499, 506 (1978), are all subject to the restraints im-
~~~ed by the Fourth Amendment. As we observed in 
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, "[t]he basic purpose of 
this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this 
Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 
\ 
3 Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applies only to 
punishments imposed ~r criminal convictions and hence does not apply 
to the punishment of schoolchildren by public school officials). 
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against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." 387 
U. S., at 528. Because the individual's interest in privacy 
and personal security "suffers whether the government's 
motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or 
breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards," Mar-
shall v. Barlow's, 436 U. S., at 312-313, it would be "anoma-
lous to say that the individual and his private property are 
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the in-
dividual is suspected of criminal behavior." Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528. 
Notwithstanding the general applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment to the activities of civil authorities, a few courts 
have concluded that school officials are exempt from the dic-
tates of the Fourth Amendment by virtue of the special 
nature of their authority over schoolchildren. See, e. g., 
R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983). 
Teachers and school administrators, it is said, act in loco 
parentis in their dealings with students: their authority is 
that of the parent, not the state, and is therefore not subject 
to the limits of the Fourth Amendment. Ibid. 
Such reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality and 
the teachings of this Court. We have held school officials 
subject to the commands of the First Amendment, see Tin-
ker v. Des Moines Independent GOmmuntiy ScRool District, 
393 U. S. 503 (1969), and the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, see ~z, supra. If school au-
thorities are state actors for purposes of the consitutional 
guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is dif-
ficult to understand why they should be deemed to be ex-
ercising parental rather than public authority when conduct-
ing searches of their students. More generally, the Court 
has recognized that "the concept of parental delegation" as a 
source of school authority is not entirely "consonant with 
compulsory education laws." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U. S., at 662. Today's public school officials do not merely 
exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individ-
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ual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly man-
dated educational and disciplinary policies. See, e. g., the 
opinion in State in the Interest ofT. L. 0., 94 N.J. 331, 343, 
463 A. 2d 934, 940 (1983), describing the New Jersey statutes 
regulating school disciplinary policies and establishing the 
authority of school officials over their students. In carrying 
out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to 
such policies, school officials act as representagyes of the 
state, not merely ~or the parent, and they can-
not claim the parent's immunity from the strictures of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
III 
To hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches 
conducted by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry 
into the standards governing such searches. Although the 
underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always 
that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable 
depends on the context within which a search takes place. 
Theaetermination of the standard of reasonableness govern-
ing any specific class of searches requires "balancing the need u~ 
to search against the invasion which thesearch entails." 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 536-537. On one 
side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate Y 
expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, 
the government's need for effective methods to deal with 
breaches of public order. 
We have recognized that even a limited search of the per-
son is a substantial invasion of privacy. Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U. S., at 24-25. We have also recognized that searches of 
closed items of personal luggage are intrusions on protected 
privacy interests, for "the Fourth Amendment provides pro-
tection to the owner of every container that conceals its con-
tents from plain view." United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 
798, 822-823 (1982). A search of a child's person or of a 
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closed purse or other bag carried on her person, 4 no less than 
a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly q se- \ 7 ? 'J)I..AJ 
vere violation of sub· ective ex ectation Ofriv~ - c::::._) 
Of course, the Fourth Amendment oes not protect subjec-
tive ex ectations of privacy that are unreasonable or other-
wise "illegitimate. ee, e. g., udsonv. Palmer~ 
U. & - (1984); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 
(1980). To receive the protection of the Fourth Amendment, 
an expectation of privacy must be one that society is "pre-
pared to recognize as legitimate." Hudson v. Palmer, --
U. S., at--. The State of New Jersey has argued that be-
cause of the pervasive supervision to which children in the 
schools are necessarily
1 
subject, a child has virtually no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in articles of personal property 
"unnecessarily" carried into a school. This argument has 
two factual premises: (1) the fundamental incompatibility of 
expectations of privacy with the maintenance of a sound edu-
cational environment; and (2) the minimal interest of the child 
in bringing any items of personal property into the school. 
Both premises are severely flawed. """( 
Although this Court may take notice of the difficulty of 
maintaining discipline in the public schools today, the situa-
'We do not address the question, not presented by this case, whether a 
schoolchild has a legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers, desks, or 
other school property provided for the storage of school supplies. Nor do 
we express any opinion on the standards (if any) governing searches of 
such areas by school officials or by other public authorities acting at the 
request of school officials. Compare Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F. 2d 662, 
670 (CAlO 1981) ("Inasmuch as the school had assumed joint control of the 
locker it cannot be successfully maintained that the school did not have a 
right to inspect it."), and People v. Overton, 24 N. Y. 2d 522, 301 N. Y. S. 
2d 479, 249 N. E. 2d 366 (1969) (school administrators have power to con-
sent to search of a student's locker), with State v. Engerud, 94 N. J. 331, 
463 A. 2d 934 (1983) ("We are satisfied that in the context of this case the 
student had an expectation of privacy in the contents of his locker .... For 
the four years of high school, the school locker is a home away from home. 
In it the student stores the kind of personal 'effects' protected by the 
Fourth Amendment."). 
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tion is not so dire that students in the schools may claim no 
legitimate expectations of privacy. We have recently recog-
nized that the need to maintain order in a prison is such that 
prisoners retain no legitimate expectations of privacy in their 
cells, but it goes almost without saying that "[t]he prisoner 
and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, 
separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incar-
ceration." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 669. We are} /'!.A' /d...J 
not yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be ' -- -{ 
equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
Nor does the State's suggestion that children have no le-
gitimate need to bring personal property into the schools 
seem well-anchored inreality. Students at a minimum must 
bring to school not only the supplies needed for their studies, 
but also keys, money, and the necessaries of personal hy-
giene and grooming. In addition, students may carry on l 
their persons or in purses or wallets such nondisruptive yet L1 ~ 
highly personal items as photographs, letters, and diaries. tf 
Finally, students -may have perfectly legitimate reasons to 
carry with them articles of property needed in connection 
with extracurricular or recreational activities. In short, 
schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with them a va-
riety of legitimate, non-contraband items, and there is no 
reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all 
rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto 
school grounds. 
A ainst the child's interest in rivac must be set the sub-~ 
stantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintain-
ing ~-=t~h::-e~c:;:::;la:"'s.=csr:;...;o::...:o:..:;:m=a':-nd.::.....=o..=.:n:...;;s:...:c.:.:h.::..oo:.;l:.Jgr2:...::o-=u=.:nds. Main-
taining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in 
recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly 
ugly form · nd viol t crime in the schools have be-
come major social roblems. See generally NIE, U. S. 
Dep't ucation, 10 en chools-§'afe Schools: The Safe 
School Study Report to the Congress (1978). Even in 
schools that have been spared the most severe disciplinary 
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problems, the preservation of order and a proper educational 
environment re uires close supervision of schoolchildren, as 
well as the enforcement o ru es agamst conduct that would 
be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult. "Events 
calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes 
require immediate, effective action." Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U. S. 565, 580 (1975). Accordingly, we have recognized that 
maintaining security and order in the schools requires a cer-
tain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, 
and we have respected the value of preserving the informal-
ity of the student-teacher relationship. See id., at 582-583; 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 680-682 (1977). 
H~, should we strike the balance between the 
schoolchild's legitimate expectations of privacy and the 
school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment 
in which learning can take place? It is evident that the 
school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to 
which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. 
The warrant re uirement, in particular, is unsuited to the 
school environment: requirmg a eacher to obtain a warrant 
before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school 
rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the 
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures 
needed in the schools. Just as we have in other cases dis-
pensed with the warrant requirement when "the burden of 
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental 
purpose behind the search," Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U. S., at 533, we hold today that school officials need not 
obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under 
their authority. 
The school setting also requires some modification of the 
level of suSDlciOnOf11llcit activity needed to justify a search. 
Or inarily, a search-even one that may permissibly be car-
ried out without a warrant-must be based upon "probable 
cause" to believe that a violation of the law has occurred. 
See, e. g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 
83-712-0PINION 
14 NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0. 
273; Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 62-66 (1968). How-
ever, "probable cause" is not an irreducible requirement of a 
valid search. The fundamental command of the Fourth 
Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and 
although "both the concept of probable cause and the require-
ment of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, 
. . . in certain limited circumstances neither is required." 
Almeida-Sanchez v. Um'ted States, supra, at 277 (POWELL, 
J., concurring). Thus, we have in a number of cases recog-
nized the legality of searches and seizures based on sus pi-~ 
cions that, although "reaso~aple," do n~t rise to the level of 
probable cause. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohw, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); 
United States v.'1irignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881 (1975); 
Delaware v Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979); United 
States v. ~artinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976); cf. Camara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 534-539. Where a careful 
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests 
that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amend-
ment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable 
cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard. 
We join the majority of courts that have examined this 
i~ G n concluding tbat tfie accommodation of the rivacy 
interests o sc oo chi ren Wit t e su stantial need of teach-
ers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the 
schools (!Qes not require strict adherence to the requirement 
that searches fie based on prooaole cause to believe that the 
sub}ect of tile searc1i has vkirated or is violating the law. 
Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend 
slri!Ply on the 'reasonableness:' under alfthe circumstances, of 
the search. ~the reasonableness of any search 
involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider "whether 
the . . . action was justified at its inception," Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U. S., at 20; second, one must determine whether the 
search as actually conducted "was reasonably related in scope 
5 See cases cited, supra n. 2. 
\1 
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to the circumstances which justified the interference in the 
first place," ibid. Under ordinary circumstances, a search of 
a student by a teacher or other school official 6 will be "justi-
fied at its inception" when there ar~ 'reasonable grounds for 
suspecti,ni that the search will turn up evidence that the stu-
dent has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of 
the school. 7 Such a search is permissible in its scope when 
its intrusiveness is reasonably related to its objectives. 
This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the 
efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their schools 
nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of 
schoolchildren. By focusing attention on the uestion of 
reasonableness, the stan ar WI spare teachers and school 
admunstra ors the necessity of schooling themselves in the 
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their 
6 We here consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting 
alone and on their own authority. This case does not present the question 
of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of se~ches conducted 
by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement 
agencies, and we express no opinion on that question. Compare Picha v. 
Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976) (holding probable 
cause standard applicable to searches involving the police). 
7 We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential ele-
ment of the reasoniilileness standard we adopt for searches by school au-
thorities. In offiet contexts, however, we have field that although "some 
quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitu-
tional search or seizure[,] ... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreduc-
ible requirement of such suspicion." United States v. a tnez-Fuerte, 
428 U. ~See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U. S. 523 (1967). Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspi-
cion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated 
by a search are minimal and where "other safeguards" are available "to as-
sure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject 
to the discretion of the official in the field.' " Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979) (citation omitted). Because the search of j 
T. L. O.'s purse was based upon an individualized suspicion that she had 
violated school rules, see infra, we need not consider the circumstances 
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conduct according to the dictates of reason and common 
sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard 
should ensure that the interests of students will be invaded 
no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of 
preserving order in the schools. 
IV 
There remains the question of the legality of the search in 
this case. We recognize that the "reasonable grounds" 
standard applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its 
consideration of this question is not substantially different 
from the standard that we have adopted today. Nonethe-
less, we believe that the New Jersey court's application of 
that standard to strike down the search ofT. L. O.'s purse 
reflects a somewhat crabbed notion of reasonableness. Our 
review of the facts surrounding the search leads us to con-
clude that the search was in no sense unreasonable for 
Fourth Amendment purposes. 8 
The incident that gave rise to this case actually involved 
two separate searches, with the first-the search for ciga-
rettes-providing the suspicion that gave rise to the sec-
ond-the search for marihuana. Although it is the fruits of 
the second search that are at issue here, the validity of the 
search for marihuana must depend on the reasonableness of 
the initial search for cigarettes, as there would have been no 
reason to suspect that T. L. 0. possessed marihuana had the 
first search not taken place. Accordingly, it is to the search 
for cigarettes that we first turn our attention. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed to two grounds 
for its holding that the search for cigarettes was unreason-
able. First, the Court observed that possession of cigarettes 
was not in itself illegal or a violation of school rules. Because 
8 Of course, New Jersey may insist on a more demanding standard 
under its own construction or statutes. In that case, its courts would not 
purport to b~applying the Fourth Amendment when they invalidate a 
search. 
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the contents ofT. L. O.'s purse would therefore have "nodi-
rect bearing on the infraction" of which she was accused 
(smoking in a lavatory where smoking was prohibited), there 
was no reason to search her purse. Second, even assuming 
that a search ofT. L. O.'s purse might under some circum-
stances be reasonable in light of the accusation made against 
T. L. 0., the New Jersey Court concluded that Mr. Choplick 
in this particular case had no reasonable grounds to suspect 
that T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse. At best, accord-
ing to the court, Mr. Choplick had "a good hunch." 94 N.J., 
at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942. 
Both these conclusions are implausible. T. L. 0. had been 
accused of smoking, and had denied the accusation in the 
strongest possible terms when she stated that she did not 
smoke at all. Surely it cannot be said that under these cir-
cumstances, T. L. O.'s possession of cigarettes would be ir-
relevant to the charges against her or to her response to 
those charges. T. L. O.'s possession of cigarettes, once it 
was discovered, would both corroborate the report that she 
had been smoking and undermine the credibility of her de-
fense to the charge of smoking. To be sure, the discovery of 
the cigarettes would not prove that T. L. 0. had been smok-
ing in the lavatory; nor would it, strictly speaking, necessar-
ily be inconsistent with her claim that she did not smoke at 
all. But it is universally recognized that evidence, to be rel-
evant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate 
fact in issue, but only have "any tendency to make the exist-
ence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." Fed. Rule Evid. 401. The rele-
vance ofT. L. O.'s possession of cigarettes to the question 
whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her 
denial that she smoked supplied the necessary "nexus" be-
tween the item searched for and the infraction under investi-
gation. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 306-307 
(1967). Thus, if Mr. Choplick in fact had a reasonable suspi-
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cion that T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse, the search was 
justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if found, would 
constitute "mere evidence" of a violation. Ibid. 
Of course, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that 
Mr. Choplick had no reasonable suspicion that the purse 
would contain cigarettes. This conclusion is puzzling. A 
teacher had reported that T. L. 0. was smoking in the lava-
tory. Certainly this report gave Mr. Choplick reason to sus-
pect that T. L. 0. was carrying cigarettes with her; and if 
she did have cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place in 
which to find them. Mr. Choplick's suspicion that there 
were cigarettes in the purse was not an "inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,"' Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U. S., at 27; rather, it was the sort of "common-sense conclu-
sion[] about human nature" upon which "practical people"-
including government officials-are entitled to rely. United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). Of course, even 
if the teacher's report were true, T. L. 0. might not have 
had a pack of cigarettes with her; she might have borrowed a 
cigarette from someone else or have been sharing a cigarette 
with another student. But the requirement of reasonable 
suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty: "suffi-
cient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reason-
ableness under the Fourteenth Amendment .... " Hill v. 
California, 401 U. S. 797, 804 (1971). Because the hypothe-
sis that T. L. 0. was carrying cigarettes in her purse was it-
self not unreasonable, it is irrelevant that other hypotheses 
were also consistent with the teacher's accusation. 9 Accord-
9 T. L. 0. also contends that even if it was reasonable for Mr. Choplick 
to open her purse to look for cigarettes, it was not reasonable for him to 
reach in and take the cigarettes out of her purse once he found them. Had 
he not removed the cigarettes from the purse, she asserts, he would not 
have observed the rolling papers that suggested the presence of mari-
huana, and the search for marihuana could not have taken place. 
T. L. O.'s argument is based on the fact that the cigarettes were not "con-
traband," as no school rule forbade her to have them. Thus, according to 
T. L. 0., the cigarettes were not subject to seizure or confiscation by 
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ingly, it cannot be said that Mr. Choplick acted unreasonably 
when he examined T. L. O.'s purse to see if it contained 
cigarettes. 
Our conclusion that Mr. Choplick's decision to open 
T. L. O.'s purse was reasonable brings us to the question of 
the further search for marihuana once the pack of cigarettes 
was located. The suspicion upon which the search for mari-
huana was founded was provided when Mr. Choplick ob-
served a package of rolling papers in the purse as he removed 
the pack of cigarettes. Although T. L. 0. does not dispute 
the reasonableness of Mr. Choplick's belief that the rolling 
papers indicated the presence of marihuana, she does contend 
that the scope of the search Mr. Choplick conducted ex-
ceeded permissible bounds when he seized and read certain 
letters that implicated T. L. 0. in drug dealing activity. 
This argument, too, is unpersuasive. The discovery of the 
rolling papers concededly gave rise to a reasonable suspicion 
that T. L. 0. was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in 
her purse. This suspicion justified further exploration of 
T. L. O.'s purse, which turned up more evidence of drug-re-
lated activities: a pipe, a number of plastic bags of the type 
commonly used to store marihuana, a small quantity of mari-
huana, and a fairly substantial amount of money. Under 
these circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the 
search to a separate zippered compartment of the purse; and 
when a search of that compartment revealed an index card 
containing a list of "people who owe me money" as well as 
two letters, the inference that T. L. 0. was involved in mari-
school authorities, and Mr. Choplick was not entitled to take them out of 
T. L. O.'s purse regardless of whether he was entitled to peer into the 
purse to see if they were there. Such hairsplitting argumentation has no 
place in an inquiry addressed to the issue of reasonableness. If Mr. 
Choplick could permissibly search T. L. O.'s purse for cigarettes, it hardly 
seems reasonable to suggest that his natural reaction to finding them-
picking them up-could be a Constitutional violation. Accordingly, we 
find that neither in opening the purse nor in reaching into it to remove the 
cigarettes did Mr. Choplick violate the Fourth Amendment. 
-
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huana trafficking was substantial enough to justify Mr. 
Choplick in examining the letters to determine whether they 
contained any further evidence. In short, we cannot con-
clude that the search for marihuana was unreasonable in any 
respect. 
Because the search resulting in the discovery of the evi-
dence of marihuana dealing by T. L. 0. was reasonable, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision to exclude that evi-
dence from T. L. O.'s juvenile delinquency proceedings on 
Fourth Amendment grounds was erroneous. Accordingly, 
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JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted certiorari in this case to examine the appropri-
ateness of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for searches car-
ried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment by public 
school authorities. Our consideration of the proper applica-
tion of the Fourth Amendment to the public schools, how-
ever, has led us to conclude that the search that gave rise to 
the case now before us did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. Accordingly, we here address only the questions of 
the proper standard for assessing the legality of searches 
conducted by public school officials and the application of that 
standard to the facts of this case. 
I 
On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in 
Middlesex County, N.J., discovered two girls smoking in a 
lavatory. One of the two girls was the respondent T. L. 0., 
who at that time was a 14-year-old high school freshman. 
Because smoking in the lavatory was a violation of a school 
rule, the teacher took the two girls to the Principal's office, 
where they met with Assistant Vice Principal Theodore 
Choplick. In response to questioning by Mr. Choplick, 
T. L. O.'s companion admitted that she had violated the rule. 
T. L. 0., however, denied that she had been smoking in the 
lavatory and claimed that she did not smoke at all. 
f?u,v~~ P-/n /.fy' L d'·r w; ~ y.... :r .... d ·lct -hJ ~ 
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Mr. Choplick asked T. L. 0. to come into his private office 
and demanded to see her purse. Opening the purse, he 
found a pack of cigarettes, which he removed from the purse 
and held before T. L. 0. as he accused her of having lied to 
him. As he reached into the purse for the cigarettes, Mr. 
Choplick also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers. 
In his experience, possession of rolling papers by high school 
students was closely associated with the use of marihuana. 
Suspecting that a closer examination of the purse might yield 
further evidence of drug use, Mr. Choplick proceeded to 
search the purse thoroughly. The search revealed a small 
amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, 
a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index 
card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T. L. 0. 
money, and two letters that implicated T. L. 0. in marihuana 
dealing. 
Mr. Choplick notified T. L. O.'s mother and the police, and 
turned the evidence of drug dealing over· to the police. At 
the request of the police, T. L. O.'s mother took her daugh-
ter to police headquarters, where T. L. 0. confessed that she 
had been selling marihuana at the high school. On the basis 
of the confession and the evidence seized by Mr. Choplick, 
the State brought delinquency charges against T. L. 0. in 
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex 
County.' Contending that Mr. Choplick's search of her 
purse violated the Fourth Amendment, T. L. 0. moved to 
suppress the evidence found in her purse as well her confes-
sion, which, she argued, was tainted by the allegedly unlaw-
ful search. The Juvenile Court denied the motion to sup-
'T. L. 0. also received a 3-day suspension from school for smoking ·ciga-
rettes in a nonsmoking area and a 7-day suspension for possession of mari-
huana. On T. L. O.'s motion, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chan-
cery Division, set aside the 7-day suspension on the ground that it was 
based on evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
(T. L. 0.) v. Piscataway Bd. ofEd., No. C.2865-79 (Super. Ct. N.J. , Ch. 
Div., Mar. 31, 1980). The Board of Education apparently did not appeal 
the decision of the Chancery Division. 
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press. State ex rel. T. L. 0., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 428 A. 2d 
1327 (1980). Although the court concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment did apply to searches carried out by school offi-
cials, it held that 
"a school official may properly conduct a search of a stu-
dent's person if the official has a reasonable suspicion 
that a crime has been or is in the process of being com-
mitted, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is 
necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school 
policies." I d., at 341, 428 A. 2d, at 1333 (emphasis in 
original). 
Applying this standard, the court concluded that the 
search conducted by Mr. Choplick was a reasonable one. 
The initial decision to open the purse was justified by Mr. 
Choplick's well-founded suspicion that T. L. 0. had violated 
the rule forbidding smoking in the lavatory. Once the purse 
was open, evidence of marihuana violations was in plain view, 
and Mr. Choplick was entitled to conduct a thorough search 
to determine the nature and extent ofT. L. O.'s drug-related 
activities. !d., at 343, 428 A. 2d, at 1334. Having denied 
the motion to suppress, the court on March 23, 1981 found 
T. L. 0. to be a delinquent and on January 8, 1982, sentenced 
her to a year's probation. 
On appeal from the final judgment of the Juvenile Court, a 
divided Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's finding 
that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation, but va-
cated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for a 
determination whether T. L. 0. had knowingly and volun-
tarily waived her Fifth Amendment rights before confessing. 
State ex rel. T. L. 0., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A. 2d 493 
(1982). T. L. 0. appealed the Fourth Amendment ruling, 
and the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the judg-
ment of the Appellate Division and ordered the suppression 
of the evidence found in T. L. O.'s purse. State ex rel. 
T. L. 0., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934 (1983). 
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The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the lower 
courts that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches con-
ducted by school officials. The court also rejected the State 
of New Jersey's argument that the exclusionary rule should 
not be employed to prevent the use in juvenile proceedings of 
evidence unlawfully seized by school officials. Declining to 
consider whether applying the rule to the fruits of searches 
by school officials would have any deterrent value, the court 
held simply that the precedents of this Court establish that 
"if an official search violates constitutional rights, the evi-
dence is not admissible in criminal proceedings." !d., at 341, 
463 A. 2d, at 939 (footnote omitted). 
With respect to the question of the legality of the search 
before it, the court agreed with the Juvenile Court that a 
warrantless search by a school official does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment so long as the official "has reasonable 
grounds to beli~ve that a student possesses evidence of illegal 
activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline 
and order." !d., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 941-942. However, 
the court, with two justices dissenting, sharply disagreed 
with the Juvenile Court's conclusion that the search of the 
purse was reasonable. According to the majority, the con-
tents ofT. L. O.'s purse had no bearing on the accusation 
against T. L. 0., for possession of cigarettes (as opposed to 
smoking them in the lavatory) did not violate school rules, 
and a mere desire for evidence that would impeach T. L. O.'s 
claim that she did not smoke cigarettes could not justify the 
search. Moreover, even if a reasonable suspicion that 
T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse would justify a search, 
Mr. Choplick had no such suspicion, as no one had furnished 
him with any specific information that there were cigarettes 
in the purse. Finally, leaving aside the question whether 
Mr. Choplick was justified in opening the purse, the court 
. held that the evidence of drug use that he saw inside did not 
justify the extensive "rummaging" through T. L. O.'s papers 
and effects that followed. !d., at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942-943. 
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We granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certio-
rari. 464 U. S. -- (1983). Although the State had argued 
in the Supreme Court of New Jersey that the search of 
T. L. O.'s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the 
petition for certiorari raised only the question whether the 
exclusionary rule should operate to bar consideration in juve-
nile delinquency proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by 
a school official without the involvement of law enforcement 
officers. When this case was first argued last Term, the 
State conceded for the purpose of argument that the stand-
ard devised by the New Jersey Supreme Court for determin-
ing the legality of school searches was appropriate and that 
the court had correctly applied that standard; the State con-
tended only that the remedial purposes of the exclusionary 
rule were not well served by applying it to searches con-
ducted by public authorities not primarily engaged in law 
enforcement. 
Although we originally granted certiorari to decide the 
issue of the appropriate remedy in juvenile court proceedings 
for unlawful school searches, our doubts regarding the wis-
dom of deciding that question in isolation from the broader 
question of what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places 
on the activities of school authorities prompted us to order 
reargument on that question. 2 Having heard argument on 
2 State and federal courts considering these questions have struggled to 
accommodate the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment and the 
interest of the States in providing a safe environment conducive to educa-
tion in the public schools. Some courts have resolved the tension between 
these interests by giving full force to one or the other side of the balance. 
Thus, in a number of cases courts have held that school officials conducting 
in-school searches of students are private parties acting in loco parentis 
and are therefore not subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. 
See, e. g., D. R. C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982); In reG., 11 
Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 
2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); R . C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. 
App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). At 
least one court has held, on the other hand, that the Fourth Amendment 
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the legality of the search ofT. L. O.'s purse, we are satisfied 
that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 3 
II 
In determining whether the search at issue in this case vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment, we are faced initially with the 
applies in full to in-school searches by school officials and that a search con-
ducted without probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So. 
2d 317 (La.), vacated, 423 U. S. 809 (1975), on remand , 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 
1976); others have held or suggested that the probable-cause standard is 
applicable at least where the police are involved in a search, see M. v. 
Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No . 5, 429 F . 
Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill. 1977); Picha v. Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 
1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S. E. 2d 
586, 594 (1975); or where the search is highly intrusive, see M. M. v. 
Anker, 607 F. 2d 588, 589 (CA2 1979). 
The majority of courts that have addressed the issue of the Fourth 
Amendment in the schools have, like the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 
this case, reac.hed a middle position: the Fourth Amendment applies to 
searches conducted by school authorities, but the special needs of the 
school environment require assessment of the legality of such searches 
against a standard less exacting than that of probable cause. These courts 
have, by and large, upheld warrantless searches by school authorities pro-
vided that they are supported by a reasonable suspicion that the search will 
uncover evidence of an infraction of school disciplinary rules or a violation 
of the law. See, e. g., Tarter v. Raybuck, No. 83-3174 (CA6, Aug. 31, 
1984); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F. 2d 1462 (CA9 1984); Horton v. Goose Creek 
Independent School Dist., 690 F. 2d 470 (CA5 1982); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 
F. Supp. 47 (NDNY 1977); M . v. Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham Community 
Unit School Dist. No. 5, supra; In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. 
Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); State v. 
D. T. W ., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Young, 
supra; In re J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); People v. 
Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N. M. 
827, 540 P. 2d 827 (App. 1975); People v. D., 34 N. Y. 2d 483, 358 N. Y. S. 
2d 403, 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P. 
2d 781 (1977); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979). 
Although few have considered the matter, courts have also split over 
whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for Fourth 
Amendment violations committed by school authorities. The Georgia 
courts have held that although the Fourth Amendment applies to the 
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question whether that Amendment's prohibition on unrea-
sonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted 
by public school officials. We hold that it does. 
It is now beyond dispute that "the Federal Constitution, 
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreason-
able searches and seizures by state officers." Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U. S. 206, 213 (1960); accord, Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 
(1949). Equally indisputable is the proposition that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of students 
against encroachment by public school officials: 
"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the 
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and 
all of its creatures-Boards of .Education not excepted. 
Tnese have, of course, delicate , and highly discretionary 
functions, but none that they may not perform within the 
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the 
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection 
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not 
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to 
schools , the exclusionary rule does not. See, e. g., State v. Young , supra; 
State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976). Other jurisdic-
tions have applied the rule to exclude the fruits of unlawful school searches 
from criminal trials and delinquency proceedings. See State v. Mora , 
supra; People v. D., supra. 
3 In holding that the search ofT. L. O.'s purse did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, we do not, as JusTICE STEVENS suggests, see post , at --, 
implicitly determine that the exclusionary rule applies to the fruits of un-
lawful searches conducted by school authorities. The question whether 
evidence should be excluded from a criminal proceeding involves two dis-
crete inquiries: whether the evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, and whether the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy 
for the violation. Neither question is logically antecedent to the other, for 
a negative answer to either question is sufficient to dispose of the case. 
Thus, our determination that the search at issue in this case did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment implies no particular resolution of the question of 
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discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes." West Virginia State Ed. of Ed. v. 
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943). 
These two propositions-that the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
that the actions of public school officials are subject to the 
limits placed on state action by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment-might appear sufficient to answer the suggestion that 
the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe unreasonable 
searches by school officials. On reargument, however, the 
State of New Jersey has argued that the history of the 
Fourth Amendment indicates that the Amendment was in-
tended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out by 
law enforcement officers; accordingly, although public school 
officials are concededly state agents for purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment creates no 
rights enforceable against them. 4 
It may well be true that the evil toward which the Fourth 
Amendment was primarily directed was the resurrection of 
the pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants or 
"writs of assistance" to authorize searches for contraband by 
officers of the Crown. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 
624-629 (1886). But this Court has never limited the 
Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and sei-
zures to operations conducted by the police. Rather, the 
Court has long spoken of the Fourth Amendment's strictures 
as restraints imposed upon "governmental action"-that is, 
"upon the activities of sovereign authority." Burdeau v. 
McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 475 (1921). Accordingly, we have 
held the Fourth Amendment applicable to the activities of 
civil as well as criminal authorities: building inspectors, see 
'Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applies only to 
punishments imposed after criminal convictions and hence does not apply 
to the punishment of schoolchildren by public school officials) . 
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Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967), 
OSHA inspectors, see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 
307, 312-313 (1978), and even firemen entering privately 
owned premises to battle a fire, see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 
U. S. 499, 506 (1978), are all subject to the restraints im-
posed by the Fourth Amendment. As we observed in 
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, "[t]he basic purpose of 
this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this 
Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." 387 
U. S., at 528. Because the individual's intere.st in privacy 
and personal security "suffers whether the government's 
motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or 
breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards," Mar-
shall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, at 312-313, it would be "anom-
alous to say that the individual and his private property are 
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the in-
dividual is suspected of criminal behavior." Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 530. 
Notwithstanding the general applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment to the activities of civil authorities, a few courts 
have concluded that school officials are exempt from the dic-
tates of the Fourth Amendment by virtue of the special 
nature of their authority over schoolchildren. See, e. g., 
R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983). 
Teachers and school administrators, it is said, act in loco 
parentis in their dealings with students: their authority is 
that of the parent, not the State, and is therefore not subject 
to the limits of the Fourth Amendment. Ibid. 
Such reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality . and 
the teachings of this Court. We have held school officials 
subject to the commands of the First Amendment, see Tin-
ker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 
393 U. S. 503 (1969), and the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975). 
If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the 
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consitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due 
process, it is difficult to understand why they should be 
deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority 
when conducting searches of their students. More gener-
ally, the Court has recognized that "the concept of parental 
delegation" as a source of school authority is not entirely 
"consonant with compulsory education laws." Ingraham v. 
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 662 (1977). Today's public school offi-
cials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred 
on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance 
of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies. 
See, e. g., the opinion in State ex rel . T. L . 0 ., 94 N.J., at 
343, 463 A. 2d, at 934, 940, describing the New Jersey stat-
utes regulating school disciplinary policies and establishing 
the authority of school officials over their students. In car-
rying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant 
to such policies, school officials act as representatives of the 
State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they 
cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
III 
To hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches 
conducted by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry 
into the standards governing such searches. Although the 
underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always 
that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable 
depends on the context within which a search takes place. 
The determination of the standard of reasonableness govern-
ing any specific class of searches requires "balancing the need 
to search against the invasion which the search entails." 
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 536-537. On one 
side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate 
expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, 
the government's need for effective methods to deal with 
breaches of public order. 
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We have recognized that even a limited search of the per-
son is a substantial invasion of privacy. Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U. S. 1, 24-25 (1967). We have also recognized that 
searches of closed items of personal luggage are intrusions on 
protected privacy interests, for "the Fourth Amendment pro-
vides protection to the owner of every container that conceals 
its contents from plain view." United States v. Ross , 456 
U. S. 798, 822-823 (1982). A search of a child's person or of 
a closed purse or other bag carried on her person, 5 no less 
than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a 
severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy. 
Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not protect subjec-
tive expectations of privacy that are unreasonable or other-
wise "illegitimate." See, e. g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 
- (1984); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98 (1980). To 
receive the protection of the Fourth Amendment, an expecta-
tion of privacy must be one that society is "prepared to recog-
nize as legitimate." Hudson v. Palmer, supra, at --. 
The State of New Jersey has argued that because of the per-
vasive supervision to which children in the schools are neces-
sarily subject, a child has virtually no legitimate expectation 
of privacy in articles of personal property "unnecessarily" 
'We do not address the question, not presented by this case, whether a 
schoolchild has a legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers, desks, or 
other school property provided for the storage of school supplies. Nor do 
we express any opinion on the standards (if any) governing searches of 
such areas by school officials or by other public authorities acting at the 
request of school officials. Compare Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F. 2d 662, 
670 (CAlO 1981) ("Inasmuch as the school had assumed joint control of the 
locker it cannot be successfully maintained that the school did not have a 
right to inspect it."), and People v. Overton, 24 N. Y. 2d 522, 249 N. E . 2d 
366 (1969) (school administrators have power to consent to search of a stu-
dent's locker), with State v. Engerud, 94 N. J. 331, 348, 463 A. 2d 934, 943 
(1983) ("We are satisfied that in the context of this case the student had an 
expectation of privacy in the contents of his locker .. . . For the four years 
of high school, the school locker is a home away from home. In it the stu-
dent stores the kind of personal 'effects' protected by the Fourth 
Amendment"). 
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carried into a school. This argument has two factual 
premises: (1) the fundamental incompatibility of expectations 
of privacy with the maintenance of a sound educational envi-
ronment; and (2) the minimal interest of the child in bringing 
any items of personal property into the school. Both 
premises are severely flawed. 
Although this Court may take notice of the difficulty of 
maintaining discipline in the public schools today, the situa-
tion is not so dire that students in the schools may claim no 
legitimate expectations of privacy. We have recently recog-
nized that the need to maintain order in a prison is such that 
prisoners retain no legitimate expectations of privacy in their 
cells, but it goes almost without saying that "[t]he prisoner 
and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, 
separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incar-
ceration." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 669. We are 
not yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be 
equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
Nor does the State's suggestion that children have no le-
gitimate need to bring personal property into the schools 
seem well anchored in reality. Students at a minimum must 
bring to school not only the supplies needed for their studies, 
but also keys, money, and the necessaries of personal hy-
giene and grooming. In addition, students may carry on 
their persons or in purses or wallets such nondisruptive yet 
highly personal items as photographs, letters, and diaries. 
Finally, students may have perfectly legitimate reasons to 
carry with them articles of property needed in connection 
with extracurricular or recreational activities. In short, 
schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with them a va-
riety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no rea-
son to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights 
to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school 
grounds. 
Against the child's interest in privacy must be set the sub-
stantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintain-
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ing discipline in the classroom and on school grounds. Main-
taining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in 
recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly 
ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have be-
come major social problems. See generally 1 NIE, U. S. 
Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Violent Schools-
Safe Schools: The Safe School Study Report to the Congress 
(1978). Even in schools that have been spared the most se-
vere disciplinary problems, the preservation of order and a 
proper educational environment requires close supervision of 
schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against 
conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by 
an adult. "Events calling for discipline are frequent occur-
rences and sometimes require immediate, effective action." 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S., at 580. Accordingly, we have rec-
ognized that maintaining security and order in the schools re-
quires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary 
procedures, and we have respected the value of preserving 
the informality of the student-teacher relationship. See id., 
at 582-583; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 680-682. 
How, then, should we strike the balance between the 
schoolchild's legitimate expectations of privacy and the 
school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment 
in which learning can take place? It is evident that the 
school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to 
which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. 
The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the 
school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant 
before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school 
rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the 
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures 
needed in the schools. Just as we have in other cases dis-
pensed with the warrant requirement when "the burden of 
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental 
purpose behind the search," Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U. S., at 532-533, we hold today that school officials need 
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not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under 
their authority. 
The school setting also requires some modification of the 
level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search. 
Ordinarily, a search-even one that may permissibly be car-
ried out without a warrant-must be based upon "probable 
cause" to believe that a violation of the law has occurred. 
See, e. g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 
273 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 62-66 (1968). 
However, "probable cause" is not an irreducible requirement 
of a valid search. The fundamental command of the Fourth 
Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and 
although "both the concept of probable cause and the require-
ment of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, 
. . . in certain limited circumstances neither is required." 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, at 277 (POWELL, 
J., concurring). Thus, we have in a number of cases recog-
nized the legality of searches and seizures based on suspi-
cions that, although "reasonable," do not rise to the level of 
probable cause. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881 (1975); 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976); cf. Camara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 534-539. Where a careful 
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests 
that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amend-
ment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable 
cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard. 
We join the majority of courts that have examined this 
issue 6 in concluding that the accommodation of the privacy 
interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teach-
ers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the 
schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement 
that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the 
'See cases cited in ~· 2, supra. 
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subject of the search has violated or is violating the law. 
Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend 
simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of 
the search. Determining the reasonableness of any search 
involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider "whether 
the ... action was justified at its inception," Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U. S., at 20; second, one must determine whether the 
search as actually conducted "was reasonably related in scope 
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the 
first place," ibid. Under ordinary circumstances, a search of 
a student by a teacher or other school official' will be "justi-
fied at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the stu-
dent has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of 
the school. 8 Such a search ~ll be permissible in its scope 
'We here consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting 
alone and on their own authority. This case does not present the question 
of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted 
by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement 
agencies, and we express no opinion on that question. Cf. Picha v. 
Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976) (holding probable 
cause standard applicable to searches involving the police). 
8 We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential ele-
ment of the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school au-
thorities. In other contexts, however, we have held that although "some 
quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitu-
tional search or seizure[,] ... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreduc-
ible requirement of such suspicion." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U. S. 543, 560-561 (1976). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U. S. 523 (1967). Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspi-
cion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated 
by a search are minimal and where "other safeguards" are available "to as-
sure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject 
to the discretion of the official in the field.'" Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979) (citation omitted). Because the search of 
T. L. O.'s purse was based upon an individualized suspicion that she had 
violated school rules, see infra, at 16-20, we need not consider the circum-
stances that might justify school authorities in conducting searches unsup-
ported by individualized suspicion. 
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when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the ob-
jectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of 
the age and sex of the student and the nature of the 
infraction. 9 
9 Our reference to the nature of the infraction is not intended as an en-
dorsement of JUSTICE STEVENS' suggestion that some rules regarding stu-
dent conduct are by nature too "trivial" to justify a search based upon rea-
sonable suspicion. See post, at --. We are unwilling to adopt a 
standard under which the legality of a search is dependent upon a judge's 
evaluation of the relative importance of various school rules. The mainte-
nance of discipline in the schools requires not only that students be re-
strained from assaulting one another, abusing drugs and alcohol, and com-
mitting other crimes, but also that students conform themselves to the 
standards of conduct prescribed by school authorities. We have "repeat-
edly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional 
safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 507 
(1969). The promulgation of a rule forbidding specified conduct presum-
ably reflects a judgment on the part of school officials that such conduct is 
destructive of school order or of a proper educational environment. Ab-
sent any suggestion that the rule violates some substantive constitutional 
guarantee, the courts should, as a general matter, defer to that judgment 
and refrain from attempting to distinguish between rules that are impor-
tant to the preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not. 
Thus, in most cases, the nature of the infraction will enter into the calcu-
lus only to the extent that it affects the likelihood that a search of any given 
level of intrusiveness will reveal evidence bearing directly on the infrac-
tion. Suspicions relating to certain kinds of infractions (for example, vi-
olations of rules against the possession or use of particular items) will fre-
quently provide grounds for a search, while suspicions of other infractions 
(for example, rules regulating conduct unrelated to possession or use of 
physical objects) will rarely provide any justification for a search. In the 
ordinary case, a search limited in scope to measures reasonably likely to 
turn up evidence of an infraction will not be deemed to violate the Constitu-
tion. Nonetheless, certain extraordinarily intrusive searches (as, for ex-
ample, "strip searches" or body cavity searches) may be justifiable, if at all, 
only when there is reason to believe that they will reveal evidence that a 
student has violated some criminal law or poses a significant and immediate 
threat to the safety of fellow students. It is only in the exceptional case in 
which the authorities have resorted to such extreme measures, however, 
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This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the 
efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their schools 
nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of 
schoolchildren. By focusing attention on the question of 
reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school 
administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the 
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their 
conduct according to the dictates of reason and common 
sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard 
should ensure that the interests of students will be invaded 
no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of 
preserving order in the schools. 
IV 
There remains the question of the legality of the search in 
this case. We recognize that the "reasonable grounds" 
standard applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its 
consideration of this question is not substantially different 
from the standard that we have adopted today. Nonethe-
less, we believe that the New Jersey court's application of 
that standard to strike down the search ofT. L. O.'s purse 
reflects a somewhat crabbed notion of reasonableness. Our 
review of the facts surrounding the search leads us to con-
clude that the search was in no sense unreasonable for 
Fourth Amendment purposes. 10 
The incident that gave rise to this case actually involved 
two separate searches, with the first-the search for ciga-
that the court's perception of the importance of the rule that the school offi-
cials have sought to enforce in carrying out a search should be a factor in 
determining the legality of the search. In most cases, the need to consider 
the importance of the underlying rule will not arise, because excessively 
intrusive searches will be prevented by the requirement that any intrusion 
be justified by a reasonable likelihood that it will reveal evidence of an 
infraction. 
10 0f course, New Jersey may insist on a more demanding standard 
under its own Constitution or statutes. In that case, its courts would not 
purport to be applying the Fourth Amendment when they invalidate a 
search. 
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rettes-providing the suspicion that gave rise to the sec-
ond-the search for marihuana. Although it is the fruits of 
the second search that are at issue here, the validity of the 
search for marihuana must depend on the reasonableness of 
the initial search for cigarettes, as there would have been no 
reason to suspect that T. L. 0. possessed marihuana had the 
first search not taken place. Accordingly, it is to the search 
for cigarettes that we first turn our attention. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed to two grounds 
for its holding that the search for cigarettes was unreason-
able. First, the court observed that possession of cigarettes 
was not in itself illegal or a violation of school rules. Because 
the contents ofT. L. O.'s purse would therefore have "nodi-
rect bearing on the infraction" of which she was accused 
(smoking in a lavatory where smoking was prohibited), there 
was no reason to search her purse. 11 Second, even assuming 
that a search ofT. L. O.'s purse might under some circum-
stances be reasonable in light of the accusation made against 
T. L. 0., the New Jersey court concluded that Mr. Choplick 
in this particular case had no reasonable grounds to suspect 
that T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse. At best, accord-
11 JUSTICE STEVENS interprets these statements as a holding that en-
forcement of the school's smoking regulations was not sufficiently related 
to the goal of maintaining discipline or order in the school to justify a 
search under the standard adopted by the New Jersey court. See post, at 
--. We do not agree that this is an accurate characterization of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court's opinion. The New Jersey court did not hold that 
the school's smoking rules were unrelated to the goal of maintaining disci-
pline or order, nor did it suggest that a search that would produce evidence 
bearing directly on an accusation that a student had violated the smoking 
rules would be impermissible under the court's reasonable suspicion stand-
ard; rather, the court concluded that any evidence a search ofT. L. O.'s 
purse was likely to produce would not have a sufficiently direct bearing on 
the infraction to justify a search-a conclusion with which we cannot agree 
for the reasons set forth infra, at --. JUSTICE STEVENS' suggestion 
that the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision rested on the perceived 
triviality of the smoking infraction appears to be a reflection of his own 
views rather than those of the New Jersey court. 
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ing to the court, Mr. Choplick had "a good hunch." 94 N. J., 
at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942. 
Both these conclusions are implausible. T. L. 0. had been 
accused of smoking, and had denied the accusation in the 
strongest possible terms when she stated that she did not 
smoke at all. Surely it cannot be said that under these cir-
cumstances, T. L. O.'s possession of cigarettes would be ir-
relevant to the charges against her or to her response to 
those charges. T. L. O.'s possession of cigarettes, once it 
was discovered, would both corroborate the report that she 
had been smoking and undermine the credibility of her de-
fense to the charge of smoking. To be sure, the discovery of 
the cigarettes would not prove that T. L. 0. had been smok-
ing in the lavatory; nor would it, strictly speaking, necessar-
ily be inconsistent with her claim that she did not smoke at 
all. But it is universally recognized that evidence, to be rel-
evant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate 
fact in issue, but only have "any tendency to make the exist-
ence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence.'' Fed. Rule Evid. 401. The rele-
vance ofT. L. O.'s possession of cigarettes to the question 
whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her 
denial that she smoked supplied the necessary "nexus" be-
tween the item searched for and the infraction under investi-
gation. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 306-307 
(1967). Thus, if Mr. Choplick in fact had a reasonable suspi-
cion that T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse, the search was 
justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if found, would 
constitute "mere evidence" of a violation. Ibid. 
Of course, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that 
Mr. Choplick had no reasonable suspicion that the purse 
would contain cigarettes. This conclusion is puzzling. A 
teacher had reported that T. L. 0. was smoking in the lava-
tory. Certainly this report gave Mr. Choplick reason to sus-
pect that T. L. 0. was carrying cigarettes with her; and if 
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she did have cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place in 
which to find them. Mr. Choplick's suspicion that there 
were cigarettes in the purse was not an "inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,"' Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U. S., at 27; rather, it was the sort of"common-sense conclu-
sio[n] about human behavior" upon which "practical peo-
ple"-including government officials-are entitled to rely. 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). Of 
course, even if the teacher's report were true, T. L. 0. might 
not have had a pack of cigarettes with her; she might have 
borrowed a cigarette from someone else or have been sharing 
a cigarette with another student. But the requirement of 
reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute cer-
tainty: "sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone 
of reasonableness under the Fs*Hth Amendment . . . . " 
Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 79 , 04 (1971). Because the 
hypothesis that T. L. 0. was carrying cigarettes in her purse 
was itself not unreasonable, it is irrelevant that other hy-
potheses were also consistent with the teacher's accusation. 
Accordingly, it cannot be said that Mr. Choplick acted unrea-
sonably when he examined T. L. O.'s purse to see if it con-
tained cigarettes. 12 
l2 T. L. 0. contends that even if it was reasonable for Mr. Choplick to 
open her purse to look for cigarettes, it was not reasonable for him to reach 
in and take the cigarettes out of her purse once he found them. Had he 
not removed the cigarettes from the purse, she asserts, he would not have 
observed the rolling papers that suggested the presence of marihuana, and 
the search for marihuana could not have taken place. T. L. 0. 's argument 
is based on the fact that the cigarettes were not "contraband," as no school 
rule forbade her to have them. Thus, according toT. L. 0., the cigarettes 
were not subject to seizure or confiscation by school authorities, and Mr. 
Choplick was not entitled to take them out ofT. L. O.'s purse regardless of 
whether he was entitled to peer into the purse to see if they were there. 
Such hairsplitting argumentation has no place in an inquiry addressed to 
the issue of reasonableness. If Mr. Choplick could pemrissibly search 
T. L. O.'s purse for cigarettes, it hardly seems reasonable to suggest that 
his natural reaction to finding them-picking them up---eould be a constitu-
tional violation. We find that neither in opening the purse nor in reaching 
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Our conclusion that Mr. Choplick's decision to open 
T. L. O.'s purse was reasonable brings us to the question of 
the further search for marihuana once the pack of cigarettes 
was located. The suspicion upon which the search for mari-
huana was founded was provided when Mr. Choplick ob-
served a package of rolling papers in the purse as he removed 
the pack of cigarettes. Although T. L. 0. does not dispute 
the reasonableness of Mr. Choplick's belief that the rolling 
papers indicated the presence of marihuana, she does contend 
that the scope of the search Mr. Choplick conducted exceeded 
permissible bounds when he seized and read certain letters 
that implicated T. L. 0. in drug dealing. This argument, 
too, is unpersuasive. The discovery of the rolling papers 
concededly gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that T. L. 0. 
was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her purse. 
This suspicion justified further exploration of T. L. O.'s 
purse, which turned up more evidence of drug-related activi-
ties: a pipe, a number of plastic bags of the t)rpe commonly 
used to store marihuana, a small quantity of marihuana, and 
a fairly substantial. amount of money. Under these circum-
stances, it was not unreasonable to extend the search to a 
separate zippered compartment of the purse; and when a 
search of that compartment revealed an index card contain-
ing a list of "people who owe me money" as well as two let-
ters, the inference that T. L. 0. was involved in marihuana 
trafficking was substantial enough to justify Mr. Choplick in 
examining the letters to determine whether they contained 
any further evidence. In short, we cannot conclude that the 
search for marihuana was unreasonable in any respect. 
Because the search resulting in the discovery of the evi-
dence of marihuana dealing by T. L. 0. was reasonable,· the 
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision to exclude that evi-
dence from T. L. O.'s juvenile delinquency proceedings on 
into it to remove the cigarettes did Mr. Choplick violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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Fourth Amendment grounds was erroneous. Accordingly, 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is 
Reversed. 
v-u-'1 vWU ~ Jct~-J;u ~- · cL-s~J--. 
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
" ... One nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and 
justice for all." 
"But, my child, you must remember that there are certain 
exceptions . . . . " 
I 
Justice Brandeis was both a great student and a great 
teacher. It was he who wrote: 
"Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent 
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people 
by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Govern-
ment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; 
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it in-
vites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 
438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion). 
Those of us who revere the flag and the ideals for which it 
stands believe in the power of symbols. Rules of law have a 
symbolic power that may vastly exceed their utility. Ques-
tions about the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule 
are often answered with utilitarian judgments about its de-
terrent impact on the behavior of unknown officials in un-
known circumstances. That approach results from mistaken 
priorities. Practical considerations require us to place limits 
on the ideal application of some of our constitutional values~ 
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such considerations are not, however, the basic motivating 
rationale for the rules themselves. 
Serious practical problems attend the maintenance of disci-
pline in a school setting. Official behavior that would consti-
tute an intolerable intrusion into privacy in a domestic set-
ting may be entirely reasonable in the classroom. Moreover, 
it is arguable that the manner in which a teacher acquires 
knowledge of facts that justify the discipline of a student 
should be irrelevant to the administration of an appropriate 
punishment. This case, however, does not involve any ques-
tion concerning a school disciplinary proceeding; a school's 
authority to ta~ whatever steps are necessary, up to and in-
cluding the expJBsion of a student, in order to protect other 
students and preserve an appropriate educational environ- 1 
ment, is simply not at issue here. The case deals only witliJ 
an evidentiary question that can arise only in a criminal pro- ~ 
ceeding after an unconstitutional search and seizure has 
occurred. 
Because it has agreed to hear this case even though the 
merits of the Fourth Amendment issue are not presented in 
the State's petition for certiorari, the majority does not tell 
us what conduct by school officials violates the Fourth 
Amendment; its decision is made in a kind of vacuum that 
makes it less than apparent what methods may be used under 
today's holding to obtain evidence for use in a criminal pros-
ecution. However, a few things are clear about the conse-
quences of today's holding. The majority itself tells us that 
its holding applies when a school official has "no reasonable 
grounds" for undertaking a search or seizure. Ante, at 6-7, 
n. 3. Moreover, in determining what a reasonable search or 
seizure is within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 1 
judgments as to reasonableness are appropriately informed 
1 The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " 
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by the State's broad power to protect minors in its care, 2 and 
the necessarily ample discretion afforded school officials to 
maintain an appropriate educational environment. 3 Given 
these premises, it will likely be the case that only the most 
abusive search and seizure will cross the line into constitu-
tional unreasonableness. Thus, the random body cavity j 
search, the arbitrary strip search-in short, the tactics of the 
police state-may well be the kinds of methods for obtaining 
evidence that are ultimately at issue here. 
II 
The Court's decision not to apply the exclusionary rule to 
evidence obtained by school officials in the course of their du-
ties rests on an empirical judgment: "prohibiting the use in 
the criminal-justice system of evidence obtained in such 
searches may well have none of the behavioral effects on 
either school officials or school boards that exclusion of ille-
gally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions is generally 
thought to have on the typical law enforcement official." 
Ante, at 9--10. The Court cites no empirical evidence in sup-
port of its conclusion; there is none in the record. The 
Court's assumptions about the sociology of schools may be 
correct,4 but they are based not on any principle of law, nor 
2 See, e. g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.-,- (1984); McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion); id., at 351--352 
(WHITE, J., concurring). 
3 See, e. g., Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863-864, 868 
(1982) (plurality opinion); id., at 880-881 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment); id., at 889 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting); 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 681--Q82 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U. S. 565, 589-590 (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
• However, their correctness surely is not clear beyond doubt. The 
record tells us nothing about the duties or responsibilities of the vice-prin-
cipal who searched TLO. For all we know, an important part of his job 
was to refer students who have committed crimes to the authorities and to 
ensure that they are successfully prosecuted. A number of States have 
statutes requiring school officials to report certain kinds of criminal con-
duct by students to the authorities so that they may be prosecuted. See 
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on anything in the record. Instead, they are premised on 
five Justices' personal experiences and beliefs. 
The problem with this approach has been candidly identi-
fied by JUSTICE BLACKMUN: "Like all courts, we face institu-
tional limitations on our ability to gather information about 
'legislative facts,' and the exclusionary rule itself has exacer-
bated the shortage of hard data concerning the behavior of 
police officers in the absence of such a rule." United States 
v. Leon, ante, at-- (concurring opinion). This case illus-
trates the problem. I am unaware of how we have gathered 
or could gather information about the relevant "legislative 
facts." 5 That being the case, I think it unwise to make law 
based on little more than our best guesses. 
The rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), is perfectly 
adequate to decide the case before us: "We hold that all evi-
dence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the 
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a 
state court." I d., at 655. It is true that this holding rested, 
in part, o its deterrent effect, see id., at 656, and as a gen- n 
eral matter it is tolerably clear to me, as it has been to the 
Court, that the existence of an exclusionary remedy does de-
ter the authorities from violating the Fourth Amendment by 
sharply reducing their incentive to do so. 6 But beyond that 
Ala. Code § 1~1-24 (Supp. 1983); Cal. Educ. Code § 48902 (West Supp. 
1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-233g (West Supp. 1983); Haw. Rev. Stat. 
§ 29~ 71 (Supp. 1983); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, § 10-21.7 (1983); Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 49-6-4301 (repl. 1983). Thus, in these States school officials have 
been in effect assigned law enforcment duties. Informal policies to similar 
effect may be widespread. 
5 Until today, the Court had proceeded with more caution in this area, 
recognizing the difficulty of gathering data and making empirical judg-
ments as to the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. See Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 
449-453 (1976). 
6 See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v. 
Janis , 428 U. S. 433, 453 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. · S. 338, 
347-348 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 174-175 (1969). 
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generalized judgment I have little confidence in our ability to 
gather "legislative facts" sufficient to engage in the kind of 
exacting sociological analysis necessary to holdings like that 
of today's majority. 7 For whatever the limitations on the 
use of the exclusionary rule in collateral contexts, ante, at 
7-S, until today, "[t]he Court has not questioned, in the ab-
sence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued application 
of the rule to suppress evidence from the State's case where 
the Fourth Amendment violation has been deliberate and 
substantial." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171 
(1978). 8 I would not start down the road of creating ad hoc 
exceptions to the rule of M app v. Ohio. 
III 
It was no accident that in M app the Court harkened back 
to Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent in explaining its hold-
ing. 9 The exclusionary rule does have an "overall educative 
effect." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493 (1976). No-
where would it be more anomalous to deprecate the impor-
tance of that effect than in our schools: 
7 Moreover, one "legislative fact" overlooked by the majority is that its 
holding may invite abuse and generate litigation, by tempting some law en-
forcement officials to solicit covertly the aid of school authorities in obtain-
ing evidence that can be used in criminal prosecutions. It was its experi-
ence with this same type of abuse-the danger that federal law 
enforcement officials would seek the aid of state officials not subject to the 
exclusionary rule in order to obtain evidence-that induced this Court to 
hold that state officials should be subject to the same exclusionary rule as 
are federal authorities. See Mapp , 367 U. S., at 658. Cf. Elkins v. 
United States , 364 U. S. 206 (1960) (rejecting for similar reasons the "sil-
ver platter doctrine" which allowed federal courts to admit evidence ob-
tained by state authorities in violation of the Constitution if done without 
involvement of federal officers). 
8 The Court has consistently held that there is no alternative remedy of 
demonstrated efficacy to the suppression of evidence. See Franks, 438 
U. S. , at 652-653; Mapp, 367 U. s~; at 652-653. 
9 See 367 U.S., at 659. 
6 
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"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the 
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and 
all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. 
These have, of course, delicate, and highly discretionary 
functions, but none that they may not perform within the 
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating th~ 
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection 
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not 
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to 
discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes." West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943). 
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential 
to a self-governing citizenry that can responsibly exercise the 
rights and responsibilities it has under our Constitution. 10 If 
the Nation's students can be convicted through the use of ar-
bitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot 
help but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly. 11 If 
10 See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864-865 (1982) (plural-
ity opinion); id., at 876, 880 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 221 (1982); Tinker v. Des 
Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 507, 511-513 (1969). 
11 Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 26--27 (1967) (conviction of juveniles 
through processes lacking in procedural regularity alienate them by creat-
ing an appearance of arbitrariness). 
Justice Frankfurter, who did not advocate applying the exclusionary rule 
to the States, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), nevertheless re-
spected the warning in Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent. See Irvine v. 
California, 347 U. S. 128, 149 (1954) (dissenting opinion) (footnote omit-
ted) ("Of course it is a loss to the community when a conviction is over-
turned because the indefensible means by which it was obtained cannot be 
squared with the commands of due process. A new trial is necessitated, 
and by reason of the exclusion of evidence derived from the unfair aspects 
of the prior prosecution a guilty defendant may escape. But the people 
can avoid such miscarriages of justice. A sturdy, self-respecting demo-
cratic community should not put up with lawless police and prosecutors. 
'Oui people may tolerate many mistakes of both intent and performance, 
but, with unerring instinct, they know that when any person is intention-
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they or their companions are deprived of their liberty 
through such methods, being left to a speculative and proba-
bly unrewarding civil remedy, they cannot but conclude that 
the ideals of our Constitution are but "a form of words";12 the 
belief that ours is a Government of laws and not men and that 
the Constitution is a fundamental charter of human liberty 
cannot but be sullied. 13 
ally deprived of his constitutional rights those responsible have committed 
no ordinary offense. A crime of this nature, if subtly encouraged by fail-
ure to condemn and punish, certainly leads down the road to totalitarian-
ism."'); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173--174 (1952) ("It has long 
since ceased to be true that due process of law is heedless of the means by 
which otherwise relevant and credible evidence is obtained. . . . [T]he 
general requirement [is] that States in their prosecutions respect certain 
decencies of civilized conduct. . . . [T]o sanction the brutal conduct which 
naturally enough was condemned by the court whose judgment is before 
us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be more 
calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a 
society."). 
12 The Mapp Court wrote: 
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared en-
forceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as 
is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as 
. . . the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures 
would be 'a form of words,' valueless and undeserving of mention in a per-
petual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the 
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so 
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish 
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a 
freedom 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 367 U. S., at 655. 
18 JUSTICE BRENNAN has written of an analogous case: 
"We do not know what class petitioner was in when the police and dogs 
burst in, but the lesson the school authorities taught her that day will un-
doubtedly make a greater impression than the one her teacher had hoped 
to convey. I would grant certiorari to teach petitioner another lesson: 
that the Fourth Amendment protects '[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures,' and that before police and local officers are permit-
ted to conduct dog-assisted dragnet inspections of public school students, 
they must obtain a warrant based on sufficient particularized evidence to 
• 
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If the validity of the Court's holding is to be judged en-
tirely by its deterrent value, the result is a matter of small 
importance. But if we look to the symbolic value of the hold-
ing-if we examine it as a statement about the Constitution's 
importance to our Nation-then the Court is surely wrong. 
This is a case in which the Court has an opportunity-at a rel-
atively low cost-to teach our students "that our society at-
taches serious consequences to violation of constitutional 
rights." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493 (1976). Be-
cause I consider that message more important than the pres-
ervation of this evidence for use in a criminal proceeding 
against an errant child, I respectfully dissent. 
establish probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed. 
Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship 
when the school authorities themselves disregard the fundamental princi-
ples underpinning our constitutional freedoms." Doe v. Renfrow, 451 
U. S. 1022, 1027-1028 (1981) (BRENNAN, J ., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. t:JJ-1~~-. 
" ... One nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and f' / -~ -~ 
justice for all." 
"But, my child, you must remember that there are certain 
exceptions . . . . " 
I 
Justice Brandeis was both a great student and a great 
teacher. It was he who wrote: 
"Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent 
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people 
by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Govern-
ment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; 
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it in-
vites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 
438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion). 
Those of us who revere the flag and the ideals for which it 
stands believe in the power of symbols. Rules of law have a 
symbolic power that may vastly exceed their utility. Ques-
tions about the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule 
are often answered with utilitarian judgments about its de-
terrent impact on the behavior of unknown officials in un-
known circumstances. That approach results from mistaken 
priorities. Practical considerations require us to place limits 
on the ideal application of some of our constitutional values; 
~ . 
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such considerations are not, however, the basic motivating 
rationale for the rules themselves. 
Serious practical problems attend the maintenance of disci-
pline in a school setting. Official behavior that would consti-
tute an intolerable intrusion into privacy in a domestic set-
ting may be entirely reasonable in the classroom. Moreover, 
it is arguable that the manner in which a teacher acquires 
knowledge of facts that justify the discipline of a student 
should be irrelevant to the administration of an appropriate 
punishment. This case, however, does not involve any ques-
tion concerning a school disciplinary proceeding; a school's 
authority to take whatever steps are necessary, up to and in-
cluding the ex~sion of a student, in order to protect other 
students and preserve an appropriate educational environ-
ment, is simply not at issue here. The case deals only with 
an evidentiary question that can arise only in a criminal pro-
ceeding after an unconstitutional search and seizure has 
occurred. 
Because it has agreed to hear this case even though the 
merits of the Fourth Amendment issue are not presented in 
the State's petition for certiorari, the majority does not tell 
us what conduct by school officials violates the Fourth 
Amendment; its decision is made in a kind of vacuum that 
makes it less than apparent what methods may be used under 
today's holding to obtain evidence for use in a criminal pros-
ecution. However, a few things are clear about the conse-
quences of today's holding. The majority itself tells us that 
its holding applies when a school official has "no reasonable 
grounds" for undertaking a search or seizure. Ante, at 6-7, 
n. 3. Moreover, in determining what a reasonable search or 
seizure is within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 1 
judgments as to reasonableness are appropriately informed 
1 The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " 
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by the State's broad power to protect minors in its care,2 and 
the necessarily ample discretion afforded school officials to 
maintain an appropriate educational environment. 3 Given 
these premises, it will likely be the case that only the most 
abusive search and seizure will cross the line into constitu-
tional unreasonableness. Thus, the random body cavity 
search, the arbitrary strip search-in short, the tactics of the 
police state-may well be the kinds of methods for obtaining 
evidence that are ultimately at issue here. 
II 
The Court's decision not to apply the exclusionary rule to 
evidence obtained by school officials in the course of their du-
ties rests on an empirical judgment: "prohibiting the use in 
the criminal-justice system of evidence obtained in such 
searches may well have none of the behavioral effects on 
either school officials or school boards that exclusion of ille-
gally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions is generally 
thought to have on the typical law enforcement official." 
Ante, at 9-10. The Court cites no empirical evidence in sup-
port · of its conclusion; there is none in the record. The 
Court's assumptions about the sociology of schools may be 
correct, ' but they are based not on any principle of law, nor 
2 See, e. g.,. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.-, - (1984); McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion); id. , at 351-352 
(WHITE, J., concurring). 
3 See, e. g., Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 863-864,868 
(1982) (plurality opinion); id., at 880-881 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment); id., at 889 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting); 
Ingraham v. Wright , 430 U. S. 651, 681-682 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U. S. 565, 589-590 (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
'However, their correctness surely is not clear beyond doubt. The 
record tells us nothing about the duties or responsibilities of the vice-prin· 
cipal who searched TLO. For all we know, an important part of his job 
was to refer students who have committed crimes to the authorities and to 
ensure that they are successfully prosecuted. A number of States have 
statutes requiring school officials to report certain kinds of criminal con-
duct by students to the authorities so that they may be prosecuted. See 
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on anything in the record. Instead, they are premised on 
five Justices' personal experiences and beliefs. 
The problem with this approach has been candidly identi-
fied by JUSTICE BLACKMUN: "Like all courts, we face institu-
tional limitations on our ability to gather information about 
'legislative facts,' and the exclusionary rule itself has exacer-
bated the shortage of hard data concerning the behavior of 
police officers in the absence of such a rule." United States 
v. Leon, ante, at-- (concurring opinion). This case illus-
trates the problem. I am unaware of how we have gathered 
or could gather information about the relevant "legislative 
facts." 5 That being the case, I think it unwise to make law 
based on little more than our best guesses. 
The rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), is perfectly 
adequate to decide the case before us: "We hold that all evi-
dence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the 
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a 
state court." !d., at 655. It is true that this holding rested, 
in part, o its deterrent effect, see id., at 656, and as a gen-
eral matter it is tolerably clear to me, as it has been to the 
Court, that the existence of an exclusionary remedy does de-
ter the authorities from violating the Fourth Amendment by 
sharply reducing their incentive to do so. 6 But beyond that 
Ala. Code § 1&-1-24 (Supp. 1983); Cal. Educ. Code § 48902 (West Supp. 
1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-233g (West Supp. 1983); Haw. Rev. Stat. 
§ 29&-71 (Supp. 1983); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, § 10-21.7 (1983); Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 49--6-4301 (repl. 1983). Thus, in these States school officials have 
been in effect assigned law enforcment duties. Informal policies to similar 
effect may be widespread. 
• Until today, the Court had proceeded with more caution in this area, 
recognizing the difficulty of gathering data and making empirical judg-
ments as to the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. See Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v. Janis , 428 U. S. 433, 
449-453 (1976). 
6 See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v. 
Janis , 428 U. S. 433, 453 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 
347-348 (1974); Alderman v. United States , 394 U. S. 165, 174-175 (1969). 
. . 
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generalized judgment I have little confidence in our ability to 
gather "legislative facts" sufficient to 1mgage in the kind of 
exacting sociological analysis necessary to holdings like that 
of today's majority. 7 For whatever the limitations on the 
use of the exclusionary rule in collateral contexts, ante, at 
7--8, until today, "[t]he Court has not questioned, in the ab-
sence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued application 
of the rule to suppress evidence from the State's case where 
the Fourth Amendment violation has been deliberate and 
substantial." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171 
(1978). 8 I would not start down the road of creating ad hoc 
exceptions to the rule of M app v. Ohio. 
III 
It was no accident that in M app the Court harkened back 
to Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent in explaining its hold-
ing. 9 The exclusionary· rule does have an "overall educative 
effect." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493 (1976). No-
where would it be more anomalous to deprecate the impor-
tance of that effect than in our schools: 
7 Moreover, one "legislative fact" overlooked by the majority is that its 
holding may invite abuse and generate litigation, by tempting some law en-
forcement officials to solicit covertly the aid of school authorities in obtain-
ing evidence that can be used in criminal prosecutions. It was its experi-
ence with this same type of abuse-the danger that federal law 
enforcement officials would seek the aid of state officials not subject to the 
exclusionary rule in order to obtain evidence-that induced this Court to 
hold that state officials should be subject to the same exclusionary rule as 
are federal authorities. See Mapp, 367 U. S., at 658. Cf. Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960) (rejecting for similar reasons the "sil-
ver platter doctrine" which allowed federal courts to admit evidence ob-
tained by state authorities in violation of the Constitution if done without 
involvement of federal officers). 
8 The Court has consistently held that there is no alternative remedy of 
demonstrated efficacy to the suppression of evidence. See Franks, 438 
U. S., at 652-653; Mapp, 367 U. S., at 652-653. 
9 See 367 U. S., at 659. 
6 
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"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the 
States, p.rutects the citizen against the State itself and 
all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. 
These have, of course, delicate, and highly discretionary 
functions, but none that they may not perform within the 
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the 
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection 
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not 
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to 
discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes." West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943). 
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential 
to a self-governing citizenry that can responsibly exercise the 
rights and responsibilities it has under our Constitution. 10 If 
the Nation's students can be convicted through the use of ar-
bitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot 
help but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly." If 
10 See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864-865 (1982) (plural-
ity opinion); id., at 876, 880 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 221 (1982); Tinker v. Des 
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 511-513 (1969). 
11 Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 2&-27 (1967) (conviction of juveniles 
through processes lacking in procedural regularity alienate them by creat-
ing an appearance of arbitrariness). 
Justice Frankfurter, who did not advocate applying the exclusionary rule 
to the States, see Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), nevertheless re-
spected the warning in Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent. See Irvine v. 
California, 347 U. S. 128, 149 (1954) (dissenting opinion) (footnote omit-
ted) ("Of course it is a loss to the community when a conviction is over-
turned because the indefensible means by which it was obtained cannot be 
squared with the commands of due process. A new trial is necessitated, 
and by reason of the exclusion of evidence derived from the unfair aspects 
of the prior prosecution a guilty defendant may escape. But the people 
can avoid such miscarriages of justice. A sturdy, self-respecting demo-
cratic community should not put up with lawless police and prosecutors. 
'Our people may tolerate many mistakes of both intent and performance, 
but, with unerring instinct, they know that when any person is intention-
. . 
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they or their companions are deprived of their liberty 
through such methods, being left to a speculative and proba-
bly unrewarding civil remedy, they cannot but conclude that 
the ideals of our Constitution are but "a form of words";12 the 
belief that ours is a Government of laws and not men and that 
the Constitution is a fundamental charter of human liberty 
cannot but be sullied. 13 
ally deprived of his constitutional rights those responsible have committed 
no ordinary offense. A crime of this nature, if subtly encouraged by fail-
ure to condemn and punish, certainly leads down the road to totalitarian-
ism."'); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 173-174 (1952) ("It has long 
since ceased to be true that due process of law is heedless of the means by 
which otherwise relevant and credible evidence is obtained. . . . [T]he 
general requirement [is] that States in their prosecutions respect certain 
decencies of civilized conduct. . . . [T]o sanction the brutal conduct which 
naturally enough was condemned by the court whose judgment is before 
us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be more 
calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a 
society."). 
12 The Mapp Court wrote: 
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared en-
forceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as 
is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as 
. . . the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures 
would be 'a form of words,' valueless and undeserving of mention in a per-
petual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the 
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so 
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish 
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a 
freedom 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" 367 U. S., at 655. 
13 JUSTICE BRENNAN has written of an analogous case: 
"We do not know what class petitioner was in when the police and dogs 
burst in, but the lesson the school authorities taught her that day will un-
doubtedly make a greater impression than the one her teacher had hoped 
to convey. I would grant certiorari to teach petitioner another lesson: 
that the Fourth Amendment protects '[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures,' and that before police and local officers are permit-
ted to conduct dog-assisted dragnet inspections of public school students, 
they must obtain a warrant based on sufficient particularized evidence to 
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8 NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0. 
If the validity of the Court's holding is to be judged en-
tirely by its deterrent value, the result is a matter of small 
importance. But if we look to the symbolic value of the hold-
ing-if we examine it as a statement about the Constitution's 
importance to our Nation-then the Court is surely wrong. 
This is a case in which the Court has an opportunity-at a rel-
atively low cost-to teach our students "that our society at-
taches serious consequences to violation of constitutional 
rights." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493 (1976). Be-
cause I consider that message more important than the pres-
ervation of this evidence for use in a criminal proceeding 
against an errant child, I respectfully dissent. 
establish probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed. 
Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship 
when the school authorities themselves disregard the fundamental princi-
ples underpinning our constitutional freedoms." Doe v. Renfrow, 451 
U. S. 1022, 1027-1028 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
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JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and I 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, join, dissenting. 
" ... One nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and 
justice for all." 
But, my child, you must remember that there are certain 
exceptions . . . . 
I 
Justice Brandeis was both a great student and a great 
teacher. It was he who wrote: 
"Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent 
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people 
by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Govern-
ment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; 
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it in-
vites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 
438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion). 
Those of us who revere the flag and the ideals for which it 
stands believe in the power of symbols. Rules of law have a 
symbolic power that may vastly exceed their utility. Ques-
tions about the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule 
are often answered with utilitarian judgments about its de-
terrent impact on the behavior of unknown officials in un-
known circumstances. That approach results from mistaken 
priorities. Practical considerations require us to place limits 
on the ideal application of some of our constitutional values; 
,, 
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such considerations are not, however, the basic motivating 
rationale for the rules themselves. 
Serious practical problems attend the maintenance of disci-
pline in a school setting. Official behavior that would consti-
tute an intolerable intrusion into privacy in a domestic set-
ting may be entirely reasonable in the classroom. Moreover, 
it is arguable that the manner in which a teacher acquires 
knowledge of facts that justify the discipline of a student 
should be irrelevant to the administration of an appropriate 
punishment. This case, however, does not involve any ques-
tion concerning a school disciplinary proceeding; a school's 
authority to take whatever steps are necessary, up to and in-
cluding the expulsion of a student, in order to protect other 
students and preserve an appropriate educational environ-
ment, is simply not at issue here. The case deals only with 
an evidentiary question that can arise only in a criminal pro-
ceeding after an unconstitutional search and seizure has 
occurred. 
Because it has agreed to hear this case even though the 
merits of the Fourth Amendment issue are not presented in 
the State's petition for certiorari, the majority does not tell 
us what conduct by school officials violates the Fourth 
Amendment; its decision is made in a kind of vacuum that 
makes it less than apparent what methods may be used under 
today's holding to obtain evidence for use in a criminal pros-
ecution. However, a few things are clear about the conse-
quences of today's holding. The majority itself tells us that 
its holding applies when a school official has "no reasonable 
grounds" for undertaking a search or seizure. Ante, at 6-7, 
n. 3. Moreover, in determining what a reasonable search or 
seizure is within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 1 
judgments as to reasonableness are appropriately informed 
'The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .. . . " 
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by the State's broad power to protect minors in its care, 2 and 
the necessarily ample discretion afforded school officials to 
maintain an appropriate educational environment. 3 Given 
these premises, it will likely be the case that only the most 
abusive search and seizure will cross the line into constitu-
tional unreasonableness. Thus, the random body cavity 
search, the arbitrary strip search-in short, the tactics of the 
police state-may well be the kinds of methods for obtaining 
evidence that are ultimately at issue here. 
II 
The Court's decision not to apply the exclusionary rule to 
evidence obtained by school officials in the course of their du-
ties rests on an empirical judgment: "prohibiting the use in 
the criminal-justice system of evidence obtained in such 
searches may well have none of the behavioral effects on 
either school officials or school boards that exclusion of ille-
gally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions is generally 
thought to have on the typical law enforcement official." 
Ante, at 9-10. The Court cites no empirical evidence in sup-
port of its conclusion; there is none in the record. The 
Court's assumptions about the sociology of schools may be 
correct, 4 but they are based not on any principle of law, nor 
2 See, e. g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.--,-- (1984); McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion); id., at 351-352 
(WHITE, J., concurring). 
8 See, e. g., Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863-864, 868 
(1982) (plurality opinion); id., at 880-881 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment); id., at 889 (BURGER, C. J. , dissenting); 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 681-682 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U. S. 565, 589-590 (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
• However, their correctness surely is not clear beyond doubt. The 
record tells us nothing about the duties or responsibilities of the vice-prin-
cipal who searched TLO. For all we know, an important part of his job 
was to refer students who have committed crimes to the authorities and to 
ensure that they are successfully prosecuted. A number of States have 
statutes requiring school officials to report certain kinds of criminal con-
duct by students to the authorities so that they may be prosecuted. See 
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on anything in the record. Instead, they are premised on 
five Justices' personal experiences and beliefs. 
The problem with this approach has been candidly identi-
fied by JusTICE BLACKMUN: "Like all courts, we face institu-
tional limitations on our ability to gather information about 
'legislative facts,' and the exclusionary rule itself has exacer-
bated the shortage of hard data concerning the behavior of 
police officers in the absence of such a rule." United States 
v. Leon, ante, at-- (concurring opinion). This case illus-
trates the problem. I am unaware of how we have gathered 
or could gather information about the relevant "legislative 
facts." 5 That being the case, I think it unwise to make law 
based on little more than our best guesses. 
The rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), is perfectly 
adequate to decide the case before us: "We hold that all evi-
dence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the 
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a 
state court." !d., at 655. It is true that this holding rested, 
in part, on its deterrent effect, see id., at 656, and as a gen-
eral matter it is tolerably clear to me, as it has been to the 
Court, that the existence of an exclusionary remedy does de-
ter the authorities from violating the Fourth Amendment by 
Ala. Code § 16-1-24 (Supp. 1983); Cal. Educ. Code § 48902 (West Supp. 
1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-233g (West Supp. 1983); Haw. Rev. Stat. 
§ 296-71 (Supp. 1983); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, § 10-21.7 (1983); Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 49-6-4301 (repl. 1983). Thus, in these States school officials have 
been in effect assigned law enforcment duties. Informal policies to similar 
effect may be widespread. 
6 The Court seems to rely on "prior judicial experience" as the basis for 
its empirical judgment. See ante, at 11, n. 6. However, the cases the 
Court cites ante, at 4-6, n. 2, do not contain material that supplies a data 
base for the Court's conclusion, nor even a consensus as to whether the ex-
clusionary rule should apply to such searches. Until today, the Court had 
proceeded with more caution in this area, recognizing the difficulty of gath-
ering data and making empirical judgments as to the deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976); United 
States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 449-453 (1976). 
83-712---DISSENT 
NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0. 5 
sharply reducing their incentive to do so. 6 But beyond that 
generalized judgment I have little confidence in our ability to 
gather "legislative facts" sufficient to engage in the kind of 
exacting sociological analysis necessary to holdings like that 
of today's majority. 7 For whatever the limitations on the 
use of the exclusionary rule in collateral contexts, ante, at 
7-8, until today, "[t]he Court has not questioned, in the ab-
sence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued application 
of the rule to suppress evidence from the State's case where 
the Fourth Amendment violation has been deliberate and 
substantial." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171 
(1978). 8 I would not start down the road of creating ad hoc 
exceptions to the rule of M app v. Ohio. 
III 
It was no accident that in M app the Court harkened back 
to Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent in explaining its hold-
ing. 9 The exclusionary rule does have an "overall educative 
effect." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493 (1976). No-
5 See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v. 
Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 453 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 
347-348 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 174-175 (1969). 
7 Moreover, one "legislative fact" overlooked by the majority is that its 
holding may invite abuse and generate litigation, by tempting some law 
enforcement officials to solicit covertly the aid of school authorities in ob-
taining evidence that can be used in criminal prosecutions. It was its ex-
perience with this same type of abuse-the danger that federal law en-
forcement officials would seek the aid of state officials not subject to the 
exclusionary rule in order to obtain evidence-that induced this Court to 
hold that state officials should be subject to the same exclusionary rule as 
are federal authorities. See Mapp, 367 U. S., at 658. Cf. Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960) (rejecting for similar reasons the "sil-
ver platter doctrine" which allowed federal courts to admit evidence ob-
tained by state authorities in violation of the Constitution if done without 
involvement of federal officers). 
8 The Court has consistently held that there is no alternative remedy of 
demonstrated efficacy to the suppression of evidence. See Franks, 438 
U. S., at 169; Mapp, 367 U. S., at 652-653. 
9 See 367 U.S., at 659. 
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where would it be more anomalous to deprecate the impor-
tance of that effect than in our schools: 
"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the 
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and 
all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. 
These have, of course, delicate, and highly discretionary 
functions, but none that they may not perform within the 
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the 
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection 
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not 
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to 
discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes." West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943). 
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential 
to a self-governing citizenry that can responsibly exercise the 
rights and responsibilities it has under our Constitution. 10 If 
the Nation's students can be convicted through the use of ar-
bitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot 
help but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly. 11 If 
10 See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864-865 (1982) (plural-
ity opinion); id., at 876, 880 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 221 (1982); Tinker v. Des 
Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 507, 511-513 (1969). 
11 Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 26-27 (1967) (conviction of juveniles 
through processes lacking in procedural regularity alienate them by creat-
ing an appearance of arbitrariness). 
Justice Frankfurter, who did not advocate applying the exclusionary rule 
to the States, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), nevertheless re-
spected the warning in Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent. See Irvine v. 
California, 347 U. S. 128, 149 (1954) (dissenting opinion) (footnote omit-
ted) ("Of course it is a loss to the community when a conviction is over-
turned because the indefensible means by which it was obtained cannot be 
squared with the commands of due process. A new trial is necessitated, 
and by reason of the exclusion of evidence derived from the unfair aspects 
of the prior prosecution a guilty defendant may escape. But the people 
can avoid such miscarriages of justice. A sturdy, self-respecting demo-
cratic community should not put up with lawless police and prosecutors. 
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they or their companions are deprived of their liberty 
through such methods, being left to a speculative and proba-
bly unrewarding civil remedy, they cannot but conclude that 
the ideals of our Constitution are but "a form of words"; 12 the 
belief that ours is a Government of laws and not men and that 
the Constitution is a fundamental charter of human liberty 
cannot but be sullied. 13 
'Our people may tolerate many mistakes of both intent and performance, 
but, with uneiTing instinct, they know that when any person is intention-
ally deprived of his constitutional rights those responsible have committed 
no ordinary offense. A crime of this nature, if subtly encouraged by fail-
ure to condemn and punish, certainly leads down the road to totalitarian-
ism.'"); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 173-174 (1952) ("It has long 
since ceased to be true that due process of law is heedless of the means by 
which otherwise relevant and credible evidence is obtained. . . . [T]he 
general requirement [is] that States in their prosecutions respect certain 
decencies of civilized conduct. . .. [T]o sanction the brutal conduct which 
naturally enough was condemned by the court whose judgment is before 
us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be more 
calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a 
society''). 
12 The M app Court wrote: 
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared en-
forceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as 
is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as 
. . . the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures 
would be 'a form of words,' valueless and undeserving of mention in a per-
petual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the 
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so 
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish 
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a 
freedom 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" 367 U. S., at 655. 
13 JusTICE BRENNAN has written of an analogous case: 
"We do not know what class petitioner was in when the police and dogs 
burst in, but the lesson the school authorities taught her that day will un-
doubtedly make a greater impression than the one her teacher had hoped 
to convey. I would grant certiorari to teach petitioner another lesson: 
that the Fourth Amendment protects '[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures,' and that before police and local officers are permit-
- , 
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If the validity of the Court's holding is to be judged en-
tirely by its deterrent value, the result is a matter of small 
importance. But if we look to the symbolic value of the hold-
ing-if we examine it as a statement about the Constitution's 
importance to our Nation-then the Court is surely wrong. 
This is a case in which the Court has an opportunity-at a rel-
atively low cost-to teach our students "that our society at-
taches serious consequences to violation of constitutional 
rights." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493 (1976). Be-
cause I consider that message more important than the pres-
ervation of this evidence for use in a criminal proceeding 
against an errant child, I respectfully dissent. 
ted to conduct dog-assisted dragnet inspections of public school students, 
they must obtain a warrant based on sufficient particularized evidence to 
establish probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed. 
Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship 
when the school authorities themselves disregard the fundamental princi-
ples underpinning our constitutional freedoms." Doe v. Renfrow, 451 
U. S. 1022, 1027-1028 (1981) (BRENNAN, J ., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
In its decision in this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
addressed three distinct questions: (1) what is the proper 
standard for judging the reasonableness of a school official's 
search of a student's purse; (2) on the facts of this case, did 
the school official violate that standard; and (3) whether the 
exclusionary rule bars the use in a criminal proceeding of evi-
dence that a school official obtained in violation of that stand-
ard. The Supreme Court held (1) that the correct standard 
is one of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause; (2) 
that the standard was violated in this case; and (3) that the 
evidence obtained as the result of a violation may not be in-
troduced in evidence against TLO in any criminal proceeding, 
including this delinquency proceeding. 
New Jersey's petition for certiorari sought review of only 
the third question. 1 The reasons why it did not seek review 
of either of the other two questions are tolerably clear. 
There is substantial agreement among appellate courts that 
the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the correct standard 
and it is apparently one that the New Jersey law enforcement 
authorities favor. As far as the specific facts of the case are 
concerned, presumably New Jersey believed that this Court 
1 The petition presented a single question for review: "Whether the 
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applies to searches made by public 
school officials and teachers in school." 
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is too busy to take a case just for the purpose of reviewing 
the State Supreme Court's application of this standard to the 
specific facts of this case. 
The single question presented to the Court has now been 
briefed and argued. Evidently unable or unwilling to decide 
the question presented by the parties, the Court, instead of 
dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, 
orders reargument directed to the questions that New Jersey 
decided not to bring here. This is done even though New 
Jersey agrees with its Supreme Court's resolution of these 
questions, and has no desire to seek reversal on those 
grounds. 2 Thus, in this nonadversarial context, the Court 
has decided to plunge into the merits of the Fourth Amend-
ment issues despite the fact that no litigant before it wants 
the Court's guidance on these questions. Volunteering un-
wanted advice is rarely a wise course of action. 
Of late, the Court has acquired a voracious appetite for ju-
dicial activism in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at 
least when it comes to restricting the constitutional rights of 
the citizen. In United States v. Leon, ante at --, and 
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, ante, at--, the Court fash-
ioned a new exception to the exclusionary rule despite its 
acknowledgement that narrower grounds for decision were 
available in both cases. 3 In United States v. Karo, ante, at 
--, in order to reverse a decision requiring the suppression 
2 At oral argument, the following colloquy took place between counsel 
for New Jersey and the bench: 
"QUESTION: Well, do you think it is open to us to deal with the reason-
ableness of the search? 
"MR. NODES: I believe that could be considered a question subsumed 
within the-
"QUESTION: But it wasn't your intention to raise it? 
"MR. NODES: It wasn't our intention to raise it because we agree with 
the standard that was set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court. We 
feel that that is a workable standard." Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. 
8 See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, ante, at- (STEVENS, J., concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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of evidence, the Court on its own initiative made an analysis 
of a factual question that had not been presented or argued 
by either of the parties and managed to find a basis for ruling 
in favor of the Government. In Segura v. United States, 
ante, at--, two creativejreached the surprising conclusion 
that an 18-20 hour warrantl ess occupation of a citizen's home 
was "reasonable," despite the fact that the issue had not been 
argued and the Government had expressly conceded the un-
reasonableness of the occupation. And, as I have previously 
observed, in recent Terms the Court has elected to use its 
power of summary disposition exclusively for the benefit of 
prosecutors. 4 In this case, the special judicial action is to 
order the parties to argue a constitutional question that they 
have no desire to raise, in a context in which a ground for de-
cision that the Court currently views as nonconstitutional is 
available, 5 and on which the State's chief prosecutor believes 
no guidance from this Court is necessary. 
I believe that the adversary process functions most effec-
tively when we rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than 
the activism of judges, to fashion the questions for review. I 
respectfully dissent. 
•see Florida v. Myers, 466 U.S.-,- (1984) (STEVENS, J., dis-
senting). 
' We are told that questions concerning the remedies for a Fourth 
Amendment violation are not constitutional in dimension. United States 
v. Leon, ante, at-. Apparently, this Court has imposed the exclusion-
ary rule on the States as a result of the Fourth Amendment's "invisible ra-
diations," Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.-,-, n. 12 
(1984), which act to somehow give the Court nonconstitutional supervisory 
powers over the State courts. 













SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-712 
NEW JERSEY, PETITIONER v. T. L. 0. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF NEW JERSEY 
[July-, 1984] 
JusTICE STEVENS, with whom JuSTICE MARSHALL joins, / 
dissenting. 
In its decision in this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
addressed three distinct questions: (1) what is the proper 
standard for judging the reasonableness of a school official's 
search of a student's purse; (2) on the facts of this case, did 
the school official violate that standard; and (3) whether the 
exclusionary rule bars the use in a criminal proceeding of evi-
dence that a school official obtained in violation of that stand-
ard. The Supreme Court held (1) that the correct standard 
is one of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause; (2) 
that the standard was violated in this case; and (3) that the 
evidence obtained as the result of a violation may not be in-
troduced in evidence against TLO in any criminal proceeding, 
including this delinquency proceeding. 
New Jersey's petition for certiorari sought review of only 
the third question. 1 The reasons why it did not seek review 
of either of the other two questions are tolerably clear. 
There is substantial agreement among appellate courts that 
the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the correct standard 
and it is apparently one that the New Jersey law enforcement 
authorities favor. As far as the specific facts of the case are 
' The petition presented a single question for review: "Whether the 
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applies to searches made by public 
school officials and teachers in school." 
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concerned, presumably New Jersey believed that this Court 
is too busy to take a case just for the purpose of reviewing 
the State Supreme Court's application of this standard to the 
specific facts of this case. 
The single question presented to the Court has now been 
briefed and argued. Evidently unable or unwilling to decide 
the question presented by the parties, the Court, instead of 
dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, 
orders reargument directed to the questions that New Jersey 
decided not to bring here. This is done even though New 
Jersey agrees with its Supreme Court's resolution of these 
questions, and has no desire to seek reversal on those 
grounds. 2 Thus, in this nonadversarial context, the Court 
has decided to plunge into the merits of the Fourth Amend-
ment issues despite the fact that no litigant before it wants 
the Court's guidance on these questions. Volunteering un-
wanted advice is rarely a wise course of action. 
Of late, the Court has acquired a voracious appetite for ju-
dicial activism in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at 
least when it comes to restricting the constitutional rights of 
the citizen. In United States v. Leon, ante at --, and 
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, ante, at --, the Court fash-
ioned a new exception to the exclusionary rule despite its 
acknowledgement that narrower grounds for decision were 
available in both cases. 3 In United States v. Karo, ante, at 
2 At oral argument, the following colloquy took place between counsel 
for New Jersey and the bench: 
"QUESTION: Well, do you think it is open to us to deal with the reason-
ableness of the search? 
"MR. NODES: I believe that could be considered a question subsumed 
within the-
"QUESTION: But it wasn't your intention to raise it? 
"MR. NODES: It wasn't our intention to raise it because we agree with 
the standard that was set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court. We 
feel that that is a workable standard." Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. 
' See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, ante, at- (STEVENS, J., concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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--, in order to reverse a decision requiring the suppression 
of evidence, the Court on its own initiative made an analysis 
of a factual question that had not been presented or argued 
by either of the parties and managed to find a basis for ruling 
in favor of the Government. In Segura v. United States, 
ante, at --, two creative Justices reached the surprising 
conclusion that an 18-20 hour warrantless occupation of a citi-
zen's home was "reasonable," despite the fact that the issue 
had not been argued and the Government had expressly con-
ceded the unreasonableness of the occupation. And, as I 
have previously observed, in recent Terms the Court has 
elected to use its power of summary disposition exclusively 
for the benefit of prosecutors. 4 In this case, the special judi-
cial action is to order the parties to argue a constitutional 
question that they have no desire to raise, in a context in 
which a ground for decision that the Court currently views as 
nonconstitutional is available, 5 and on which the State's chief 
prosecutor believes no guidance from this Court is necessary. 
I believe that the adversary process functions most effec-
tively when we rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than 
the activism of judges, to fashion the questions for review. I 
respectfully dissent. 
'See Florida v. Myers , 466 U.S.--,-- (1984) (STEVENS, J., dis-
senting). 
5 We are told that questions concerning the remedies for a Fourth 
Amendment violation are not constitutional in dimension. United States 
v. Leon, ante, at--. Apparently, this Court has imposed the exclusion-
ary rule on the States as a result of the Fourth Amendment's "invisible ra-
diations," Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. --, --, n. 12 
(1984), which act to somehow give the Court nonconstitutional supervisory 
powers over the State courts. My own view is different. See Sheppard, 
ante, at-- and n. 37 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) . 
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JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and 
JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. 
In its decision in this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
addressed three distinct questions: (1) what is the proper 
standard for judging the reasonableness of a school official's 
search of a student's purse; (2) on the facts of this case, did 
the school official violate that standard; and (3) whether the 
exclusionary rule bars the use in a criminal proceeding of evi-
dence that a school official obtained in violation of that stand-
ard. The Supreme Court held (1) that the correct standard 
is one of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause; (2) 
that the standard was violated in this case; and (3) that the 
evidence obtained as the result of a violation may not be in-
troduced in evidence against TLO in any criminal proceeding, 
including this delinquency proceeding. 
New Jersey's petition for certiorari sought review of only 
the third question. 1 The reasons why it did not seek review 
of either of the other two questions are tolerably clear. 
There is substantial agreement among appellate courts that 
the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the correct standard 
and it is apparently one that the New Jersey law enforcement 
authorities favor. As far as the specific facts of the case are 
' The petition presented a single question for review: "Whether the 
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applies to searches made by public 
school officials and teachers in school." 
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concerned, presumably New Jersey believed that this Court 
is too busy to take a case just for the purpose of reviewing 
the State Supreme Court's application of this standard to the 
specific facts of this case. 
The single question presented to the Court has now been 
briefed and argued. Evidently unable or unwilling to decide 
the question presented by the parties, the Court, instead of 
dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, 
orders reargument directed to the questions that New Jersey 
decided not to bring here. This is done even though New 
Jersey agrees with its Supreme Court's resolution of these 
questions, and has no desire to seek reversal on those 
grounds. 2 Thus, in this nonadversarial context, the Court 
has decided to plunge into the merits of the Fourth Amend-
ment issues despite the fact that no litigant before it wants 
the Court's guidance on these questions. Volunteering un-
wanted advice is rarely a wise course of action. 
Of late, the Court has acquired a voracious appetite for ju-
dicial activism in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at 
least when it comes to restricting the constitutional rights of 
the citizen. In United States v. Leon, ante at --, and 
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, ante, at --, the Court fash-
ioned a new exception to the exclusionary rule despite its 
acknowledgement that narrower grounds for decision were 
available in both cases. 3 In United States v. Karo, ante, at 
2 At oral argument, the following colloquy took place between counsel 
for New Jersey and the bench: 
"QUESTION: Well, do you think it is open to us to deal with the reason-
ableness of the search? 
"MR. NODES: I believe that could be considered a question subsumed 
within the-
"QUESTION: But it wasn't your intention to raise it? 
"MR. NODES: It wasn't our intention to raise it because we agree with 
the standard that was set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court. We 
feel that that is a workable standard." Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. 
8 See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, ante, at- (STEVENS, J., concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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--, in order to reverse a decision requiring the suppression 
of evidence, the Court on its own initiative made an analysis 
of a factual question that had not been presented or argued 
by either of the parties and managed to find a basis for ruling 
in favor of the Government. In Segura v. United States, 
ante, at --, two creative Justices reached the surprising 
conclusion that an 18-20 hour warrantless occupation of a citi-
zen's home was "reasonable," despite the fact that the issue 
had not been argued and the Government had expressly con-
ceded the unreasonableness of the occupation. And, as I 
have previously observed, in recent Terms the Court has 
elected to use its power of summary disposition exclusively 
for the benefit of prosecutors. 4 In this case, the special judi-
cial action is to order the parties to argue a constitutional 
question that they have no desire to raise, in a context in 
which a ground for decision that the Court currently views as 
nonconstitutional is available, 5 and on which the State's chief 
prosecutor believes no guidance from this Court is necessary. 
I believe that the adversary process functions most effec-
tively when we rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than 
the activism of judges, to fashion the questions for review. I 
respectfully dissent. 
'See Florida v. Myers, 466 U.S.--, -- (1984) (STEVENS, J., dis-
senting). 
•we are told that questions concerning the remedies for a Fourth 
Amendment violation are not c9nstitutional in dimension. United States 
v. Leon, ante, at--. Apparently, this Court has imposed the exclusion-
ary rule on the States as a result of the Fourth Amendment's "invisible ra-
diations," Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc ., 465 U. S. --, --, n. 12 
(1984), which act to somehow give the Court nonconstitutional supervisory 
powers over the State courts. My own view is different. See Sheppard, 
ante, at-- and n. 37 (STEVENS, J. , concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
Assistant Principal Choplick searched T. L. O.'s purse for 
evidence that she was smoking in the girls' restroom. Be-
cause T. L. O.'s suspected misconduct was not illegal and did 
not pose a serious threat to school discipline, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that Choplick's search of her purse was 
an unreasonable invasion of her privacy and that the evidence 
which he seized could not be used against her in criminal pro-
ceedings. The New Jersey court's holding was a careful re-
sponse to the case it was required to decide. 
The State of New Jersey sought review in this Court, first 
arguing that the exclusionary rule is wholly inapplicable to 
searches conducted by school officials, and then contending 
that the Fourth Amendment itself provides no protection at 
all to the student's privacy. The Court has accepted neither 
of these frontal assaults on the Fourth Amendment. It has, 
however, seized upon this "no smoking" case to announce 
"the proper standard" that should govern searches by. school 
officials who are confronted with disciplinary problems far 
more severe than smoking in the restroom. Although I 
agree with Part II of the Court's opinion, I continue to be-
lieve that the Court has unnecessarily and inappropriately 
reached out to decide a consitutional question. More impor-
tantly, I fear that the concerns that motivated the Court's ac-
tivism have produced a holding that will permit school admin-
.•. 
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istrators to search students suspected of violating only the 
most trivial school regulations and guidelines for behavior. 
I 
The question the Court decides today-whether Mr. 
Choplick's search of T. L. O.'s purse violated the Fourth 
Amendment-was not raised by the state's petition for writ 
of certiorari. That petition only raised one question: 
"Whether the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applies 
to searches by public school officials and teachers in school."' 
The State quite properly declined to submit the former ques-
tion because "it did not wish to present what might appear to 
be solely a factual dispute to this Court." 2 By reaching the 
merits of that factual dispute, the Court implicitly decides 
the question raised by the State in its petition for certiorari. 
This Court has no license to decide the merits of Fourth 
Amendment questions unless they are relevant to a case be-
fore it. These questions typically arise in criminal cases 
when a defendant challenges the admission of allegedly 
tainted evidence. Unless the exclusionary rule applies, 
there is no reason for the Court to go further and decide the 
Fourth Amendment question. 3 Since this Court has twice 
had the threshold question argued, since it does not disagree 
with the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling that the exclu-
sionary rule applies, and since it has addressed and decided 
the merits of this particular case, it is fair to infer-notwith-
standing its disclaimer-that the Court has implicitly decided 
that the exclusionary rule applies in a case of this kind. 
' Pet. for Cert. , at i. 
' Supp. Br. for Petitioner, at 6. 
3 Few cases have explicitly considered which question should be decided 
first. Compare Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F . 2d 307, 309 n. 2 (CA2 
1982) (Newman, J. , joined by Winter, J. ) ("Each issue is of constitutional 
dimension," and exclusionary rule question may be decided first when a de-
cision that it does not apply will completely dispose of the case), cert. de-
nied, 460 U. S. 1014 (1983) with id. , at 315 (Oakes, J ., concurring) (The 
constitutionality of the search must logically be decided first) . 
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The Court's decision not to disturb the New Jersey Su-
preme Court's holding on this question is plainly correct. As 
the state court noted, 1 this case does not involve the use of 
evidence in a school disciplinary proceeding; the juvenile pro-
ceedings brought against T. L. 0. involved a charge that 
would have been a criminal offense if committed by an adult. 4 
Accordingly, the exclusionary rule issue decided by that 
court and later presented to this Court concerned only the 
use in a criminal proceeding of evidence obtained in a search 
conducted by a public school administrator. 
Having confined the issue to the law enforcement context, 
the New Jersey court then reasoned that this Court's cases 
have made it quite clear that the exclusionary rule is equally 
applicable "whether the public official who illegally obtained 
the evidence was a municipal inspector, See v. Seattle 387 
U. S. 541 [1967]; Camara [v. Municipal Court,] 387 U. S. 
523 [1967]; a firefighter, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 
506 [1978]; or a school administrator or law.enforcement offi-
cial." 5 It correctly concluded "that if an official search vio-
lates constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible in 
criminal proceedings." 6 
When a defendant in a criminal proceeding alleges that she 
was the victim of an illegal search by a school administrator, 
the application of the exclusionary rule is a simple corollary of 
the principle "that all evidence obtained by searches and sei-
zures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same, author-
ity, inadmissible in a state court." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 
643, 655 (1961). The practical basis for this principle is , in 
part, its deterrent effect, see id., at 656, and as a general 
matter it is tolerably clear to me, as it has been to the Court, 
that the existence of an exclusionary remedy does deter the 
authorities from violating the Fourth Amendment by sharply 
• State in the Interest ofT. L. 0. , 94 N. J. 331, 337 nn. 1 & 2, 342 n. 5, 
463 A. 2d 934, 937, nn. 1. & 2, 939, n. 5 (1983). 
5 !d. , at 341, 463 A. 2d, at 939. · 
• ld., at 341-342, 463 A. 2d, at 939. 
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reducing their incentive to do so. 7 In the case of evidence 
obtained in school 'searches, the "overall educative effect" 8 of 
the exclusionary rule (ldds important symbolic force to this 
utilitarian judgment. · 
Justice Brandeis was both a great student and a great 
teacher. It was he who wrote: 
"Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent 
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people 
by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Govern-
ment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; 
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it in-
vites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 
438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion) 
Those of us who revere the flag and the ideals for which it 
stands believe in the power of symbols. We cannot ignore 
that rules of law also have a symbolic power that may vastly 
exceed their utility. 
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential 
to the meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a 
self-governing citizenry. 9 If the Nation's students can be 
convicted through the use of arbitrary methods destructive of 
personal liberty, they cannot help but feel that they have 
been dealt with unfairly. 10 The application of the exclusion-
' See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v. 
Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 453 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 
347-348 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 174-175 (1969). 
8 Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. , at 493. 
9 See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864-865 (1982) (BREN-
NAN, J., joined by MARSHALL & STEVENS, JJ); id., at 876, 880 (BLACK-
MUN, J . , concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U. S. 202, 221 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 68, 76 (1979); Tinker 
v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 507, 511-513 (1969); Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954); West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943). 
1° Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 26-27 (1967). JUSTICE BRENNAN has 
written of an analogous case: 
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ary rule in criminal proceedings arising from illegal school 
searches makes an important statement to young people that 
"our society attaches serious consequences to a violation of 
constitutional rights," 11 and that this is a principle "of liberty 
and justice for all." 12 
Thus, the simple and correct answer to the question pre-
sented by the state's petition for certiorari would have re-
quired affirmance of a state court's judgment suppressing ev-
idence. That result would have been dramatically out of 
character for a court that not only grants prosecutors relief 
from suppression orders with distressing regularity, 13 but 
'------------------
"We do not know what class petitioner was in when the dogs burst in, 
but the lesson the school authorities taught her that day will undoubtedly 
make a greater impression than the one her teacher had hoped to convey. 
I would grant certiorari to teach petitioner another lesson: that the Fourth 
Amendment protects '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures,' .... Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of 
good citizenship when the school authorities themselves disregard the fun-
damental principles underpinning our constitutional freedoms." Doe v. 
Renfrow, 451 U. S. 1022, 1027-1028 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
11 Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 493. 
12 36 U. S. C. § 172 (pledge of allegiance to the flag). 
13 A brief review of the Fourth Amendment cases involving criminal pros-
ecutions sinceOctober Term, 1982, support the proposition. Compare 
Florida v. Rodriguez,-- U. S. -- (1984) (per curiam); United States 
v. Leon, -- U. S. -- (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, -- U. S. 
-- (1984); Segura v. United States,-- U. S. -- (1984); United States 
v. Karo, -- U. S. -- (1984); Oliver v. United States,-- U.S.--
(1984); United States v. Jacobsen,-- U. S. -- (1984); Massachusetts v. 
Upton,-- U. S. -- (1984) (per curiam); Florida v. Meyers,-- U. S. 
-- (1984) (per curiam); Michigan v. Long, -- U. S. -- (1983); Illi-
nois v. Andreas, -- U. S. -- (1983); Illinois v. Lafayette, -- U. S. 
-- (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, -- U. S. -- (1983); 
Illinois v. Gates, -- U. S. -- (1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 
(1983); United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983); Illinois v. 
Batchelder, 463 U. S. -- (1983) (per curiam); Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 
U. S. 571 (1983) (per curiam) with Thompson v. Louisiana, -- U. S. 
-- (1984) (per curiam); Welsh v. Wisconsin, -- U. S. -- (1984); 
I } 
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also is prone to rely on grounds not advanced by the parties 
in order to protect evidence from exclusion. 14 In characteris-
tic disregard .of the doctrine of judicial restraint, the Court 
avoided that result in this case by ordering reargument and 
directing the parties to address a constitutional question that 
the parties, with good reason, had not asked the Court to de-
cide. Because judicial activism undermines the Court's 
power to perform its central mission in a legitimate way, I 
dissented from the reargument order. See-- U. S. --
(1984). I have not modified the views expressed in that dis-
sent, but since the majority has brought the question before 
us, I shall explain why I believe the Court has misapplied the 
standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth 
Amendment. 
II 
The search of a young woman's purse by a school adminis-
trator is a serious invasion of her legitimate expectations of 
privacy. A purse "is a common repository for one's personal 
effects and therefore is inevitably associated with the expec-
tation of privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 762 
(1979). Although such expectations must sometimes yield to 
the legitimate requirements of government, in assessing the 
constitutionality of a warrantless search, our decision must 
be guided by the language of the Fourth Amendment: "The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated .... " In order to evaluate the reason-
ableness of such searches, "it is necessary 'first to focus upon 
the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official in-
Michigan v. Clifford, - U. S. - (1984) ; United States v. Place, -
U. S. - (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983). 
14 E . g. United States v. Karo, - U. S. - , - (1984); see also 
United States v. Segura, - U. S. -,- (1984) (Opinion of BURGER, 
C. J . joined by O'CONNOR, J. ); cf. United States v. Gates., 459 U. S. , 1028, 
1028 (1982) (STEVENS, J. , dissenting from reargument order, joined by 
BRENNAN & MARSHALL, JJ.) 
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trusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the 
private citizen,' for there is 'no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search 
[or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] 
entails.' "Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (quoting 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 534-535, 
536-537 (1967)). 15 
The "limited search for weapons" in Terry was justified by 
the "immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to 
assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not 
armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be 
used against him.'' 392 U. S., at 23, 25. When viewed from 
the institutional perspective, "the substantial need of teach-
ers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the 
schools," ante, at 14 (majority opinion), is no less acute. Vi-
olent, unlawful, or seriously disruptive conduct is funda-
mentally inconsistent with the principal function of teaching 
institutions which is to educate yo:ung people and prepare 
them for citizenship. 16 When such conduct occurs amidst a 
sizable group of impressionable young people, it creates an 
explosive atmosphere that requires a prompt and effective 
response. 
Thus, warrantless searches of students by school adminis-
trators are reasonable when undertaken for those purposes. 
But the majority's statement of the standard for evaluating 
the reasonableness of such searches is not suitably adapted to 
that end. The majority holds that "a search of a student by a 
teacher or other school official will be 'justified at its incep-
·~ See also United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881-882 (1976); 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U. S. 543, 567 (1976). 
'
6 Cf. ante, at 3 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The spe-
cial need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either the 
safety of school children and teachers or the educational process itself justi-
fies the Court in excepting school searches from the warrant and probable 
cause requirement"); ante, at 3 (POWELL, J., concurring, joined by O'CoN-
NOR, J.) ("Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, 
teachers cannot begin to educate their students." 
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tion' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated 
or is violating either the law or the rules of the school." 
Ante, at 15. This standard will permit teachers and school 
administrators to search students when they suspect that the 
search will reveal evidence of even the most trivial school 
regulation or precatory guideline for student behavior. The 
Court's standard for deciding whether a search is justified "at 
its inception" treats all violations of the rules of the school as 
though they were fungible. For the Court, a search for curl-
ers and sunglasses in order to enforce the school dress code 17 
is apparently just as important as a search for evidence of 
heroin addiction or violent gang activity. 
The majority, however, does not contend that school ad-
ministrators have a compelling need to search students in 
order to achieve optimum enforcement of minor school regu-
lations.18 To the contrary, when minor violations are in-
17 Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N. J.] H. S. (1979), Record 
Doc. S-1, at 7. A brief survey of school rule books reveals that, under the 
majority's approach, teachers and school administrators may also search 
students to enforce school rules regulating: 
(i) secret societies; 
(ii) students driving to school; 
(iii) parking and use of parking lots during school hours; 
(iv) smoking on campus; 
(v) the direction of traffic in the hallways; 
(vi) student presence in the hallways during class hours without .a pass; 
(vii) profanity; 
(viii) school attendance of interscholastic athletes on the day of a game, 
meet or match; 
(ix) cafeteria use and cleanup; 
(x) eating lunch off-campus; and 
(xi) unauthorized absence. 
See Id. , 7-18; Student Handbook of South Windsor [Conn.] H. S. (1984); 
Fairfax County [Va.] Public Schools, Student Responsibilities and Rights 
(1980); Student Handbook of Chantilly [Va.] H. S. (1984). 
18 Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 535 ("There is unani-
mous agreement among those inost familiar with this field that the only ef-
fective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards re-
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volved, there is every indication that the informal school dis-
ciplinary process, with only minimum requirements of due 
process, 19 can function effectively without the power to 
search for enough evidence to prove a criminal case. In ar-
guing that teachers and school administrators need the power 
to search students based on a lessened standard, the United 
States as amicus curiae relies heavily on empirical evidence 
of a contemporary crisis of violence and unlawful behavior 
that is seriously undermining the process of education in 
American schools. 20 A standard better attuned to this con-
cern would permit teachers and school administrators to 
search a student when they have reason to believe that the 
search will uncover evidence that the student is violating the 
law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of 
school order, or the educational process. 
This standard is properly directed at "[t]he sole justifica-
tion for the [warrantless] search." 21 In addition, a standard 
that varies the extent of the permissible intrusion with the 
gravity of the suspected offense is also more consistent with 
common law experience and this Court's precedent. Crimi-
nal law has traditionally recognized a distinction between es-
sentially regulatory offenses and serious violations of the 
quired by municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections of all 
structures. . . . [l]f the probable cause standard ... is adopted, .. . the 
reasonable goals of code enforcement will be dealt a crushing blow.") 
•• See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 583-584 (1975). 
20 "The sad truth is that many classrooms across the country are not tem-
ples of learning teaching the lessons of good will, civility, and wisdom that 
are central to the fabric of American life. To the contrary, many schools 
are in such a state of disorder that not only is the educational atmosphere 
polluted, but the very safety of students and teachers is imperiled." Br. 
for United States as Amicus Curiae 23. 
See also Br. for National Education Ass'n as Amicus Curiae 21 ("If a sus-
pected violation of a rule threatens to disrupt the school or threatens to 
harm students, school officials should be free to search for evidence of it 
. ... "). 
21 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. , at 29; United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 
U. S. , at 881-882. 
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peace, and graduated the response of the criminal justice sys-
tem depending on the character of the violation. 22 The appli-
cation of a similar distinction in evaluating the reasonable-
ness of warrantless searches and seizures "is not a novel 
idea." Welsh v. Wisconsin,-- U. S. --, -- (1984). 23 
In Welsh, police officers arrived at the scene of a traffic ac-
cident and obtained information indicating that the driver of 
the automobile involved was guilty of a first offense of driv-
ing while intoxicated-a civil violation with a maximum fine 
of $200. The driver had left the scene of the accident, and 
the officers followed the suspect to his home where they ar-
rested him without a warrant. Absent exigent circum-
stances, the warrantless invasion of the home was a clear vi-
olation of Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980). In 
22 Throughout the criminal law this dichotomy has been expressed by 
classifying crimes as misdemeanors or felonies, malum prohibitum or 
malum in se, crimes that do not involve moral turpitude or those that do,. 
and major or petty offenses. See generally W. LaFave, Handbook on 
Criminal Law § 6 (1972). 
Some codes of student behavior also provide a system of graduated re-
sponse by distinguishing between violent, unlawful or seriously disruptive 
conduct, and conduct that will only warrant serious sanctions when the stu-
dent engages in repetitive offenses. See, e. g. , Parent-Student Handbook 
of Piscataway [N. J.] H. S. (1979), Record Doc. S-1, at 15-16; Student 
Handbook of South Windsor [Conn.] H. S. ~ E (1984); Rules of the Board of 
Education of the District of Columbia Chap. IV, §§ 431.1-.10 (1982). In-
deed, at Piscatawy H. S. a violation of smoking regulations that is "[a] stu-
dent's first offense will result in assignment of up to three (3) days of after 
school classes concerning hazards of smoking." Record Doc. S-1, at 15. 
23 In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 582-583 (1975) (emphasis added), the 
Court noted that similar considerations require some variance in the re-
quirements of due process in the school disciplinary context: 
"[A]s a general rule notice and hearing should precede removal of the stu-
dent from school. We agree ... , however, that there are recurring situa-
tions in which prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon. Students 
whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an on-
going threat of disrupting the academic process may be immediately re-
moved from school. In such cases the necessary notice and rudimentary 
hearing should follow as soon as practicable . . . . " 
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holding that the warrantless arrest for the "noncriminal, traf-
fic offense" in Welsh was unconstitutional, the Court noted 
that "application of the exigent-circumstances exceptions in 
the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when 
there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense 
. . . has been committed." -- U. S., at --. 
The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious of-
fenses in evaluating the reasonableness of school searches is 
almost too clear for argument. In order to justify the seri-
ous intrusion on the persons and privacy of young people that 
New Jersey asks this Court to approve, the State must iden-
tify "some real immediate and serious consequences." M c-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 460 (1948) (Jackson, 
J., concurring, joined by Frankfurter, J.). 24 While school ad-
ministrators have entirely legitimate reasons for adopting 
school regulations and guidelines for student behavior, the 
authorization of searches to enforce them "shows a shocking 
lack of all sense of proportion." I d., 459. 25 
2A In McDonald police officers made a warrantless search of the office of 
an illegal "numbers" operation. Justice Jackson rejected the view that the 
search could be supported by exigent circumstances: 
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a 
forced entry without a warrant, no such emergency was present in this 
case. . .. Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without wait-
ing to obtain a warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the 
offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of the method of 
attempting to reach it. ... [The defendant's] criminal operation, while a 
shabby swindle that the police are quite right in suppressing, was not one 
which endangered life or limb or the peace and good order of the commu-
nity .... " 
McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 459-460 (1948). 
25 While a policeman who sees a person smoking in an elevator in violation 
of a city ordinance may conduct a full-blown search for evidence of the 
smoking violation in the unlikely event of a custodial arrest, United States 
v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 236 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U. S. 
260, 265-266 (1973), it is more doubtful whether a search of this kind would 
be reasonable if the officer only planned to issue a citation to the offender 
and depart, see Robinson, supra, 414 U. S., at 236, n. 6. In any case, the 
majority offers no rationale supporting its conclusion that a student de-
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The majority offers weak deference to these principles of 
balance and decency by announcing that school searches will 
only be reasonable in scope "when the measures adopted are 
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not ex-
cessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student, 
and the nature of the infraction." Ante, at 15 (emphasis 
added). The majority offers no explanation why a two-part 
standard is necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the 
ordinary school search. Significantly, in the balance of its 
opinion the Court pretermits any discussion of the nature of 
T. L. O.'s infraction of the "no smoking" rule. 
The "rider" to the Court's standard for evaluating the 
reasonableness of the initial intrusion apparently is the 
Court's perception that its standard is overly generous and 
does not, by itself, achieve a fair balance between the admin-
istrator's right to search and the student's reasonable expec-
tations of privacy. The Court's standard for evaluating the 
"scope" of reasonable school searches is obviously designed to 
prohibit physically intrusive searches of students by persons 
of the opposite sex for relatively minor offenses. The 
Court's effort to establish a standard that is, at once, clear 
enough to allow searches to be upheld in nearly every case, 
and flexible enough to prohibit obviously unreasonable intru-
sions of young adults' privacy only creates uncertainty in the 
extent of its resolve to prohibit the latter. Moreover, the 
majority's application of its standard in this case-to permit a 
male administrator to rummage through the purse of a fe-
male high school student in order to obtain evidence that she 
was smoking in a bathroom-raises grave doubts in my mind 
whether its effort will be effective. 26 Unlike the Court, I be-
tained by school officials for questioning, on reasonable suspicion that she 
has violated a school rule, is entitled to no more protection under the 
Fourth Amendment than a criminal suspect under custodial arrest. 
26 One thing is clear under any standard-the shocking strip searches 
that are described in some cases have no place in the school house. See 
Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F. 2d 91, 92-93 (CA7 1980) ("It does not require a 
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lieve the nature of the suspected infraction is a matter of first 
importance in deciding whether any invasion of privacy is 
permissible. 
III 
The Court embraces the standard applied by the New J er-
sey Supreme Court as equivalent to its own, and then depre-
cates the state court's application of the standard as reflect-
ing "a somewhat crabbed notion of reasonableness." Ante, 
at 16. There is no mystery, however, in the state court's 
finding that the search in this case was unconstitutional; the 
decision below was not based on a manipulation of reaonable 
suspicion, but on the trivial character of the activity that pro-
moted the official search. The New Jersey Supreme Court 
wrote: 
"We are satisfied that when a school official has rea-
sonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evi-
dence of illegal activity or activity that would interfere 
with school discipline and order, the school official has 
the right to conduct a reasonable search for such 
evidence. 
"In determining whether the school official has reason-
able grounds, courts should consider 'the child's age, his-
tory, and school record, the prevalence and seriousness 
of the problem in the school to which the search was di-
rected, the exigency to make the search without delay, 
and the probative value and reliability of the information 
used as a justification for the search.' " 27 
constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year-old child 
is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude"), cert. denied, 
451 U. S. 1022 (1981); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (ND N. Y. 1977); 
People v. Scott D., 34 N. Y. 2d 483, 315 N. E. 2d 466, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 403 
(1974); M. J. v. State, 399 So. 2d 996 (Fla. App. 1981). To the extent that 
deeply intrusive searches are ever reasonable outside the custodial con-
text, it surely must only be to prevent imminent, and serious harm. 
27 94 N.J., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 943 (quoting State v. McKinnon, 88 
Wash. 2d 75, 81, 558 P. 2d 781, 784 (1977)) (emphasis added). 
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The emphasized language in the state court's opinion focuses 
on the character of the rule infraction that is the predicate for 
the search. 
In the view of the state court, there is a quite obvious, and 
material difference between a search for evidence relating to 
violent or disruptive activity, and a search for evidence of a 
smoking rule violation. This distinction does not imply that 
a no smoking rule is a matter of minor importance. Rather, 
like a rule that prohibits a student from being tardy, its occa-
sional violation in a context that poses no threat of disrupting 
school order and discipline offers no reason to believe that an 
immediate search is necessary to avoid unlawful conduct, vio-
lence or a serious impairment of the educational process. 
A correct understanding of the New Jersey court's stand-
ard explains why that court concluded in T. L. O.'s case that 
"the assistant principal did not have reasonable grounds to 
believe that the student was concealing in her purse evidence 
of criminal activity or evidence of activity that would seri-
ously interfere with school discipline or order." 28 The im-
portance of the nature of the rule infraction to the New J er-
sey Supreme Court's holding is evident from its brief 
explanation of the principal basis for its decision: 
"A student has an expectation of privacy in the contents 
of her purse. Mere possession of cigarettes did not vio-
late school rule or policy, since the school allowed smok-
ing in designated areas. The contents of the handbag 
had no direct bearing on the infraction. 
The assistant principal's desire, legal in itself, to 
gather evidence to impeach the student's credibility at a 
hearing on the disciplinary infraction does not validate 
the search." 29 
28 94 N. J. , at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942 (emphasis added). 
29 Ibid . The court added: 
"Moreover, there were not reasonable grounds to believe that the purse 
contained cigarettes, if they were the object of the search. No one had 
furnished information to that effect to the school official. He had, at best, 
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Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, I would view this case 
differently if the assistant principal had reason to believe 
T. L. O.'s purse contained evidence of criminal activity, or of 
an activity that would seriously disrupt school discipline. 
There was, however, absolutely no basis for any such as-
sumption-not even a "hunch." 
In this case, Mr. Choplick overreacted to what appeared to 
be nothing more than a minor infraction-a rule prohibiting 
smoking in the bathroom of the Freshman's and Sophmores' 
building. 30 It is, of course, true that he actually found evi-
dence of serious wrongdoing by T. L. 0., but no one claims 
that the prior search may be justified by his unexpected dis-
covery. As far as the smoking infraction is concerned, the 
search for cigarettes merely tended to corroborate a teach-
er's eyewitness account of T. L. O.'s violation of a minor 
regulation designed to channel student smoking behavior into 
designated locations. Because this conduct was neither un-
lawful nor significantly disruptive of school order or the edu-
cational process, the invasion of privacy associated with the 
forcible opening of the T. L. O.'s purse was entirely unjusti-
fied at its inception. 
A review of the sampling of school search cases relied on by 
the Court demonstrates how different this case is from those 
in which there was indeed a valid justification for intruding 
on a student's privacy. In most of them the student was sus-
pected of a criminal violation;31 in the remainder either vio-
a good hunch. No doubt good hunches would unearth much more evidence 
of crime on the persons of students and citizens as a whole. But more is 
required to sustain a search." 
!d. , at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942-943. 
It is this portion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning-a portion 
that was not necessary to its holding-to which this Court makes its princi-
pal response. See ante, at 18. 
30 See Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N. J.] H. S. 15, 18 
(1979), Record Doc. S-1. See also Tr. of Mar. 31 , 1980 Hearing 13-14. 
31 See, e. g. , Tarter v. Raybuck , 742F. 2d 977 (CA6 1984) (search for mar-
ijuana); M. v. Board of Education Ball-Chatham Community Unit School 
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lence or substantial disruption of school order or the integrity 
of the academic process was at stake. 32 Few involved mat-
ters as trivial as the no smoking rule violated by T. L. 0. 33 
The rule the Court adopts today is so open-ended that it may 
make the Fourth Amendment virtually meaningless in the 
school context. Although I agree that school administrators 
must have broad latitude to maintain order and discipline in 
our classrooms, that authority is not unlimited. 
IV 
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have 
to experience the power of government. Through it passes 
every citizen and public official, from schoolteachers to po-
licemen and prison guards. The values they learn there, 
they take with them in life. One of our most cherished ideals 
is the one contained in the Fourth Amendment: that the Gov-
ernment may not intrude on the personal privacy of its citi-
zens without a warrant or compelling circumstance. The 
Dist No.5, 429 F. Supp. 288 (SD Ill. 1977) (drugs and large amount of 
money); D. R . C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982) (stolen 
money); In re W. , 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973) (mari-
juana); In reG., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970) (ampheta-
mine pills); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969) 
(methedrine pills); State v. Baccino, 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971) 
(drugs); State v. D. T. W., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) 
(drugs); In re J. A., 85 Ill. App. 567, 406 N. E. 2d 598 (1980) (marijuana); 
People v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975) (drug pills); 
Mercer v. State, 450 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (marijuana); State 
v. McKinnon , 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P. 2d 781 (1977) ("speed"). 
32 See, e. g., In re L . L. , 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979) 
(search for knife or razor blade); R . C. M. v. State , 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. 
App. 1983) (student with bloodshot eyes wandering halls in violation of 
school rule requiring students to remain in examination room or at home 
during mid-term examinations). 
33 See, e. g. , State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S. E. 2d 586 (1975) (three 
students searched when they made furtive gestures and displayed obvious 
conciousness of guilt); Doe v. State, 88 N. M. 347, 540 P. 2d 827 (1975) (stu-
dent searched for pipe when a teacher saw him using it to violate smoking 
regulations). 
83-712-DISSENT 
NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0. 17 
Court's decision today is a curious moral for the Nation's 
youth. Although the search of T. L. O.'s purse does not 
trouble today's majority, I submit that we are not dealing 
with "matters relatively trivial to the welfare of the Nation. 
There are village tyrants as well as village Hampdens, but 
none who acts under color of law is beyond the reach of the 
Constitution." West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943). 
I respectfully dissent. 
8 
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[June-, 1984] 
JusTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. 
In this case the Court decides that the exclusionary rule 
does not bar the admission in a criminal proceeding of evi-
dence illegally seized from students in public schools by pub-
lic school officials. The Court's conclusion is premised on its 
belief that public school officials cannot be deterred by appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule in criminal juvenile proceed-
ings. This empirical speculation cannot, in my view, be rec-
onciled with the presumption consistently applied in this 
Court's past cases: that exclusion of evidence from the pros-
ecution's case-in-chief at criminal trials will tend to deter un-
lawful searches and seizures by any and all officials of the 
State. The Court has relied on this presumption both be-
cause of the uncertainties inherent in assessing the exclusion-
ary rule's deterrent effect and because of society's compelling 
need for predictable rules to guide the administration of crim-
inal trials. Since today's decision ignores that heretofore ap-
plied presumption, I respectfully dissent. 
The proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment are not lim-
ited to "the paradigmatic entry into a private dwelling by a 
law enforcement officer in search of the fruits or instrumen-
talities of a crime." Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 504 
(1978). Rather, they extend to all unreasonable encroach-
ments by the government, "whether the government's moti-
vation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches 
of other statutory or regulatory standards." Marshall v. 
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Barlow's Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 312-313 (1978). Accordingly, 
the Court has found unreasonable, within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, actions of both police and non-police of-
ficers alike. See, e. g., Michigan v. Clifford, -- U. S. 
-- (1984) (fire department investigators); Michigan v. Ty-
ler, supra (firefighters); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., supra 
(Occupational Health and Safety Administration inspectors); 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967) (building 
inspectors); Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493 (1958) (al-
cohol tax collectors). 
Concomitantly, whenever the Court has found unreason-
able government action, it has generally required, as one 
remedy, that evidence derived therefrom be excluded from 
the prosecution's case-in-chief at criminal trials. See Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 
U. S. 383 (1914). Though the empirical tests of the exclu-
sionary rule are inconclusive, the Court has consistently "as-
sumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be to dis-
courage law enforcement officials from violating the Fourth 
Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it." 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976) (emphasis added); 
see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171 (1978). The 
Court bases this deterrence theory on a more general sys-
temic assumption: that exclusion will "encourage those who 
formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who im-
plement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into 
their value system." Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492. On 
this basis, the Court has applied the exclusionary rule to the 
fruits of Fourth Amendment intrusions of both police and 
non-police officer alike, reasoning that both police and non-
police officials can and should be encouraged to incorporate 
Fourth Amendment values into the conduct of their day-to-
day activities. See, e. g., Dunaway v. New York , 442 U. S. 
200 (1979) (police officers); Michigan v. Clifford, supra (non-
police officers); Michigan v. Tyler, supra (non-police 
officers). 
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The Court has never before engaged in an analysis of 
whether a particular class of government officials actually 
will be deterred by application of the exclusionary rule. To 
be sure, the Court has rejected application of the exclusion-
ary rule in some cases because it would not, by that applica-
tion, be likely appreciably to deter future police misconduct. 
See, e. g., United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620 (1980) (ille-
gally obtained evidence may be used to impeach defendant); 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974) (use of ille-
gally obtained evidence permitted at a grand jury proceed-
ing); United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976) (evidence 
illegally seized by state authorities may be used in civil suit 
brought by federal tax authorities); Stone v. Powell, supra 
(exclusionary rule questions cannot generally be considered 
on federal habeas corpus); cf. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, --
U. S. -- (1984) (exclusionary rule inapplicable in civil de-
portation proceedings because social costs outweigh the ad-
mitted marginal deterrent effect). Yet none of these cases 
entailed, as does the instant matter, the introduction of ille-
gally seized evidence into the State's case-in-chief at a crimi-
nal proceeding, where "the need for deterrence and hence the 
rationale for excluding the evidence is the strongest . . . . " 
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. In none of these 
cases was application of the exclusionary rule rejected, as it 
is in this case, because of a judicial intuition that the offend-
ing officials could not be deterred by application of the rule in 
the criminal case-in-chief. Rather, these cases considered 
and rejected proposals to extend the exclusionary rule's appli-
cation beyond the prosecution's criminal case-in-chief because 
the additional deterrent effect to be gained was insufficient 
to outweigh the concomitant social costs to be incurred. 
Nor does this case fit within the analytic framework articu-
lated in cases such as Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 
471 (1963), and United States v. Leon,-- U. S. -- (1984). 
In Wong Sun, the Court held that illegally seized evidence of 
crime will nevertheless be admissible whenever the official 
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error complained of is sufficiently attenuated from the evi-
dence thereby discovered. 371 U. S., at 484. In Leon, the 
Court held that evidence of crime will nevertheless be admis-
sible whenever the error making its seizure unconstitutional 
is an objectively reasonable one. -- U. S., at--. In 
short, relying on the experience it has gathered from years of 
adjudicating police search and seizure problems, the Court 
has concluded that deterrence of particular categories of 
Fourth Amendment intrusions is unlikely to result from 
application of the exclusionary rule to the evidence derived 
therefrom. By striking contrast, in this case the Court has 
categorically determined that deterrence of certain persons, 
as opposed to the commission of certain errors, will not result 
by excluding the evidence illegally seized from the prosecu-
tion's criminal case-in-chief at trial. That determination is, 
in my view, irreconcilable with the Court's consistently ap-
plied assumption that all government officials can and should 
be encouraged to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into 
their value systems. Such a determination is especially un-
fortunate in this case, since the Court has so little experience 
with public school official search and seizure problems. 
The Court apparently proposes now to assess in every case 
whether prohibiting "the use in the criminal-justice system of 
evidence obtained in [non-police officer] searches [will] have 
. . . the behavioral effects ... that exclusion of illegally ob-
tained evidence in criminal prosecutions generally is thought 
to have on the typical law enforcement official." Ante, at 
9-10. I fear this approach will not lead to principled deci-
sionmaking. It makes little sense, in the absence of determi-
nate empirical evidence, to expect judges in state and federal 
courts to be able to draw reliable and consistent conclusions 
about the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on various gov-
ernment officials. If social scientists thoroughly trained in 
statistical analysis cannot reach consistent conclusions con-
cerning the rule's deterrent effect, there is little reason to be-
lieve that trial judges trained only in legal analysis will be 
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able to do any better. The difference, of course, is that 
judges do not engage in mere academic debate; they must ad-
judicate real prosecutions and dispose of them in a principled 
manner. The Court's new approach will unnecessarily com-
plicate, and possibly undermine, their performance of this 
task. 
This case serves as a good example of the arbitrary distinc-
tions that may very well attend the Court's new approach. 
The Court suggests that public school officials cannot be de-
terred by application of the exclusionary rule in criminal pro-
ceedings because they cannot fairly be classified as "law en-
forcement officers." Ante, at 9. Yet public school officials 
are no less concerned with "law enforcement" than are other 
regulatory agents to whom the exclusionary rule has already 
been applied. Like firefighters, building inspectors, and al-
cohol tax collectors, public school officials are charged with 
enforcing government regulations and with administering a 
government program. School authorities are responsible for 
enforcing compulsory attendance laws and for maintaining 
order and good discipline in the schools. School officials, like 
these other regulatory agents, are often obliged to seek out 
and report to the police evidence of criminal conduct. See 
post, at --, n. 4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). If the pre-
sumption of deterrence properly applies to these other public 
officials, then it should apply to public school officials as well. 
All can fairly be characterized as engaging in "law enforce-
ment." Nothing in today's decision provides the federal and 
state courts with a principled basis for distinguishing among 
them and arbitrary distinctions are bound to result. 
I am sympathetic to the Court's disagreement with the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey's determination that the evi-
dence seized from respondent has to be excluded from her 
criminal trial, but my sympathy turns on a different ground. 
School administrators must be given great discretion in their 
efforts to maintain order and discipline in the public schools. 
Students correspondingly can expect less privacy in the 
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grade schools and high schools than can other persons in non-
educational settings. In short, the intrusions that must be 
tolerated in public schools necessarily extend beyond those 
which would pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny in other envi-
ronments. On this basis, it is more likely that various 
searches conducted by school officials on school premises will 
be characterized as "reasonable" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. However, since the State has not chal-
lenged the Supreme Court of New Jersey's contrary holding 
on this issue, the judgment of that court must be affirmed. I 
respectfully dissent from the Court's conclusion to the 
contrary. 
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. 
In this case the Court decides that the exclusionary rule 
does not bar the admission in a criminal proceeding of evi-
dence illegally seized from students in public schools by pub-
lic school officials. The Court's conclusion is premised on its 
belief that public school officials cannot be deterred by appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule in criminal juvenile proceed-
ings. This empirical speculation cannot, in my view, be rec-
onciled with the presumption consistently applied in this 
Court's past cases: that exclusion of evidence from the pros-
ecution's case-in-chief at criminal trials will tend to deter un-
lawful searches and seizures by any and all officials of the 
State. The Court has relied on this presumption both be-
cause of the uncertainties inherent in assessing the exclusion-
ary rule's deterrent effect and because of society's compelling 
need for predictable rules to guide the administration of crim-
inal trials. Since today's decision ignores that heretofore ap-
plied presumption, I respectfully dissent. 
The proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment are not lim-
ited to "the paradigmatic entry into a private dwelling by a 
law enforcement officer in search of the fruits or instrumen-
talities of a crime." Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 504 
(1978). Rather, they extend to all unreasonable encroach-
ments by the government, "whether the government's moti-
vation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches 
of other statutory or regulatory standards." Marshall v. 
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Barlow's Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 312-313 (1978). Accordingly, 
the Court has found unreasonable, within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, actions of both police and non-police of-
ficers alike. See, e. g., Michigan v. Clifford, -- U. S. 
-- (1984) (fire department investigators); Michigan v. Ty-
ler, supra (firefighters); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., supra 
(Occupational Health and Safety Administration inspectors); 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967) (building 
inspectors); Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493 (1958) (al-
cohol tax collectors). 
Concomitantly, whenever the Court has found unreason-
able government action, it has generally required, as one 
remedy, that evidence derived therefrom be excluded from 
the prosecution's case-in-chief at criminal trials. See Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 
U. S. 383 (1914). Though the empirical tests of the exclu-
sionary rule are inconclusive, the Court has consistently "as-
sumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be to dis-
courage law enforcement officials from violating the Fourth 
Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it." 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976) (emphasis added); 
see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171 (1978). The 
Court bases this deterrence theory on a more general sys-
temic assumption: that exclusion will "encourage those who 
formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who im-
plement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into 
their value system." Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492. On 
this basis, the Court has applied the exclusionary rule to the 
fruits of Fourth Amendment intrusions of both police and 
non-police officer alike, reasoning that both police and non-
police officials can and should be encouraged to incorporate 
Fourth Amendment values into the conduct of their day-to-
day activities. See, e. g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 
200 (1979) (police officers); Michigan v. Clifford, supra (non-
police officers); Michigan v. Tyler, supra (non-police 
officers). 
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The Court has never before engaged in an analysis of 
whether a particular class of government officials actually 
will be deterred by application of the exclusionary rule. To 
be sure, the Court has rejected application of the exclusion-
ary rule in some cases because it would not, by that applica-
tion, be likely appreciably to deter future police misconduct. 
See, e. g., United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620 (1980) (ille-
gally obtained evidence may be used to impeach defendant); 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974) (use of ille-
gally obtained evidence permitted at a grand jury proceed-
ing); United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976) (evidence 
illegally seized by state authorities may be used in civil suit 
brought by federal tax authorities); Stone v. Powell, supra 
(exclusionary rule questions cannot generally be considered 
on federal habeas corpus); cf. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, --
U. S. -- (1984) (exclusionary rule inapplicable in civil de-
portation proceedings because social costs outweigh the ad-
mitted marginal deterrent effect). Yet none of these cases 
entailed, as does the instant matter, the introduction of ille-
gally seized evidence into the State's case-in-chief at a crimi-
nal proceeding, where "the need for deterrence and hence the 
rationale for excluding the evidence is the strongest . . . . " 
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. In none of these 
cases was application of the exclusionary rule rejected, as it 
is in this case, because of a judicial intuition that the offend-
ing officials could not be deterred by application of the rule in 
the criminal case-in-chief. Rather, these cases considered 
and rejected proposals to extend the exclusionary rule's appli-
cation beyond the prosecution's criminal case-in-chief because 
the additional deterrent effect to be gained was insufficient 
to outweigh the concomitant social costs to be incurred. 
Nor does this case fit within the analytic framework articu-
lated in cases such as Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 
471 (1963), and United States v. Leon,-- U. S. -- (1984). 
In Wong Sun, the Court held that illegally seized evidence of 
crime will nevertheless be admissible whenever the official 
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error complained of is sufficiently attenuated from the evi-
dence thereby discovered. 371 U. S., at 484. In Leon, the 
Court held that evidence of crime will nevertheless be admis-
sible whenever the error making its seizure unconstitutional 
is an objectively reasonable one. -- U. S., at--. In 
short, relying on the experience it has gathered from years of 
adjudicating police search and seizure problems, the Court 
has concluded that deterrence of particular categories of 
Fourth Amendment intrusions is unlikely to result from 
application of the exclusionary rule to the evidence derived 
therefrom. By striking contrast, in this case the Court has 
categorically determined that deterrence of certain persons, 
as opposed to the commission of certain errors, will not result 
by excluding the evidence illegally seized from the prosecu-
tion's criminal case-in-chief at trial. That determination is, 
in my view, irreconcilable with the Court's consistently ap-
plied assumption that all government officials can and should 
be encouraged to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into 
their value systems. Such a determination is especially un-
fortunate in this case, since the Court has so little experience 
with public school official search and seizure problems. 
The Court apparently proposes now to assess in every case 
whether prohibiting "the use in the criminal-justice system of 
evidence obtained in [non-police officer] searches [will] have 
... the behavioral effects . . . that exclusion of illegally ob-
tained evidence in criminal prosecutions generally is thought 
to have on the typical law enforcement official." Ante, at 
9-10. I fear this approach will not lead to principled deci-
sionmaking. It makes little sense, in the absence of determi-
nate empirical evidence, to expect judges in state and federal 
courts to be able to draw reliable and consistent conclusions 
about the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on various gov-
ernment officials. If social scientists thoroughly trained in 
statistical analysis cannot reach consistent conclusions con-
cerning the rule's deterrent effect, there is little reason to be-
lieve that trial judges trained only in legal analysis will be 
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able to do any better. The difference, of course, is that 
judges do not engage in mere academic debate; they must ad-
judicate real prosecutions and dispose of them in a principled 
manner. The Court's new approach will unnecessarily com-
plicate, and possibly undermine, their performance of this 
task. 
This case serves as a good example of the arbitrary distinc-
tions that may very well attend the Court's new approach. 
The Court suggests that public school officials cannot be de-
terred by application of the exclusionary rule in criminal pro-
ceedings because they cannot fairly be classified as "law en-
forcement officers." Ante, at 9. Yet public school officials 
are no less concerned with "law enforcement" than are other 
regulatory agents to whom the exclusionary rule has already 
been applied. Like firefighters, building inspectors, and al-
cohol tax collectors, public school officials are charged with 
enforcing government regulations and with administering a 
government program. School authorities are responsible for 
enforcing compulsory attendance laws and for maintaining 
order and good discipline in the schools. School officials, like 
these other regulatory agents, are often obliged to seek out 
and report to the police evidence of criminal conduct. See 
post, at ___.__, n. 4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). If the pre-
sumption of deterrence properly applies to these other public 
officials, then it should apply to public school officials as well. 
All can fairly be characterized as engaging in "law enforce-
ment." Nothing in today's decision provides the federal and 
state courts with a principled basis for distinguishing among 
them and arbitrary distinctions are bound to result. 
I am sympathetic to the Court's disagreement with the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey's determination that the evi-
dence seized from respondent has to be excluded from her 
criminal trial, but my sympathy turns on a different ground. 
School administrators must be given great discretion in therrq 
efforts to maintain order and discipline in the public schools. 
Students correspondingly can expect less privacy in the 
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grade schools and high schools than can other persons in non-
educational settings. In, short, the intrusions that must be 
tolerated in ublic schools necessaril extend be ona those 
whic wou d pass Fourth Amendment scrutmy in other envi-
roiLmenM,. On this basis, it is more hkely that various 
searches conducted by school officials on school premises will 
be characterized as "reasonable" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. However, since the State has not chal-
lenged the Supreme Court of New Jersey's contrary holding 
on this issue, the judgment of that court must be affirmed. I 
respectfully dissent from the Court's conclusion to the 
contrary. 
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
I join Part II of the Court's opinion. Teachers, like all 
other government officials, must conform their conduct to the 
Fourth Amendment's protections of personal privacy and 
personal security. As JUSTICE STEVENS points out, post, at 
16-17, this principle is of particular importance when applied 
to schoolteachers, for children learn as much by example as 
by exposition. It would be incongruous and futile to charge 
teachers with the task of embuing their students with an un-
derstanding of our system of constitutional democracy, while 
at the same time immunizing those same teachers from the 
need to respect constitutional protections. See Board of 
Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864-865 (plurality opinion); 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 
u. s. 624, 637 (1943). 
I do not, however, otherwise join the Court's opinion. To-
day's decision sanctions school officials to conduct full-scale 
searches on a "reasonableness" standard whose only definite 
content is that it is not the same test as the "probable cause" 
standard found in the text of the Fourth Amendment. In 
adopting this unclear, unprecedented, and unnecesary depar-
ture from generally ·applicable Fourth Amendment stand-
ards, the Court carves out a broad exception to standards 
that this Court has developed over years of considering 
Fourth Amendment problems. Its decision is supported nei-
·---n~ ;s .. r d.ssJ. If. r;Jr ~ -h-.J •'"- it--
~ ~ -~ ~, ...JL -h-. L...A LJ bJ<v.-u.d ;Ju~sh 
-. 
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ther by precedent nor even by a fair application of the "bal-
ancing test" it proclaims in thi~ very opinion. 
I 
Three basic principles underly this Court's Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. First, warrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically delineated 
and well-recognized exceptions. See, e. g., Katz v. United 
States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967); accord Welsh v. Wisconsin, 
-- U. S. --, -- (1984); United States v. Place, --
U. S. --, -- (1983); Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 
204, 211-212 (1981); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20 (1968); Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). Second, full-scale 
searches-whether conducted in accordance with the war-
rant requirement or pursuant to one of its exceptions-are 
"reasonable" "in Fourth Amendment terms only on a showing 
of probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed 
and that evidence of the crime will be found in the place to be 
searched. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 (1964); Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 479 (1963); Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175-176 (1949). Third, catego-
ries of intrusions that are substantially less intrusive than 
full-scale searches or seizures may be justifiable in accord-
ance with a balancing test even absent a warrant or probable 
cause, provided that the balancing test used gives sufficient 
weight to the privacy interests that will be infringed. 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 210 (1979); Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). 
Vice-Principal Choplick's thorough excavation ofT. L. O.'s 
purse was undoubtedly a serious intrusion on her privacy. 
Unlike the searches in Terry v. Ohio, supra, or Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), the search at issue here en-
compassed a detailed and minute examination of respondent's 
pocketbook, in which the contents of private papers and let-
83-712-DISSENT 
NEW JERSEY v. T. L . 0. 3 
ters were thoroughly scrutinized. 1 Wisely, neither peti-
tioner nor the Court today attempt to justify the search of 
T. L. O.'s pocketbook as a minimally intrusive search in the 
Terry line. To be faithful to the Court's settled doctrine, the 
inquiry therefore must focus on the warrant and probable 
cause requirements. 
A 
I agree that school teachers or principals, when not acting 
as agents of law enforcement authorities, generally may con-
duct a search of their students' belongings without first ob-
taining a warrant. To agree with the Court on this point is 
to say that school searches may justifiably be held to that ex-
tent to constitute an exception to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement. Such an exception, however, is not to 
be justified, as the Court apparently holds, by assessing net 
social value through application of an unguided "balancing 
test" in which "the individual's legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy and personal security" are weighed against "the govern-
ment's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of 
public order." Ante, at 10. The Warrant Clause is some-
thing more than an exhortation to this Court to maximize so-
cial welfare as we see fit. It requires that the authorities 
must obtain a warrant before conducting a full-scale search. 
The undifferentiated governmental interest in law enforce-
ment is insufficient to justify an exception to the warrant re-
quirement. Rather, some special governmental interest be-
yond the need merely to apprehend lawbreakers is necessary 
to justify a categorical exception to the warrant requirement. 
For the most part, special governmental needs sufficient to 
override the warrant requirement flow from "exigency"-
that is, from the press of time that makes obtaining a warrant 
'A purse typically contains items of highly personal nature. Especially 
for shy or sensitive adolescents, it could prove extremely embarrassing for 
a teacher or principal to rummage through its contents, which could include 
notes from friends, fragments of love poems, caricatures of school authori-
ties, ~nd items of personal hygiene. 
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either impossible or hopelessly infeasible. See United States 
v. Place,-- U.S., at--; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S., 
at 393-394; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S., at 15. Only 
after finding an extraordinary governmental interest of this 
kind have we-or ought we-engage in a balancing test to de-
termine if a warrant should nonetheless be required. 2 
To require a showing of some extraordinary governmental 
interest before dispensing with the warrant requirement is 
not to undervalue society's need to apprehend violators of the 
criminal law. To be sure, forcing law enforcement personnel 
to obtain a warrant before engaging in a search will predict-
ably deter the police from conducting some searches that 
they would otherwise like to conduct. But this is not an un-
intended result of the Fourth Amendment's protection of pri-
vacy; rather, it is the very purpose for which the Amendment 
was thought necessary. Only where the governmental in-
terests at stake exceed those implicated in any ordinary law 
enforcement context-that is, only where there is some ex-
traordinary governmental interest involved-is it legitimate 
to engage in a balancing test to determine whether a warrant 
is indeed necessary. 
In this case, such extraordinary governmental interests do 
exist and are sufficient to justify an exception to the warrant 
requirement. Students are necessarily confined for most of 
the school day in close proximity to each other and to the 
school staff. I agree with the Court that we can take judicial 
notice of the serious problems of drugs and violence that 
plague our schools. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN notes, teachers 
must not merely "maintain an environment conducive to 
' Administrative search cases involving inspection schemes have recog-
nized that "if inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, 
unannounced, even frequent inspections are essential. In this context, the 
prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection .... " United 
States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311, 316 (1972); accord Donovan v. Dewey, 452 
U. S. 594, 603 (1981). Cf. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 (1978)' 
(holding that a warrant is nonetheless necessary in some administrative 
search contexts). 
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learning" among children who "are inclined to test the outer 
boundaries of acceptable conduct," but must also "protect the 
very safety of students and school personnel." Ante, at 3. 
A teacher or principal could neither carry out essential teach-
ing functions nor adequately protect students' safety if re-
quired to wait for a warrant before conducting a necessary 
search. For these reasons, I agree with the Court's conclu-
sion that Mr. Choplick did not need a warrant before search-
ing T.L. O.'s purse. 
B 
I emphatically disagree with the Court's decision to cast 
aside the constitutional probable cause standard when assess-
ing the constitutional validity of a schoolhouse search. The 
Court's decision jettisons the probable cause standard-the 
only standard that finds support in the text of the Fourth 
Amendment-on the basis of of its Rohrschach-like "balanc-
ing test." Use of such a "balancing test" to determine the 
standard for evaluating the validity of a full-scale search rep-
resents a sizable innovation in Fourth Amendment analysis. 
This innovation finds support neither in precedent nor policy 
and portends a dangerous weakening of the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment to protect the privacy and security of 
our citizens. Moreover, even if this Court's historic under-
standing of the Fourth Amendment were mistaken and a bal-
ancing test of some kind were appropriate, any such test that 
gave adequate weight to the privacy and security interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment would not reach the 
preordained result the Court's conclusory analysis reaches 
today. Therefore, because I believe that the balancing test 
used by the Court today is flawed both in its inception and in 
its excecution, I respectfully dissent. 
1 
An unbroken line of cases in this Court have held that 
probable cause is a prerequisite for a full-scale search. In 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 (1925), the Court 
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held that "[o]n reason and authority the true rule is that if the 
search and seizure ... are made upon probable cause, ... 
the search and seizure are valid." Under our past decisions 
probable cause--which exists where "the facts and circum-
stances within [the officials'] knowledge and of which they 
had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the be-
lief" that a criminal offense had occurred and the evidence 
would be found in the suspected place, id., at 162-is the con-
stitutional minimum for justifying a full-scale search, regard-
less whether it is conducted pursuant to a warrant or, as in 
Carroll, within one of the exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 104 (1959) 
(Carroll "merely relaxed the requirements for a warrant on 
grounds of practicality," but "did not dispense with the need 
for probable cause"); accord Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 
42, 51 (1970) ("In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's prohi-
bition against unreasonable searches and seizures; the Court 
has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement 
for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution."). 3 
Our holdings that probable cause is a prerequisite to a full-
scale search are based on the relationship between the two 
clauses of the Fourth Amendment. The first clause ("The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated .... ")states the purpose of the amend-
ment and its coverage. The second clause (" ... and no war-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause ... ") gives con-
' In fact, despite the somewhat diminished expectation of privacy that 
this Court has recognized in the automobile context, see South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 367-368 (1976), we have required probable 
cause even to justify a warrantless automobile search, see United States v. 
Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 896 (1975) ("A search, even of an automobile, is a sub-
stantial invasion of privacy. To protect that privacy from official arbi-
trariness, the Court always has regarded probable cause as the minimum 
requirement for a lawful search.") (footnote omitted); Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 51 (1970). 
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tent to the word "unreasonable" in the first clause. "For all 
but ... narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite 'balancing' 
has been performed in centuries of precedent and is embod-
ied in the principle that seizures are 'reasonable' only if sup-
ported by probable cause." Dunaway v. New York, 442 
u. s. 200, 214 (1979). 
I therefore fully agree with the Court that "the underlying 
command of the Fourth Amendment. is always that searches 
and seizures be reasonable." Ante, at 10. But this "under-
lying command" is not directly interpreted in each category 
of cases by some amorphous "balancing test." Rather, the 
provisions of the warrant clause-a warrant and probable 
cause-provide the yardstick against which official searches 
and seizures are to be measured. The Fourth Amendment 
neither requires nor authorizes the conceptual free-for-all 
that ensues when an unguided balancing test is used to assess 
sp~cific categories of searches. If the search in question is 
more than a minimally intrusive Terry-stop, the constitu-
tional probable cause standard determines its validity. 
To be sure, the Court recognizes that probable cause "ordi-
narily'' is required to justify a full-scale search and that the 
existence of probable cause "bears upon" the validity of the 
search. Ante, at 13-14. Yet the Court fails to cite any case 
in which a full-scale intrusion upon privacy interests has been 
justified on less than probable cause. The line of cases 
begun by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1980), provides no sup-
port, for they applied a balancing test only in the context of 
minimally intrusive searches that served crucial law enforce-
ment interests. The search in Terry itself, for instance, was 
a "limited search of the outer clothing." I d., at 30. The 
type of border stop at issue in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 880 (1975), usually "consume[d] no 
more than a minute"; the Court explicitly noted that "any fur-
ther detention . . . must be based on consent or probable 
cause." ld., at 881. See also United States v. Hensley, 
-- U. S. --,-- (1985) (momentary stop); United States 
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v. Place,-- U. S. --, -- (1983) (brief detention of lug-
gage for canine "sniff"); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 
106 (1978) (per curiam) (brief frisk after stop for traffic viola-
tion); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 560 
(1976) (characterizing intrusion as "minimal"); Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972) (stop and frisk). In short, all of 
these cases involved "'seizures' so substantially less intrusive 
than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to 
make Fourth Amendment 'seizures' reasonable could be re-
placed by a balancing test." Dunaway, supra, at 210. 
Nor do the "administrative search" cases provide any com-
fort for the Court. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U. S. 523 (1967), the Court held that the probable cause 
standard governed even administrative searches. Although 
the Camara Court recognized that probable cause standards 
themselves may have to be somewhat modified to take into 
account the special n::!.ture of administrative ·searches, the 
Court did so only after noting that "because [housing code] 
inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the 
discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively lim-
ited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy." ld., at 537. 
Subsequent administrative search cases have similarly recog-
nized that such searches intrude upon areas whose owners 
harbor a significantly decreased expectation of privacy, see, 
e. g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594, 598-599 (1981), thus 
circumscribing the injury to Fourth Amendment interests 
caused by the search. 
Considerations of the deepest significance for the freedom 
of our citizens counsel strict adherence to the principle that 
no search may be conducted where the official is not in pos-
session of probable cause-that is, where the official does not 
know of "facts and circumstances [that] warrant a prudent 
man in believing that the offense has been committed." 
Unted .States v. Henry, 361 U.S., at 102; see also id., at 
100-101 (discussing history of probable cause standard). 
The Fourth Amendment was designed not merely to protect 
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against official intrusions whose social utility was less as 
measured by some "balancing test" than its intrusion on indi-
vidual privacy; it was designed in addition to grant the indi-
vidual a zone of privacy whose protections could be breached 
only where the "reasonable" requirements of the probable 
cause standard were met. Moved by whatever momentary 
evil has aroused their fears, officials-perhaps even sup-
ported by. a majority of citizens-may be tempted to conduct 
searches that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to assuage 
the perceived evil. 4 But the Fourth Amendment rests on 
the principle that a true balance between the individual and 
society depends on the recognition of "the right to be let 
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). That right 
protects the privacy and security of the individual unless the 
authorities can cross a specific threshold of need, designated 
by the term "probable cause." I cannot agree with the 
Court's assertions today that a "balancing test" can replace 
the constitutional threshold with one that is more convenient 
for those enforcing the laws but less protective of the citizens' 
liberty; the Fourth Amendment's protections should not be 
defaced by "a balancing process that overwhelms the individ-
ual's protection against unwarranted official intrusion by a 
governmental interest said to justify the search and seizure." 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 570 (BREN-
NAN, J., dissenting). 
2 
I thus do not accept the majority's premise that "[t]o hold 
that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted 
by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry into the 
• As Justice Stewart said in Coolidge v. N ew Hampshire , 403 U. S. 443, 
455 (1971), "In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict 
or fear of internal subversion, this basic law and the values that it repre-
sents may appear unrealistic or 'extravagant' to some. But the values 
were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts." 
-
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standards governing such searches." Ante, at --. For 
me, the finding that the Fourth Amendment applies, coupled 
with the observation that what is at issue is a full-scale 
search, is the end of the inquiry. But even if I believed that 
a "balancing test" appropriately replaces the judgment of the 
Framers of the Fourth Amendment, I would nonetheless ob-
ject to the cursory and short-sighted "test" that the Court 
employs to justify its predictable weakening of Fourth 
Amendment protections. In particular, the test employed 
by the Court vastly overstates the social costs that a proba-
ble cause standard entails and, though it plausibly articulates 
the serious privacy interests at stake, inexplicably fails to ac-
cord them adequate weight in striking the balance. 
The Court begins to articulate its "balancing test" by ob-
serving that "the government's need for effective methods to 
deal with breaches of public order" is to be weighed on one 
side of the balance. Ante, at 10. Of course, this is not cor-
rect. It is not the ·government's need for effective enforce-
ment methods that should weigh in the balance, for ordinary 
Fourth Amendment standards-including probable cause-
may well permit methods for maintaining the public order 
that are perfectly effective. If that were the case, the gov-
ernmental interest in having effective standards would carry 
no weight at all as a justification for departing from the prob-
able cause standard. Rather, it is the costs of applying prob-
able cause as opposed to applying some lesser standard that 
should be weighed on the government's side. 5 
5 I speak of the "government's side" only because it is the terminology 
used by the Court. In my view, this terminology itself is seriously mis-
leading. The government is charged with protecting the privacy and secu-
rity of the citizen, just as it is charged with apprehending those who violate 
the criminal law. Consequently, the government has no legitimate inter-
est in conducting a search that unduly intrudes on the privacy and security 
of the citizen. The balance is not between the rights of the government 
and the rights of the citizen, but between opposing conceptions of the con-
stitutionally legitimate means of carrying out the government's varied 
responsibilities. 
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In order to tote up the costs of applying the probable cause 
standard, it is thus necessary first to take into account the 
nature and content of that standard, and the likelihood that it 
would hamper achievment of the goal-vital not just to 
"teachers and administrators," see ante, at 12-of maintain-
ing an effective educational setting in the public schools. 
The seminal statement concerning the nature of the probable 
cause standard is found in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 
132 (1925). Carroll held that law enforcement authorities 
have probable cause to search where "the facts and circum-
stances within their knowledge and of which they had reason-
ably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that a 
criminal offense had occurred." !d., at 162. In Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949), the Court amplified this 
requirement, holding that probable cause depends upon "the 
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Id., at 
175. 
Two Terms ago, in Illinois v. Gates, -- U.S. --
(1983), this Court expounded at some length its view of the 
probable cause standard. Among the adjectives used to de-
scribe the standard were "practical," "fluid," "flexible," "in-
formal," "easily applied," and "nontechnical." See id., at 
--, --, -- The probable cause standard was to be 
seen as a "commonsense" test whose application depended on 
an evaluation of the "totality of the circumstances." I d., at 
Ignoring what Gates took such great pains to emphasize, 
the Court today holds that a new "reasonableness" standard 
is appropriate because it "will spare teachers and school ad-
ministrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the 
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their 
conduct according to the dictates of reason and common 
sense." Ante, at 16. I had never thought that our pre-
Gates understanding of probable cause defied either reason 
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or common sense. But after Gates, I would have thought 
that there could be no doubt that this "nontechnical," "practi-
cal," and "easily applied" concept was eminently serviceable 
in a context like a school, where professional teachers require 
the flexibility to respond quickly and decisively to 
emergencies. 
A consideration of the likely operation of the probable 
cause standard reinforces this conclusion. Discussing the 
issue of school searches, Professor LaFave has noted that the 
cases that have reached the appellate courts "strongly sug-
gest that in most instances the evidence of wrongdoing 
prompting teachers or principals to conduct searches is suffi-
ciently detailed and specific to meet the traditional probable 
cause test." 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.11, at 
459-460 (1978). 6 The problems that have caused this Court 
difficulty in interpreting the probable cause standard have 
largely involved informants, see, e. g., Illinois v. Gates,--
U. S. - (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 
(1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964); Draper v. 
United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959). However, three factors 
make it likely that problems involving informants will not 
make it difficult for teachers and school administrators to 
make probable cause decisions. This Court's decision in 
Gates applying a "totality of the circumstances" test to deter-
mine whether an informant's tip can constitute probable 
cause renders the test easy for teachers to apply. The fact 
that students and teachers interact daily in the school build-
ing makes it more likely that teachers will get to know stu-
dents who supply information; the problem of informants who 
remain anonymous even to the teachers-and who are there-
fore unavailable for verification or further questioning-is 
unlikely to arise. Finally, teachers can observe the behavior 
I 
6 It should be noted that Professor LaFave reached this conclusion in 
1978, before this Court's decision in Gates made clear the "flexibility" of t.pe 
probable cause concept. 
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of students under suspicion to corroborate any doubtful tips 
they do receive. 
As compared with the relative ease with which teachers 
can apply the probable cause standard, the amorphous 
"reasonableness under all the circumstances" standard 
freshly coined by the Court today will likely spawn increased 
"litigation and greater uncertainty among teachers and admin-
istrators. Of course, as this Court should know, an essential 
purpose of developing and articulating legal norms is to en-
able individuals to conform their conduct to those norms. A 
school system conscientiously attempting to obey the Fourth 
Amendment's dictates under a probable cause standard 
could, for example, consult decisions and other legal materi-
als and prepare a booklet expounding the rough outlines of 
the concept. Such a booklet could be distributed to teachers 
to provide them with guidance as to when a search may be 
lawfully conducted. I cannot but believe that the same 
school system faced with interpreting what is permitted 
under the Court's new "reasonableness" standard would be 
hopelessly adrift as to when a search may be permissible. 
The sad result of this uncertainty may well be that some 
teachers will be reluctant to conduct searches that are fully 
permissible and even necessary under the constitutional 
probable cause standard, while others may intrude arbi-
trarily and unjustifiably on the privacy of students. 7 
7 A comparison of the language of the standard ("reasonableness under 
all the circumstances") with the traditional language of probable cause 
("facts sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that 
a crime had been committed and the evidence would be found in the desig-
nated place") suggests that the Court's new standard may turn out to be 
probable cause under a new guise. If so, the additional uncertainty caused 
by this Court's innovation is surely unjustifiable; it would be naive to ex-
pect that the addition of this extra dose of uncertainty would do anything 
other than "burden the efforts of school authorities to maintain order in the 
schools," ante, at 15. If, on the other hand, the new standard permits 
searches of students in instances when probable cause is absent-in-
stances, according to this Court's consistent formulations, when a person of 
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One further point should be taken into account when con-
sidering the desirability of replacing the constitutional proba-
ble cause standard. The question facing the Court is not 
whether the probable cause standard should be replaced by a 
test of "reasonableness under all the circumstances." 
Rather, it is whether traditional Fourth Amendment stand-
ards should recede before the Court's new standard. Thus, 
although the Court today paints with a broad brush and holds 
its undefined "reasonableness" standard applicable to all 
school searches, I would approach the question with consider-
ably more reserve. I would not think it necessary to develop 
a single standard to govern all school searches, any more 
than traditional Fourth Amendment law applies even the 
probable cause standard to all searches and seizures. For 
instance, just as police officers may conduct a brief stop and 
frisk on something less than probable cause, so too should 
teachers be permitted the same flexibility. A teacher or ad-
ministrator who had reasonable suspicion that a student was 
carrying a gun would no doubt have authority under ordinary 
Fourth Amendment doctrine to conduct a limited search of · 
the student to determine whether the threat was genuine. 
The "costs" of applying the traditional probable cause stand-
ard must therefore be discounted by the fact that, where ad-
ditional flexibility is necessary and where the intrusion is 
minor, traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence itself 
displaces probable cause when it determines the validity of a 
search. 
A legitimate balancing test whose function was something 
more substantial than reaching a predetermined conclusion 
acceptable to this Court's impressions of what authority 
teachers need would therefore reach rather a different result 
than that reached by the Court today. On one side of the 
reasonable caution would not think it likely that a violation existed or that 
evidence of that violation would be found-the new standard is genuinely 
objectionable and impossible to square with the premise that our citizens 
have the right to be free from arbitrary intrusions on their privacy. 
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balance would be the costs of applying traditional Fourth 
Amendment standards-the "practical" and "flexible" proba-
ble cause standard where a full-scale intrusion is sought, a 
lesser standard in situations where the intrusion is much less 
severe and the need for greater authority compelling. 
Whatever costs were toted up on this side would have to be 
discounted by the costs of applying an unprecedented and ill-
defined "reasonableness under all the circumstances" test 
that will leave teachers and administrators uncertain as to 
their authority and will encourage excessive fact-based 
litigation. 
On the other side of the balance would be the serious pri-
vacy interests of the student, interests that the Court ad-
mirably articulates in its opinion, ante, ae 10-12, but which 
the Court's new ambiguous standard places in serious jeop-
ardy. I have no doubt that a fair assessment of the two sides 
of the balance would necessarily reach the same conclusion 
that, as I have argued above, the Fourth Amendment's lan-
guage compels-that school searches like that conducted in 
this case are valid only if supported by probable cause. 
II 
Applying the constitutional probable cause standard to the 
facts of this case, I would find that Mr. Choplick's search vio-
lated T. L. O.'s Fourth Amendment rights. After escorting 
T. L. 0. into his private office, Mr. Choplick demanded to 
see her purse. He then opened the purse to find evidence 
whether she had been smoking in the bathroom. When he 
opened the purse, he discovered the pack of cigarettes. At 
this point, his search for evidence of the smoking violation 
was complete. 
Mr. Choplick then noticed, below the cigarettes, a pack of 
cigarette rolling papers. Believing that such papers were 
"associated," see ante, at 2, with the use of marijuana, he 
proceeded to conduct a detailed examination of the contents 
of her purse, in which he found some marihuana, a pipe, some 
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money, an index card, and some private letters indicating 
that T. L. 0. had sold marihuana to other students. The 
State sought to introduce this latter material in evidence at a 
criminal proceeding, and the issue before the Court is 
whether it should have been suppressed. 
On my view of the case, we need not decide whether the 
initial search conducted by Mr. Choplick-the search for evi-
dence of the smoking violation that was completed when Mr. 
Choplick found the pack of cigarettes-was valid. For Mr. 
Choplick at that point did not have probable cause to continue 
to rummage through T. L. O.'s purse. Mr. Choplick's suspi-
cion of marijuana possession at this time was based solely on 
the presence of the package of cigarette papers. The mere 
presence without more of such a staple item of commerce is 
insufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in infer-
ring both that T. L. 0. had violated the law by possessing 
marijuana and that evidence of that violation would be found 
in her purse. Just as a police officer could not obtain a war-
rant to search a home based solely on his claim that he had 
seen a package of cigarette papers in that home, Mr. 
Choplick was not entitled to search possibly the most private 
possessions ofT. L. 0. based on the mere presence of a pack-
age of cigarette papers. Therefore, the fruits of this illegal 
search must be excluded and the judgment of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court affirmed. 
III 
In the past several Terms, this Court has produced a suc-
cession of Fourth Amendment opinions in which "balancing 
tests" have been applied to resolve various questions con-
cerning the proper scope of official searches. The Court has 
begun to apply a "balancing test" to determine whether a 
particular category of searches intrudes upon expectations of 
privacy that merit Fourth Amendment protection. See 
Hudson v. Palmer,-- U.S.--,-- (1984) ("Determin-
ing whether an expectation of privacy is 'legitimate' or 'rea-
sonable' necessarily entails a balancing of interests.").. It ap-
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plies a "balancing test" to determine whether a warrant is 
necessary to conduct a search. See ante, at --; United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 564-566 (1976). In 
today's opinion, it employs a "balancing test" to determine 
what standard should govern the constitutionality of a given 
category of searches. See ante, at--. Should a search 
turn out to be unreasonable after application of all of these 
"balancing tests," the Court then applies an additional "bal-
ancing test" to decide whether the evidence resulting from 
the search must be excluded. See United States v. Leon, 
- u. s. - (1984). 
All of these "balancing tests" amount to brief nods by the 
Court in the direction of a neutral utilitarian calculus while 
the Court in fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of judicial 
will. Perhaps this doctrinally destructive nihilism is merely 
a convenient umbrella under which a majority that cannot 
agree on a genuine rationale- can conceal its differences. 
Compare ante, at-- (WHITE, J., delivering the opinion of 
the Court) with ante, at-- (POWELL, J., joined by O'CON-
NOR, J., concurring) and ante, at--, (BLACKMUN, J., con-
curring in the judgment). And it may be that real force un-
derlying today's decision is the belief that the Court purports 
to reject-the belief that the unique role served by the 
schools justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment on 
their behalf. If so, the methodology of today's decision may 
turn out to have as little influence in future cases as will its 
result, and the Court's departure from traditional Fourth 
Amendment doctrine will be confined to the schools. 
On my view, the presence of the word "unreasonable" in 
the text of the Fourth Amendment does not grant a shifting 
majority of this Court the authority to answer all Fourth 
Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision of 
the social good. Full-scale searches unaccompanied by prob-
able cause violate the Fourth Amendment. I do not pretend 
that our traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine automati-
cally answers all of the difficult legal questions that occasion-
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ally arise. I do contend, however, that this Court has an ob-
ligation to provide some coherent framework to resolve such 
questions on the basis of more than a conclusory recitation of 
the results of a "balancing test." The Fourth Amendment 
itself supplies that framework and, because the Court today 
fails to heed its message, I must respectfully dissent. 
~. ·' '*} 
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Justice Powell, concurring. 
I agree with the result reached by the Court and with 
most of its reasoning. I write separately only to make clear my 
disagreement with language in the Court's opinion that suggests 
that exclusion of evidence from school disciplinary proceedings 
may provide a significant deterrent to Fourth Amendment viola-
tions by school officials. That suggestion is unsubstantiated by 
~· 
the current record and is ~~ecessary to the question before us. 
As the Court ~ante, at 9, the only question 
before us is whether evidence unlawfully seized by school offi-
cials during the course of an in-school search must be excluded 
in juvenile delinquency proceedings. I agree with the Court's 
conclusion that it need not. Application of the exclusionary 
rule to criminal proceedings is warranted only where it is clear 




States v. Janis, 428 u.s. 433, 454 (1976). ~ As the Court ~ ,J 
1\ 
d- pl aj R.S, school officials properly are concerned primarily with 
enforcing school regulations and maintaining a safe and drug-free 
learning enviornment. Ante, at 9-10. They, therefore, will have 
strong incentives to perform in-school searches that will not be 
diminished by the exclusion of evidence in a subsequent delin-
quency proceeding. 
This explanation sufficiently answers the question 
whether the exclusionary rule will "result in appreciable deter-
renee." Nevertheless, the Court goes on to consider the likely 
deterrent effect of excluding evidence seized by school officials 
from school disciplinary proceedings. See ante, at 10-11. The 
basis for the Court's speculation is the decision by the New Jer-
sey Superior Court that evidence seized in this case must be ex-
eluded from the disciplinary proceedings involving T.L.O.'s sus-
pension from school. 
The Court states in a footnote that "the propriety of 
that decision is not before us in this case." Ante, at 10 n. 6. 
page 3. 
This disclaimer, however, is undermined by the Court's subsequent 
statement to the effect that "illegal searches and seizures by 
school officials will be adequately deterred" by the exclusion of 
evidence from school disciplinary proceedings. Ante, at 11. Not 
only is this statement ~~ unsupported by the record in this 
case, but it suggests an answer to a question that is not cur-
rently before us. Moreover, it suggests an answer that is con-
trary to our decisions concerning the exclusionary rule -- deci-
sions that consistently have refused to extend the rule to civil 
proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 u.s. 433 
(1976). 
Although I join the Court's opinion, I disapprove of its 
unnecessary musings concerning the deterrent effect of the exclu-
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A Baltimore County high school gym class was sent 
back to school from a roller rink recently after 'the scent 
of marijuana was detected in a rink restroqm and on 
some of the students. 
When they got back to Towson High, small groups of 
students were taken to administrative offices and frisked 
. by members of the school staff. Their purses, bags, shoes 
and socks were searched and, in some cases, clothing was 
removed and bras and underwear were checked. 
School officials found a 51f2 -inch knife in one girl's 
pocket arid marijuana in the purses of two other stu-
dents. Juvenile charges were brought against the stu-
dents .. <;>ne ~as suspended and two were expelled. 
~h{ · · cident r fleets a tro~bling problem for ~~ol 
officials around the country: How do they balance the 
mied for a safe school environment against a student's 
right to Fourth Amendment protection from unreason-
able searches? 
That is the issue in a case pending before the Supreme 
Court involving a New ~ersey vice principal's search of a 
student's purse. Courts around the nation have ruled 
erratically on student searches, and many school officials 
are nervously awaiting the high court's decision, which is 
expected before the court's term expires in July. The 
decision, school officials say, could radically alter when 
and how they may search students. ' 
"We could be in a heap of trouble," says Peter Blau-
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velt, chief of security for Prince 
George's County schools, where of-
ficials collected about 100 weapons 
from students this school year, some 
during searches. "The decision could 
be devastating." 
"It's an issue of real concern to us. 
We realize the tenuous legal grounds 
much of this search business is based 
upon," says Jim Fleming, an assist-
ant superintendent with the Miami 
schools, where drug trafficking has 
been a major problem. Through De-
cember of this school year, Miami 
school officials confiscated 98 weap-
ons and processed 97 cases of drug 
possession. "We are watching the 
Supreme Court decision very, very 
closely." 
"Essentially, schools seem to ex-
pect students to shed their consti-
tutional rights when they come into 
school: says Barry Goodman, a New 
Jersey lawyer with the American 
Civil Liberties Union, who has filed 
a brief in the Supreme Court case. 
"They have the rights on the street, 
but once they walk into school they 
can forget il Their rights are lost." 
Schools are different from the 
streets, argues Tom Shannon, exec-
utive director of the National School 
Boards Association in Alexandria. 
"We are not at war with our chil-
dren," says Shannon, but "this is not 
the street. Certain rights people have 
in school have to be subordinated to 
the common good and safety of all 
children." Shannon has also filed a 
brief in Supreme Court case. · 
In the New Jersey case, a Pisca- ' 
taway, N.J., student, who is identi-
fied only as T.L.O. in court papers, 
was seen smoking in the school bath-
room on March 7, 1980. When the 
girl denied the accusation, the vice 
principal searched the girl's purse. 
The administrator found cig~­
rettes on top and rolling papers not · 
far below. A deeper look into the 
purse yielded marijuana, empty plas-
tic bags, a pipe and a list of names of 
persons who owed th~ student mon-
ey. The evidence was turned over to 
police, and the girl was convicted of 
possession of marijuana with intent 
to distribute. 
The conviction a overturned 
last year by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court, which rul~ that stu-
dents should be guaranteed the same 
rights as adult offenders and that 
the 8earch was improper. The evi-
dence was suppressed. 
At iaaue in the New Jersey case, 
now on appeal to the high court, is 
whether the evidence found by the 
vice principal should have been per-
mitted in court, even if the search 
did not meet a legal standard of rea-
sonableness or fairness. Attorneys 
for the state argue that school ad-
ministrators are not trained police 
officers and should not have to meet 
the same criminal law standards. 
They say the purpose of school 
searches is a pragmatic one: to main-
tain a safe and disciplined environ-
ment. 
In friend-of-the-court briefs, 
school board attorneys have urged 
the court to permit broader discre-
tion for school administrators in 
searches. 
"We are concerned about an over-
broad decision that could endanger a 
school's ability to llct in loco paren-
tis," says Shannon. "It could ham-
string administration efforts and 
teachers' efforts to control what is 
going on in the school." 
Goodman and the girl's lawyers, 
on the other hand, contend that chil-
dren in school should be afforded 
· the same guarantees they have else-
where. They argue that because 
smoking was allowed in other areas 
of the Piscataway school building, 
possession of cigarettes was not a 
violation of school rules and was not 
a reasonable in'dication that the 
purse contained marijuana. 
The "wholesale rummaging" of the 
girl's purse was unreasonable, they 
contended, adding that the marijua-
na found should not have been per-
mitted as evidence in a criminal 
\ court proceeding. Strict standards 
are particularly important when im-
l pounded material is turned over for 
a court proceeding. , 
"It would be ironic in the ex-
treme," wrote the ACLU in 'its brief; 
"if ln our schools, the institution 
upon which we rely to teach our chil-
dren the rights and responsibilities 
of our constitutional form of govern-
ment, violations of those rights are 
.countenanced .... " 
School officials are hoping the Su-
, preme Court will clear up some of 
the confusion and set clearer guide-
lines as to when students can be 
searched and when the evidence can 
be used in court. At present, school 
districts and courts around the coun-
try require standards varying from 
suspicion to "probable cause. • Some, 
such as in Maryland, Virginia and 
the District, allow searches when 
there appears to be "reasonable" be-
lief that the student has drugs, a 
weapon or stolen property. In others, 
such as Miami, a student is asked if 
he or she will permit a search; if the , 
student refuses the parent or police 
will be called to judge if the stricter 
standard of "probable cause" can be 
met. 
"Searches are shaky," says Mi-
ami's Fleming. 
As a result of the differing inter-
pretations, numerous problems have 
arisen. In California, lawyers are ex-
pecting the high court's decision to 
affect a similar case in the State Su-
. preme Court. In that case, a student 
was standing in a hallway during 
class time and a school staff mem-
her, concerned that he might be 
1
\ skipping class, searched his bag and 
found marijuana. 
A group of Northern Virginia par-
I ents are considering filing suit 
against an elementary school be-
cause a group of boys recently were 
required to strip to their shorts when 
some material was milfsing from a _ 
classroom. 
And, principals in Burbank, Calif., 
have strongly endorsed the use of 
dogs to sniff out drugs, but the 
ACLU has filed suit to block the 
action. 
For civil libertarians opposi~g the 
searches, seme of their most surpris-
ing foes are parents. "At one time we 
tried using publicity [about searches] 
to shock the consciences of adults, 
but we got the opposite response," 
says John Roemer, executive director 
of the Maryland chapter of the 
ACLU. "The parents clamored for 
more." 
· For the most part, parents sup-
. ported the search of the Towson 
High students. ,They wanted their 
children's schools safe and drug-free. 
But some students were annoyed. 
"I was mad," said 15-year-old Mel-
anie Gore. "A lot of people felt it was 
unfair that they put us through a lot 
of embarrassment .... People 
shouldn't bring drugs into school in 
the first place, but the teachers 
weren't even sure who was smoking." 
ACLR lawyers told two Towson 
High students who contacted th~m 
that they had a good shot at provmg 
the students were searched unrea-
sonably, but the girls did not purs~e 
court action because most of the1r 
classmates expressed disinterest. 
After a rash of violence or a well -
publicized incident, the pleas be-
come more emotional. Newspapers 
were splashed with community de-
mands for a crackdown last year 
when a loaded gun was found in the 
desk of a third grade student in the 
Miami area. 
When a 14-year-old Baltimore 
City student .was gunn~ down in a 
junior high hallway after refusing to 
turn his jacket over to two youths, 
some parent. and members of the 
news media called for school guards 
to begin carrying metal detectors. 
Guards in Detroit schools began 
using metal detectol'tl this year after 
local governm~nt officials and res-
idents became incensed by a spate of 
attacks on student., even though 
niany of the assaults occurred off 
school grounds. This year Detroit 
guards, using the scanners, have 
found 59 guns and 69 knives. 
Fed up with the large volumes of 
drugs floating around schools, stu-
dents in Miami have formed Youth 
Crime Watch teams in all 77 of the 
system's secondary schools and 60 of 
the 176 elementary schools. At Nor-
iand Miami High, 11 varsity athletes 
patrol the ha1la at lunch time and 
between classes. School officials say 
· ' ' EssentiaUy, schools seem to expeet 
students to shed their constitutional rights 
when they eome Into school. They have the 
rights on -the street, but once they walk Into 
school they can forget it. Their rights are 
fust. ff 
the athletes provide information 
about probable crimes and act as a 
deterrent to attacks. 
Last year, there were about a doz-
en necklace snatchings at Norland 
Miami. This year, none have been 
reported. 
The forbidding size of the athletes 
may be an influencing factor. The 
.captain of the Varsity Patrol, Clyde 
Montgom~ry. is a 6-foot-1, 200-
pound linebacker. · ' ' 
"I believe I'm a civil libertarian," 
says Frank Blount, who heads the 
Detroit security staff. "But I also 
believe kids should go to school to 
·learn. There · is no place in our 
schools for weapons. We don't hand 
them out at the school door." 
The most troublesome and trou-
bling of the search techniques used 
by school systems appears to be strip 
searches, the effect of which, say op-
ponents, can be a lifetime of humil-
iation and fear. 
., 
Brooklyn school ~fficials ~t YMk 
settled a case with the parents of 
two P.S. 282 students who sued, 
charging that most of the children in 
a substitute teacher's class were 
stripped after $50 was discovered to 
be missing from the instructor's 
purse, even though the money was 
found on one of the first students 
examined. 
The parents of a 12-year-old Wil-
lingboro, N.J., child are in the pro- · 
cess of settling a case against school 
officials. The parents said their 
daughter was partially strip-searched 
after some students were seen brush-
ing close enough to her to have ei-
ther given or received something. A 1 
school nurse examined the girl but 
found no evidence of drugs. 
"It was really embarrassing and 
we didn't know what was going on." 
said one student who was late get-
ting ~ her job after the Towson 
skating incident. "We didn't )mow 
why it was happening. It was really 
weird and awful. I don't know why 
they had to search all of us." . 
But ·Towson High Assistant Prin-
cipal Ray Gross defends the search. 
"We had both probable cause and 
reasonable belief to think some of 
our students were using drugs. We 
had a number of different sources 
supporting this assumption," said 
Gross. "Some of the girls did com-
plain to me that their bras and un-
derwear were checked. If that hap-
pened, that shouldn't have." 
School officials concede that 
searches sometimes go too far but 
generally say most staff members -
involved in searches have no Wish to 
infringe on students' rights or pri-
vacy-only a need to protect the 
majority. 
"In strip searches th_e rule of 
thumb is, 'What is reasonable?' " 
says Prince George'~ security chief 
Blauvelt. "There are times when ac-
tions taken are just not reasonable 
.... But principals have never re-
ceived any training in this area of 
school security. 
"They fly by the seats of their 
pants, and what's a good idea today 
may not be a good idea tomorrow," 
says Blauvelt. · 
"But if the Supreme Court were to 
rule school administrators do not 
have their current rights to search 
. and seizur~. I think the .schools 
. would have a tendency to become 
open territory, if, you will. I don't 
think anyone wants that." 






82-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Justice Powell, concurring. 
I agree with the decision reached by the Court 
and with most of its reasoning. I do not agree, however, 
with the language in the opinion that suggests that 
exclusion of evidence from school disciplinary proceedings 
may provide a deterrent to Fourth Amendment violations by 
school officials. This suggestion has no support in the 
record and is unnecessary to a decision of the question 
before us. 
As the Court states, ante, at 9, the only 
question presented is whether evidence unlawfully seized 
by school officials during the course of an in-school 
search must be excluded in juvenile delinquency 
2. 
proceedings. I agree with the Court's conclusion that the 
exclusionary rule is not applicable. The school 
officials, in searching respondent's purse, were acting 
pursuant to their duty to enforce school regulations and 
maintain a safe and drug-free learning environment. They 
had no responsibility for enforcing the criminal laws. 
Application of the exclusionary rule, as the Court 
correctly reasons, would be unlikely to result in 
appreciable deterrence. 1 My difficulty concerns the 
1The courts below found an absence of probable 
cause for the search that revealed the drugs and evidence 
that T.L.O. was selling drugs to her youthful schoolmates. 
Determination of what constitutes "probable cause" is a 
question on which lawyers and judges, as well as police 
officials, frequently differ. It would be unrealistic 
to extend the subtleties of the Fourth Amendment the 
school classroom. I therefore do not agree with the 
statement in the Court's opinion that "school boards may 
and should have both the incentive and the means to foster 
an understanding [of federal constitutional standards]". 
See, ante, at 10. Decisions of the courts, including this 
Court, frequently decide close questions of alleged Fourth 
Amendment violations and applications of the exclusionary 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
portion of the Court's opinion, see ante, at 10-11, that 
goes on to consider the likely deterrent effect of 
excluding evidence seized by school officials in school 
disciplinary proceedings as distinguished from delinquency 
proceedings. The basis for the Court's speculation in 
this respect is the decision by the New Jersey Superior 
Court, in the disciplinary proceedings, that the evidence 
found in T.L.O. 's purse must be excluded. 
The Court is careful to state in a footnote that 
the "propriety of that decision is not before us in this 
case . " Ante , at 1 0 , n • 6 • This disclaimer, however, is 
rule. Keeping abreast of, and understanding, these 
developments has been a problem for law enforcement 
officials who are briefed regularly on Court decisions. 
School officials rarely possess legal training, and few 
schools could provide adequate briefing. It would be 
unreasonable on its face to suggest that they should be 
held to the same standards that the law expects of police 
officials. 
4. 
undermined by the Court's subsequent statement to the 
effect that "illegal seizures and searches by school 
officials will be adequately deterred" by the exclusion of 
evidence from disciplinary proceedings. Ante, at 11. 
This statement is unsupported in the record, and it 
suggests or implies an answer to a question not before us. 
Moreover, it suggests an answer that is contrary to our 
decisions concerning the exclusionary rule decisions 
that consistently have refused to extend the rule to civil 
proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 u.s. 
433 (1976). 
Although I join the judgment and the greater 
part of the Court's opinion, I dissent from that portion 
of it that speculates unnecessarily as to a deterrent 
of th~ituations that are effect not before 2 us. 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages. 
5. 
2 If, indeed, the decision of the New Jersey 
Superior Court were before us, or if I am permitted also 
to speculate, I would say with some confidence that the 
judgment of that court should be reversed. There is no 
evidence of overreaching conduct on the part of the school 
officials, and the seven-day suspension of T.L.O. for 
selling drugs to 14-year-old children in school, was a 
singularly modest penalty. 
alb 11/01/84 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., No. 83-712 
POWELL,J., concurring: 
After balancing the interests of students against 
those of the government, the majority holds that school 
searches need not be based on probable cause. I agree 
that the fourth amendment should not prohibit a teacher 
from conducting a search when "reasonable grounds" exist 
to suspect that the search will turn up evidence of a 
violation of school rules or the law. Nevertheless, I 
write separately to emphasize that our departure from the 
probable cause standard c~nn~t be justified under the test 
set forth in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 u.s. 523 --------
(1967) , which balances the interests of the student 
2. 
against those of the school. Our holding should be 
premised on the principle that students are entitled to 
only those constitutional protections that will not 
"materially and substantially interfere with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
schools." Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.s. 
503 (1969). 
I. 
In Camara, we held that "there can be no ready 
test for determining reasonableness other than by 
balancing the need to search against the invasion which 
the search entails." Identifying the competing interests, 
the majority recognizes that teachers and school 
3. 
administrators have a "substantial interest" in 
maintaining discipline in the classroom. A teacher's 
ability to maintain order will be frustrated by a 
requirement that searches be based on probable cause. The 
majority recognizes, however, that the government's "need" 
for a departure from the probable cause standard must be 
balanced against the concomitant intrusion on the privacy 
interests of students. The Court finds that the 
schoolchild's "subjective" expectation of privacy, at 
least with respect to his person and personal effects, is 
as great as that of an adult. Furthermore, the Court 
states that the student's expectation is one that society 
recognizes as "legitimate." 
The majority apparently finds that the school's 
need to maintain discipline outweighs any intrusion upon 
4. 
the student's privacy interest, even though it 
acknowledges the substantiality of the privacy invasion 
represented by a search. I cannot understand this finding 
since in other cases where the Court has approved a search 
or seizure on the basis reasonable suspicion, the 
resulting intrusion has been quite limited. In United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 873 (1975), for 
example, we held that a roving border patrolman may stop a 
car that he "reasonably suspects" contains illegal aliens. 
Despite the government's substantial interest in limiting 
the influx of illegal aliens, this departure from the 
probable cause standard was sanctioned only after we found 
that the brief stop of an automobile constitutes a 
"modest" intrusion. This case, unlike Brignoni-Ponce, 
,, 
5. 
involves a privacy interest so substantial that results 
under the Camara "balancing test" are inconclusive. 
II. 
Only by recognizing the limited nature of the ---------------
schoolchild's constitutional rights can we justify our 
departure from the standard of probable cause. Although 
this Court has recognized that students do not "shed their 
constitutional rights •.• at the schoolhouse gate," Tinker 
v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 u.s. 503, 506 (1969), it 
has been reluctant to interfere with the discretion of 
teachers and school officials. We consistently have 
refused to afford students constitutional protections 
6. 
which would materially interfere with the operation of the 
public schools. 
In Tinker, the Court held that the first 
amendment protected high school students' right to wear 
black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. Although the 
students' conduct was "closely akin to 'pure speech,'" the 
Court did not intimate that the school policy forbidding 
the armbands could be sustained only if it served a 
"compelling state interest." Cf. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 
u.s. 45, 53-54 (1982). Instead, thev;;:nker Court held 
that school officials could not restrict the students' 
conduct because the wearing of armbands did not 
"materially and substantially interfere with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of 
the school. " The Court's analysis thus indicates that 
'·~ 
7. 
schoolchildren are not entitled to the same first 
amendment rights enjoyed by adults. The decision to 
afford students only limited constitutional protection was 
based on the Court's recognition of the "need for 
affirming the comprehensive authority of school 
officials to prescribe and control conduct in the 
school." 
In Goss v. Lopez, 417 u.s. 565 (1975), the Court 
held that students could not be suspended from school, 
even for less than ten days, without a notice and a 
hearing. Again, the Court was careful to limit the nature 
of the student's constitutional right so as to avoid 
interfering with the operation of the schools. The 
"notice" to which the student was entitled could be given 
orally, immediately prior to the hearing. The decision 
8. 
did not grant the student a right to counsel, to cross-
examination, or to call witnesses. The teacher was 
required only to give the student an explanation of the 
evidence against him and "an opportunity to present his 
side of the story." The Court recognized that these 
procedures were "rudimentary;" nevertheless it stated that 
requiring more than this "informal give-and-take" would 
make the short suspension too costly as a disciplinary 
tool and would destroy its effectiveness as part of the 
teaching process. 
While Tinker and Goss recognized limitations on 
the constitutional rights of students, Ingraham v. Wright, 
430 u.s. 651 (1977), went further and held the eighth 
amendment inapplicable to the schools. The 
Ingraham decision was based primarily on our conclusion 
,, 
9. 
that the eighth amendment was intended only to protect 
those convicted of crimes. Nevertheless, we went on to 
state that even if it had some application outside the 
context of criminal pubishments, the eighth amendment 
should not prohibit corporal punishment of public school 
students. 
Tinker, Goss, and Ingraham do not indicate that 
the rights of students are unimportant. Instead, these 
decisions reflect an awareness that school officials must ~ 
be given broad discretionary authority in the daily 
operation of the public schools. But despite our 
reluctance to afford schoolchildren full constitutional 
rights, we are confident that their interests will be 
protected, because: (1) those members of the community 




supervise their operation; and (2) there is a "commonality 
of interest" between teachers and students. 
The public school is an open and highly visible l 
institution in the community. Although attendance is 
compelled, students leave school at the end of the day and 
return to their families. Ingraham, 430 u.s. at 670. 
. ~4 
Instances of m1streatment ~o~ally a~e reported to parents 
.I\ 
Therefore, the teacher 
knows that if he acts unfairly, he faces the unwelcome 
prospect of irate parents in his office. Wilkinson, Goss 
v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School Superintendant, 1975 
The Supreme Court Rev. 25, 70. If the school official's 
explanation fails to satisfy them, the concerned parents 
.. may approach a school board member or another elected 
official. Given the usual geographic concentration of 
11. 
/ 
parents around the schools in which they are interested, 
their ability to influence the school's operation through 
political channels will be substantial. 
Our refusal to grant schoolchildren full 
constitutional protection can also be justified by the 
"commonality of interest" between teachers and students. 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 u.s. 565, 593 (Powell,J., dissenting). 
The constitution articulates individual liberties because 
of an underlying assumption that citizens and state 
officials officials have conflicting interests. Since the 
teacher serves as an educator, adviser, and friend to the 
student, the interests of the two usually coincide. Id. at 
594. Hence, it is unnecessary to give schoolchildren the 
same constitutional protection afforded to some others. A 
policeman who is "engaged in the competitive process of 
l i 
12. 
ferreting out crime," Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1, 12 
(1968), may have little regard for the rights of a 
criminal suspect. The same cannot be said about a teacher 
who thinks that his student has violated a school 
regulation; in many cases, the teacher will be as 
concerned with the welfare of the offending student as 
with that of his classmates. 
III. 
The ability of concerned parents to supervise the 
schools, as well as the "commonality of interest" between 
teachers and students, make it appropriate to relax the 
constitutional protections afforded schoolchildren. 
Students should be granted only those constitutional 
rights which will not "materially and substantially 
13. 
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline 
in ••• the school." The probable cause requirement would 
substantially interfere with the efforts of school 
authorities to maintain discipline in the classroom. 
Requiring a teacher to wait until there is probable cause 
to search would frustrate his efforts to act quickly so as 
to prevent not only infractions of school rules, but also 
injuries to other students. Moreover, teachers often are 
unfamiliar with the legal technicalities of the probable 
cause standard. They would find its application to the 
classroom setting impossiblly difficult. Allowing the 
search of a student on the basis of "reasonable grounds," 
however, gives school officials the discretion that they 
need to maintain discipline in the schools. It is on this 
basis that I join Part III of the majority opinion. 
alb 10/26/84 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Lee 
RE: No. 83-712, New Jersey v. T.L.O., Justice White's first draft 
Justice White's draft opinion certainly reaches the 
right result. It seems to me, however, that he skips one step in ---------------the analysis. He correctly recognizes that the determination of 
what is "reasonable" requires "balancing the need to search 
against the invasion which the search entails." Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 u.s. at 536-537 (page 10). In setting up 
the equation, he states that: (1) a student has a substantial 
expectation of privacy that is infringed by a search of her 
person or purse (pages 10-12): and (2) there is a great need to 
maintain discipline in the classroom. (pages 12-13) • He then 
announces that the search of a student may be based on 
"reasonable grounds."(page 15). The analysis is very conclusory: 
after identifying a severe intrusion and a weighty governmental 
need, Justice White simply picks a standard less demanding than 
probable cause. 
It seems that a decision to depart from the probable 
cause standard should be justified in either of two ways. First, 
----------------~ ------
the Court could hold that schoolchildren have restricted privacy 
interests. Unfortunately, it would be difficult to limit the use 
of this rationale to the school setting. If juveniles have such 
limited privacy interests, why not allow policemen to search 
children in the park without probable cause? A better approach 
would be to rely upon the reasoning in your opinion in Ingraham 
v. Wright. In Ingraham, you stated that the "openness of the 
public school and its supervision by the community afford 
significant safeguards against" abuses of corporal punishment. 
That same openness will tend to prevent unreasonable searches. 
With the exception of his failure to discuss the 
relevance of your opinion in Ingraham, Justice White's draft 
appears to be satisfactory. He was wise to avoid deciding 
whether a school search would ever be appropriate in the absence 
of individualized suspicion. (page 15, note 7). I therefore 
recommend that you join Justice White's opinion. I am not sure 
whether you will want to write a short concurring opinion. 
t ' ~ I 
~ I 
lfp/ss 11/05/84 PLO 
83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. u J , 
wi-r .... ~
I agree with the Court's decision, andAmuch ot 
~ow fi:JJU", ) 
its opinion. ~ I would place greater emphasis 
special characteristics of the school . etiiN-i~W'WIIWiiW~"J.---.;;tft"' 
emrironment in which st~adents necessarily fiave a lessene a--. 
enpectation of privacy than the pop~alation general!~. 1 
In ..a. ;f~~~~{ of cases, we have recognized the 
special characteristics of the school . ~nvironmQnt, To oe 
sure, the Court properly has said that students do not 
"shed their constitutional rights • • . at the schoolhouse 
1 The Court's op1n1on states that "[a] search 
of a [school] child's person or of a closed purse or of a 
bag carried on her person, no less than a similar searcn 
carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation 
of subjective expectations of privacy". Ante, at 10, 11. 
This expectation also is said to be "legitimate". Ante, 
at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation of privacy 
is "no les " n adult, it is not clear to me 
how Court can conclude that a standard less ,:::;than 
p able cause is appropriate. In cases in which a lesser 
standard has been applied - quite properly I think - there 
have been circumstances that lessened the reasonableness 
of o ectation of riv e.g., United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u .. 873 1975) (Lee: cite other 
cases.) hild y be 
pp 1es rds e p n 
schoo ses) · ------------------~ 
? 
(br;e' s~ of a..J.-.th ·.~ i'\v;v.&o~ 6. '' ""-otk'liV' ,·-J.r,...sJrr::JJ. /err'1 "'· ~) J't.l U. ~. I(/ '~:>~)( $PArd.. 
k- weo.rs WAJ "J;~J.,J "); ~ ~ Sf,JiJ v . ~/,~,_- F'~A..Vk > lf:J ~ U.S · S"'f 3 { 1176) 
c-,..~v-u..~ CA.~~ ,.ttd; ...... ~u b~ r.s .. ~.A ... t.. ~·-·~ ·-J. ~
gate". Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 u.s. 
503, 506 (1969). But we have refused consistently tu 
· .. lu ~f 
afford students constitutional protections ~Jnorrnally 
are e~joyed bJ j~veniles as well as adults in non-school 
--e~~Rts. 0}' Goss v. Lopez, 417 u.s. 565 (1975), ~ fk 
~.j.. re.c..DjV"'-uJ,. constitutional right to due process1 .w•• ili4 Cagni zed ,.. ana 
/..:l'lfU Wtt=t::: 1-J(.S 
yet tl:le C01ut wa.e careful to limit the exercise of th1s 
right by a student who challenged a disciplinary 
A~· c._g_ -5' {,til-
The only process found to be "Que" was HOtiee-~ 
described as "rudimentary"; )~mount~ to no 
suspension. 
~~ s(l,r ~ a.ng a hearing 
41\ 
more than "the disciplinarian * * * informally 
discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the student 
minutes after it has occurred". Id., at 581-582. In 
v. Wright, 430 u.s. 651 (1977), we declined to 
~~~§i~~~xtend the Eighth Arnendrnen~~ of corporal 
punishment"t_irj:fhool childre'!E•i~~ h'f i'lo>Ei 7&~ 
ernphasized~hat':~;v:- a!e constraints in the school ana 
([{=JC:J~~~~~ 
community ~ provide substantial protection against the 
violation of constitutional rights 
a9iiJl - ts 2 a " pttl: 1 ic &alidbl:w z emsins:z n r • 
end of the school day, the child 
return horne. Even while at school, the child brings with 





from teachers and other pupils who may witness and protect 
1~ ,...;-= 
Th any instances of mistreatment". Id., at 670. 
further pointed out that the "openness of the public 
school and its supervision by the community afford;{ 
significant safeguards" against the violation ot 
constitutional · rights. Id., at 670. 
'11 ---~~-~- - ~~~ 
~t is necessary also te bear in mind j the unique 
nature of the responsibility of school officials and 
~!!fhe.r.s~ Unlike police officers, they have no law 
enforcement responsibility or indeed any obligation to be 
familiar with the criminal laws and their applicability.~ 
The primary duty of school offiCials and teachers, ot 
course, is ~ educat&~and trairlA~~ung people. A state has 
.J 
. L~~~·~J 
a compelling i~terest in assuring that th~~onsibility# 
::e m::ai~:9===~ t:ttfqg~l:::, ~ ~~ 
\ .. _ ~lo~ -fl-y kJ-Js. J 




to protect pupils from mistreatment by 
~
~ to protect teachers from the type of violence that 1n 
" recent years has prompted national concern. For me, it s i mp 1 &~t;z6 II S 1 p?R!Ie to argue that the full panoply 
of constitutional rules appl~~in the schoolhouse with the 
same force and effect ~h~rules ~ ~~~f'ft ll~ 
enforcement of criminal laws. In sum, although 1 
~~ 
with t the Court' s -1 ~ C'9RG l.lS iHm agree and its holding, 3 ~ 
3The Court's holding is that "when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a] search wilJ. 
turn up evidence that the student has violated or 1s 
violating either the law or the rules of the school", a 
search of the student or his person or belongings 1s 
justified. Ante, at __ __ 
lfp/ss 11/05/84 PLO SALLY-POW 
83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and much OJ. 
its opinion. I would place greater emphasis on ~ne 
special character is tics of the school environment - an 
environment in which students necessarily have a lessenea 
expectation of privacy than the population generally. 1 
In a number of cases, we have recognized the 
special characteristics of the school environment. To oe 
sure, the Court properly has said that students do not 
"shed their constitutional rights • • • at the schoolhouse 
1The Court's opinion states that "[a] search 
of a [school] child's person or of a closed purse or of a 
bag carried on her person, no less than a similar searcn 
carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation 
of subjective expectations of privacy". Ante, at 10, ~~. 
This expectation also is said to be "legitimate". Ante, 
at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation of privacy 
is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me 
how the Court can conclude that a standard less than 
probable cause is appropriate. In cases in which a lesser 
standard has been applied - quite properly I think - there 
have been circumstances that lessened the reasonableness 
of one's expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 873 (1975) (Lee: cite other 
cases.) The age of a child may be relevant, as the ~aw 
applies different standards based upon age even in a non-
school environment (Lee, cite cases). 
~. 
gate". Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.ti. 
503, 506 (1969). But we have refused consistently tv 
afford students constitutional protections that normally 
are enjoyed by junveniles as well as adults in non-school 
environemnts. In Goss v. Lopez, 417 u.s. 565 (1975), a 
constitutional right to due process was recognized, ana 
yet the Court was careful to limit the exercise of tn1s 
right by a student who challenged a disciplinary 
suspension. The only process found to be "due" was not1ce 
and a hearing described as "rudimentary", amounting to no 
more than "the disciplinarian * * * informally 
discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the student 
minutes after it has occurred". Id., at 581-582. ln 
!graham v. Wright, 430 u.s. 651 (1977), we declined to 
extend the Eighth Amendment to the use of corporal 
punishment of school children authorized by Florida law. 
We emphasized that there are constraints in the school ana 
community that provide substantial protection against the 
violation of constitutional rights by school authorities. 
The "public school remains an open institution * * * at 
the end of the school day, the child is invariably free ~o 
return home. Even while at school, the child brings witn 
him the support of family and friends, and is rarely apar~ 
3. 
from teachers and other pupils who may witness and protect 
any instances of mistreatment". Id., at 670. The Court: 
further pointed out that the "openness of the public 
school and its supervision by the community afforas 
significant safeguards" against the violation or 
constitutional rights. Id., at 670. 
It is necessary also to bear in mind the unique 
nature of the responsibility of school officials ana 
teachers. Unlike police officers, they have no law 
enforcement responsibility or indeed any obligation to be 
familiar with the criminal laws and their applicability.~ 
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, ot 
course, is to educate and train young people. A state nas 
a compelling interest in assuring that this responsibility 
is met. As a predicate even to undertaking the teaching 
and training of children, order and discipline must be 
maintained. And apart from education, there is the duty 
2of course, as illustrated by this case, 
school authorities are familiar - unhappily - with the 
types of crimes that occur frequently in our schools: tne 
distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence 
against teachers as well as fellow students. [Lee, see 
SG' s Biref for studies of crime problem, and add those 
that BRW does not cite.] 
.. 
':to 
to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, ana 
also to protect teachers from the type of violence that In 
recent years has prompted national concern. For me, it 
simply makes little sense to argue that the full panop.Ly 
of constitutional rules apply in the schoolhouse with the 
same force and effect as these rules apply generally to 
the enforcement of criminal laws. In sum, although l 
agree with the Court's conclusion and its holding,j 1. 
reach these results by somewhat different reasoning 
though I acknowlege that the difference may be one or 
modest degree. 
3The Court's holding is that "when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a] search wiLL 
turn up evidence that the student has violated or IS 
violating either the law or the rules of the school", a 
search of the student or his person or belongings IS 
justified. Ante, at 
lfp/ss 11/14/84 NJ SALLY-POW 
I cl- I 
.fhe_ L. c:. k i 0 
~ L.~e 
73-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much 
- bu-t not cH.l- of its opinion. I would place greater 
emphasis on the special characteristics of the school, and 
on the status of pupils in the elementary and secondary 
grades. This case concerns a fourteen-year-old girl, and 
the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to a 
search of her purse by a school official. Within the 
.4rJo• :>~}; 
school environment, pupils certainly have a less~~ ~ 
expectation of privacy than members of the population 
generally. They spend the school hours in close 
association with each other, both in the classroom and at 
play. The children in a particular class come to know 
a-'C.4l 
each othe 5{ well 
~tu:. 
~ 




my:ea»'dRabi-e to think that they have the same subjective 
expectation of privacy as adults in the population at 
large. 1 
~ 
In this case, o:Iol-lil4t~a~\~~3~rJk~fo~~~ ,hF~;~:.tt.bbL.aa..tt;.....!J'I'~a..J:Ii:r.s~O~"./F'w'4i.tt.l:ll:l~-;;<::::1r::::::::r-"__.:;> 
r. L. ,o /rj'  
1\ marijuana and $40 in her purse ~ was anxious not to have 
~ t>fr/-4-~ 
~ contents revealed to school officials. This sort of 
"'\ 
states that "[ search 
se or of a 
lar search 
violation 
t 10, 11. 
Ante, 
generally prevailing disposition of children to share 
freely with each other whatever they happen to have with 
them. But for purposes of deciding this case, I can 
assume that children in school reasonably may have - no 
less than adults - subjective expectations of privacy. 
at • Supra, n. 1. 
1\ 
In a broader sense, I view this case as one to 
be decided in light of the special characteristics of a 
school. No one now doubts that students have 
3. 
constitutional rights. In an often quoted statement, the 
Court properly said that students do not "shed their 
constitutional rights ..• at the schoolhouse gate". 
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 u.s. 503, 506 
(1969). The Court in Tinker also "emphasized the need for 
4. 
affirming the comprehensive authority of the states and of 
school officials, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional standards, to prescribe and control conduct 
in the schools". Id., at 507. See also Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97, 104 (1968}. In addressing the 
assertion of particular constitutional rights by a 
student, the Court has found qualitative differences 
between juveniles and adults in entitlement to remedies. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 417 u.s. 565 (1975}, the Court 
recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet 
was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a 
student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The 
only process found to be "due" was notice and a hearing 
described as "rudimentary": it amounted to no more than 
"the disciplinarian * * * informally discuss[ing] the 
5. 
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has 
occurred". !d., at 581-582. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
u.s. 651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth 
Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment 
&4/ 
authorized by Florida law of school childre • 
A 
emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in 
the school, and also in the community, provide substantial 
protection against the violation of constitutional rights 
by school authorities. "At the end of the school day, the 
child is invariably free to return home. Even while at 
school, the child brings with him the support of family 
and friends, and is rarely apart from teachers and other 
~ 
pupils who may witness and prote~t any instances of 
mistreatment". !d., at 670. The Ingraham Court further 
pointed out that the "openness of the public school and 
6. 
its supervision by the community afford significant 
safeguards" against the violation of constitutional 
rights. Id., at 670. 
The school environment and its special 
characteristics distinguish the setting within which 
school children operate from the adult world. Law 
enforcement officers function as adversaries of persons 
who commit crimes. Such officers have the responsibility 
to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest 
those who violate our laws, and to charge and bring to 
trial persons thought to be guilty. Rarely is there this 
type of adversarial relationship betwen school authorities 
and pupils. Traditionally, there has been and is a 
commonality of interests particularly between teachers and 
their pupils. This is not to say that the former act in 
• 
7 • 
loco parentis in relationships with students in a sense 
that would exempt teachers and officials from the 
application of the Fourth Amendment. The point is that 
~~ the attitude of the teacher is one of personal 
" 
responsibility for the pupil's welfare as well as for his 
education. Unlike police officers, school authorities 
have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any 
obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws and their 
applicability. 2 
The primary duty of school officials and 
~~ ~.4-.-~/ 
teachers, e£ ~~e, is the education and training of 
young people. A state has a compelling interest in 
2of course, as illustrated by this case, 
school authorities have a layman's familiarity with the 
types of crimes that occur frequently in our schools: the 
distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence 
against teachers as well as fellow students. 
• 
8 • 
assuring that the schools meet this responsibility. 
Without first establishing discipline and maintaining 
order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students. 
And apart from education, the school has the obligation to 
protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, and 
.UrJ. 
also to protect teachers themselves from violence by ~ few 
~~~--
students ~ in recent years has prompted national 
I\ 
concern. For me, it would be unreasonable and at odds 
with history to argue that the full panoply of 
constitutional rules apply in the schoolhouse with the 
same force and effect that these rules have when applied 
generally in the enforcement of criminal laws. 3 
3As noted above, decisions of this Court 
have never held to the contrary. The law recognizes a 
host of constitutional distinctions between the rights and 
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. 
Lopez, supra, at 591 (Powell, J., dissenting.} 
9. 
In sum, although I agree with mu' 
Court's opinion and its holding, 4 my emphas 
different. 
4The Court's holding is that "when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a] search will 
turn up evidence that the student has violated or is 
violating either the law or the rules of the school", a 
search of the student or his person or belongings is 
justified. Ante, at J:f' • L 
~~ 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much 
- but not all - of its opinion. I would place greater 
emphasis ~ ~wev.er,.l on the special character is tics of the 
school, and on the status of pupils in the elementary and 
secondary grades. This case concerns a fourteen-year-old 
girl, and the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies 
to a search of her purse by a school official. Within the 
school environment, pupils certainly have a lesser 
expectation of privacy than members of the population 
generally. They spend the school hours in close 
association with each other, both in the classroom and at 
play. The children in a particular class come to know 
~~ 
each other ~1 as well as their teachers. It is 
unreasonable to think that they have the same subjective 
expectation of privacy as adults in the population at 
large. 1 
In this case, I have no doubt that T.L.O. with 
marijuana and $40 in her purse, was anxious not to have 
its contents revealed to school officials. This sort of 
1The Court's opinion states that "[a) search 
of a [school] child's person or of a closed purse or of a 
bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search 
carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation 
of subjective expectations of privacy". Ante, at 10, 11. 
This expectation also is said to be "legitimate". Ante, 
at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation of privacy 
is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me 
how the Court can conclude that a standard less stringent 
than probable cause is appropriate. I would not have 
thought that an adult visiting in a schoolhouse could be 
detained and his pockets search in the absence of probable 
cause. In cases in which a lesser standard has been 
applied quite properly I think there have been 
circumstances that lessened the reasonableness of one's 
expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 873 (1975) (brief stop of 
automobile involved a "modest" intrusion; Terry v. Ohio, 
392 u.s. 1 (1968) (search for weapons was "limited); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuer te, 428 U.S. 543 ( 1976) (intrusion 
cause by routine checkpoint stop is "quite limited"). 
3. 
or-~ 
expectatio~ of privacyJ_ M <:Qurs.,, r. =:::.:J.,...., 
is quite different from the genera~~ttMee of children 
" 1J I II j 2 ff( j' t._ r/1::2-
to share freely with each other whatever they happen to 
have with them. But for purposes of deciding this case, I 
~ 
can assume that children in school reasonably may~- nJ' , 
less than adults - subjective expectations of privacy. 
Supra, n. 1. 
~~,L.o~~ 
In a broader sense, I view this casj(w~thin ~~e 
~ LujtJ-
~amework of the special characteristics of a school. No 
one now doubts that students have constitutional rights. 
In an often quoted statement, the Court properly said that 
students do not "shed their constitutional rights ••• at 
the schoolhouse gate". Tinker v. Des Moines School 
District, 393 u.s. 503, 506 (1969). The Court in Tinker 
also "emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive 
4. 
autho~ity of the states and of school officials, 
consistent with fundamental constitutional standards, to 
prescribe and control conduct in the schools". Id., at 
507. See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97, 104 
(1968) • In addre~ing the assertion of particular 
~ 
constitutional rights by a student, the Court has 
recognized qualitative differences between juveniles and 
adults in entitlement to remedies. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 417 u.s. 565 (1975), the Court 
reee~i~ titutional right to due process, and yet 
~ 
was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a 
student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The 
only process found to be "due" was notice and a hearing 
described as "rudimentary"; it amounted to no more than 
"the disciplinarian * * * informally discuss[ing] the 
5. 
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has 
occurred". Id., at 581-582. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
u.s. 651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth 
Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment 
authorized by Florida law of school children.) --- ~ ~e emphasized i~ that opinion that~b9£C ar~ ~ 
~· ~ ~ _.,/ . J 1 #" r"'-'- ...r£ 
constraints in the school and community provide ; fff 
substantial protection against the violation of 
constitutional rights by school authorities. "At the end 
of the school day, the child is invariably free to return 
home. Even while at school, the child brings with him the 
support of family and friends, and is rarely apart from 
teachers and other pupils who may witness and protect any 
instances of mistreatment". Id., at 670. The Ingraham 
Court further pointed out that the "openness of the public 
6. 
school and its supervision by the community afford 
significant safeguards" against the violation of 
constitutional rights. Id., at 670. 
The school environment and its special 
characteristics distinguish the setting within which 
school children operate from the adult world. Law 
enforcement officers function as adversaries of persons 
who commit crimes. Such officers have the responsibility 
~ 
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those 
.1\ 
who violate our laws, and to charge and bring to trial 
persons thought to be guilty. Rarely is there this type 
of adversarial relationship betwen school authorities and 
pupils. Traditionally, ther~?een a~ : 
s/~~:!~~-~ 
commonality of interes~be.tween_teecheLS~and s~ool 
t 
7. 
This is not to say that the former act in loco parentis in 
relationships with students in a sense that would exempt 
teachers and officials from the application of the Fourth 
Amendment. The point is that the attitude of the teacher 
in ~e~~~±•r is one of personal responsibility for the 
J- . ~~ ~ 
pupil's welfare as" for n. See €aaiii r:; rgp~ 1 
~a.tA-~ 
~5 ~- Unlike police officers, t~ have no law __.. , 
enforcement responsibility or indeed an~!:li~a~i~~·~ 
~z· s :'z:u...>.. s k.f 2 
familiar with the criminal laws and their applicability. 
~ ]S(The primary duty of school officials and teachers, of 
course, is the education and training of young people. A 
k4·'-~~~'r ~ 
2of cour~ , as illustrated by this case, 
school authorities r-€' famili at - +'nhappily- with the 
types of crimes tha occur frequently in our schools: the 
distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence 
against teachers as well as fellow students. -Ue~W, see 
SG's.... .... S.iz.e.f .... f.o~.i:..JJ.dies of crime problem, and a.Qg th>ose 
t~ BRW €Ices -aQ.t cj ..t.e -L 
8. 
state has a compelling interest in assuring that the 
~ 
schoo~ meetj this responsibility. Without first 
~~~
establishing discipline, teachers cannot begin to educate 
/\ 
their students. And apart from education, the school has 
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by 
other children, and also to protect teachers themselves 
/J•t I .hr a,... ~1'2-~ 
from ~tfthe~~~~e~>~~~ violence~that in recent years has 
prompted national concern. For me, it would be 
unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the 
full panoply of constitutional rules appl~ in the 
schoolhouse with the same force and effect that these 
rules have when applied generally in the enforcement of 
criminal laws~In sum, although I agree with much of the 
'I- . 






Court's holding is tha~ "when there are 
reasonable gr unds for suspecting that [a] search will 
turn up evid nee that the student has violated or is 
violating ei t er the law or the rules of the school", a 
search of th student or his person or belongings is 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much 
of its opinion. I would place greater emphasis on the 
special characteristics of the school, and on the status 
of pupils in the elementary and secondary grades. This 
case concerns a fourteen-year-old girl, and the extent to 
which the Fourth Amendment applies to a search of her 
purse by a school official. Within the school 
environment, pupils certainly have a lesser expectation of 
privacy than members of the population generally. They 
spend the school hours in close association with each 
other, both in the classroom and at play. The children in 
a particular class come to know each other and their 
2. 
teachers quite well. It is unrealistic to think that they 
have the same subjective expectation of privacy as adults 
in the population at large. 1 
In this case, with marijuana and $40 in her 
purse, T.o.o., of course, was anxious not to have the 
contents of the purse revealed to school officials. This 
sort of expectation or hope of privacy is quite different 
from the generally prevailing disposition of children to 
share freely with each other whatever they happen to have 
with them. But for purposes of deciding this case, I can 
1The Court's op1n1on states that "(a] search 
of a [school] child's person or of a closed purse or of a 
bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search 
carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe - violation 
of subjective expectations of privacy". Ante, at 10, 11. 
This expectation also is said to be "legitimate". Ante, 
at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation of privacy 
is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me 
how the Court can conclude that a standard less stringent 
than probable cause is appropriate. An adult visiting in 
a schoolhouse hardly could be detained lawfully and his 
pockets searched in the absence of probable cause. 
3. 
assume that children in school reasonably may have - no 
less than adults - subjective expectations of privacy. 
Cf. supra, n. 1. 
In a broader sense, I view this case as one to 
be decided in light of the special characteristics of a 
school. No one now doubts that students have 
constitutional rights. In an often quoted statement, the 
Court properly said that students do not "shed their 
constitutional rights ••• at the schoolhouse gate". 
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 u.s. 503, 506 
(1969) • The Court in Tinker also "emphasized the need for 
affirming the comprehensive authority of the states and of 
school officials, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional standards, to prescribe and control conduct 
in the schools". !d., at 507. See also Epperson v. 
! 
4. 
Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97, 104 (1968). In addressing the 
assertion of particular constitutional rights by a 
student, the Court has found qualitative differences 
between juveniles and adults in entitlement to remedies. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 417 u.s. 565 (1975), the Court 
recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet 
was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a 
student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The 
only process found to be "due" was notice and a hearing 
described as "rudimentary": it amounted to no more than 
"the disciplinarian * * * informally discuss[ing] the 
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has 
occurred". Id., at 581-582. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
u.s. 651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth 
Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment of 
5. 
school children as authorized by Florida law. We 
emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in 
the school, and also in the community, provide substantial 
protection against the violation of constitutional rights 
by school authorities. "At the end of the school day, the 
child is invariably free to return home. Even while at 
school, the child brings with him the support of family 
and friends, and is rarely apart from teachers and other 
pupils who may witness and protest any instances of 
mistreatment". Id., at 670. The Ingraham Court further 
pointed out that the "openness of the public school and 
its supervision by the community afford significant 
safeguards" against the violation of constitutional 
rights. Id., at 670. 
' 
6. 
The school environment and its special 
characteristics distinguish the setting within which 
school children operate from the adult world. Law 
enforcement officers function as adversaries of persons 
who commit crimes. Such officers have the responsibility 
to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest 
those who violate our laws, and to charge and bring to 
trial persons thought to be guilty. Rarely is there this 
type of adversarial relationship betwen school authorities 
and pupils. Traditionally, there has been and is a 
commonality of interests particularly between teachers and 
their pupils. This is not to say that the former act in 
loco parentis in relationships with students in a sense 
that would exempt teachers and officials from the 
application of the Fourth Amendment. The point is that 
7. 
the attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal 
responsibility for the pupil's welfare as well as for his 
education. Unlike police officers, school authorities 
have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any 
obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws and their 
applicability. 2 
The primary duty of school officials and 
teachers, as the Court states, is the education and 
training of young people. A state has a compelling 
interest in assuring that the schools meet this 
responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and 
maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their 
2of course, as illustrated by this case, 
school authorities have a layman's familiarity with the 
types of crimes that occur frequently in our schools: the 
distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence 
against teachers as well as fellow students. 
8. 
students. And apart from education, the school has the 
obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other 
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from 
violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years 
has prompted national concern. For me, it would be 
unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the 
full panoply of constitutional rules apply in the 
schoolhouse with the same force and effect that these 
rules have when applied generally in the enforcement of 
criminal laws. 3 
In sum, although I agree with much of the 
Court's opinion and its holding, 4 my emphasis is somewhat 
3As noted above, decisions of this Court 
have never held to the contrary. The law recognizes a 
host of constitutional distinctions between the rights and 
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. 
Lopez, supra, at 591 (Powell, J., dissenting.) 




4The Court's holding is that "when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a] search will 
turn up evidence that the student has violated or is 
violating either the law or the rules of the school", a 
search of the student or his person or belongings is 
justified. Ante, at 15. This is in acord with the 
Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state 
and federal courts that have addressed this issue. See 
ante, n. 2, p. 6 • 
lfp/ss 11/15/84 NJ SALLY-POW 
73-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much 
l-\ow211'4f", 
of its opinion. ,A I would place greater emphas }s...fn the 
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special characteristicsJ/f£ the sche!l. and on Hte ~Lat!1:1s ~~-
Gf pupils in tAe eleffiefti!ary aftd seeonelary §raeleo r ~ 
cas~ concerns a fourteen year old 9irl, an~ tAe entent to ~ 
~~AioA tAe Fo1:1rth Ameudmeftt applies to a search of her -
.purse by a seAool offici~ Within the school 
environment, pupils .QCFtaiR1¥· have a lesser expectation of 
privacy than members of the population generally. They 
spend the school hours in close association with .each \ a \ 
t J.,w-i .... ~ ~e.J-i~ ¢'•dJr,1 L..,__;;_S~--;;..__j 
other, both in the classroom and at play.~ The enildreR/ in 
o.C .\.t..... 
a particular class oo~e to know each other and their 
teachers quite well. 
~s~~J 
have the same subjective expectation of privacy as) ad~lts 
-.i.A the populatio~t la:r9e. ~ 
-------__ ---:; .rn tHis case, with marijtlal'\a and $4Q in her-
p1:1rse, 'f.O.O., of cotlrse, wa~ anxio11s not to 'Rave tRo 
..contents of tho purse rovoaloc to oeRooJ officials• TRi a=-
'S"Ort of expectation or hope of pri"v·ae:y is (ltlite dif£erene-
~ont the generally prevailing dispo~ition o£ c'Aildren to 
·share freel:y wit'A eac'A ot'Aer \IRatover tRey ha~pon to RiP'e 
with But for purposes of deciding this case, I can 
assume that children in school reaseRahJy rna¥ have - no 
less than adults - .Qott~jeeti·;e en~eeta1;joos ~ privacy ik~h ~ 
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c~. supra, n. 1. 
~ a broader sense, I ~iew this case as ol'\e to_ 
~ gecided in light of the special characteri~tics of a. 
3. 
<if (J./"~ ~C~ ~ 
school.. No one now doubts that students have 
P~ ' 
constitutional ~i~ht~. In an often quoted statement, the 
Court ~re~9r1~ said that students do not "shed their 
constitutional rights ••• at the schoolhouse gate". 
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 u.s. 503, 506 
IJ a..Ar Ms) ~~ 
(1969). j ,the Court in 'finke£ alsoJI"emphasized the need for 
affirming the comprehensive authority of the states and of 
.... 
school officials .,.- c:on~i~teftt "~itR fulldamliRtial-
"t!ons Li Ltt tieAal staRdardo, to prescribe and control conduct 
in the schoolsfh; !d., at 507. See also Epperson v. 
11u ~ J "" s W~c.a..J. {.L_ 
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In Goss v. Lopez, 417 u.s. 565 (1975), the Court 
recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet 
was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a 
student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The 
only process found to be "due" was notice and a hearing 
described as "rudimentary": it amounted to no more than 
"the disciplinarian * * * informally discuss[ing] the 
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has 
occurred". Id., at 581-582. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
u.s. 651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth 
Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment of 
school children as authorized by Florida law. We 
emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in 
the school, and also in the community, provide substantial 
protection against the violation of constitutional rights 
5. 
by school authorities. "At the end of the school day, the 
child is invariably free to return home. Even while at 
school, the child brings with him the support of family 
and friends, and is rarely apart from teachers and other 
pupils who may witness and protest any instances of 
mistreatment". Id., at 670. The Ingraham Court further 
pointed out that the "openness of the public school and 
its supervision by the community afford significant 
safeguards" against the violation of constitutional 
rights. Id., at 670. 
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school children operate~from tAe adtllt wer~. Law 
enforcement officers function as adversaries of persons 
C\l~"J ~s~. ~ eCCteu-~ 
wno oommit erimes. Stle~eF~ have the responsibility 
6. 
to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest 
those who violate our laws, and to charge and bring to 
trial persons thought to be guilty. Rarely is~~ this 
y;sl-
type of adversarial relationship,betw~ school authorities 
L~~) 
Praeieie~all~, there has b~~R aRe is a 
commonality of interests ~ between teachers and 
their pupils. ~is is not to say that the £oFmer act iR 
loco parentis in relationships with students in a sense 
that wQ.l.lls exe!ftpt teachers and officials rtom the · 
'application of the Fo1:1reh .".menemeRt The ~eiRe i• that 
the attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal 
&~'J 
responsibility for the~~pil's welfare as well as for his 
police officers, school authorities 
have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any 
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8. 
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-schoelbe1::1se with the same force and effec~ that these__ 
~ · 1 lQ~ have when applie~ ~efierall~ in the enforcement of 
criminal laws. 3 
In sum, although I agree with much of the 




obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws . aH9 thai¥ 
applirabilit~ 
The primary duty of school officials and 
teachers, as the Court states, is the education and 
training of young people. A state has a compelling 
interest in assuring that the schools meet this 
responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and 
maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their 
students. And apart from education, the school has the 
~ 
obligation to protect) pupils €fom mi:!Jtreatme:At by oth~r 
·~ 
~ildren, aRe al:!Jo to proteet~teachers ~h~m:!Jel~es from 
violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years 
has prompted national concern. For me, it would be 
unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the 
;tJ 
full panoply of constitutional rules appy.{ in the 
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73-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much 
of its opinion. However, I would place greater emphasis 
on the special characteristics, which make it necessary to 
afford students the same constitutional protections 
granted adults and juveniles in a non-school setting. 
Within the school environment, pupils have a 
lesser expectation of privacy than members of the 
population generally. They spend the school hours in 
close association with each other, both in the classroom 
and during recreation periods. The students in a 
particular class often know each other and their teachers 
quite well. of necessity, teachers have a degree of 
"'.·· 
2. 
familiarity with, and authority over thier students which 
is unparalleled, save perhaps in the relationship between 
parent and child. It is thus unrealistic to think that 
studentshave the same subjective expectation of privacy as 
population. 1 But for purposes of deciding this case, I 
can assume that children in school have - no less than 
adults - privacy interests that society is prepared to 
recognize as legitimate •• Cf. supra, n. 1. 
No one now doubts that students are afforded 
someconstitutional protections. In an often quoted 
1 The Court's op1n1on states that .. [a] search 
of a [school] child's person or of a closed purse or of a 
bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search 
carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation 
of subjective expectations of privacy ... Ante, at 10, 11. 
This expectation also is said to be "legitimate ... Ante, 
at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation of privacy 
is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me 
how the Court can conclude that a standard less stringent 
than probable cause is appropriate. An adult visiting in 
a schoolhouse hardly could be detained lawfully and his 
pockets searched in the absence of probable cause. 
3. 
statement, the Court said that students do not "shed their 
constitutional rights ••. at the schoolhouse gate". 
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 u.s. 503, 506 
(1969). Noevertheless, the Court also has "emphasized the 
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
states and of school officials ••• to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools." !d., at 507. See also 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97, 104 (1968). The Court 
has balanced the interests of the student against the 
school officials' need to maintain discipline by 
recognizing qualitative differences between the 
constitutional remedies to which students and adults are 
entitled. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 417 u.s. 565 (1975), the Court 
recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet 
4. 
was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a 
student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The 
only process found to be "due" was notice and a hearing 
described as "rudimentary"; it amounted to no more than 
"the disciplinarian * * * informally discuss[ing] the 
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has 
occurred". !d., at 581-582. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
u.s. 651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth 
Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment of 
school children as authorized by Florida law. We 
emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in 
the school, and also in the community, provide substantial 
protection against the violation of constitutional rights 
by school authorities. "At the end of the school day, the 
child is invariably free to return horne. Even while at 
. ,. 
5. 
school, the child brings with him the support of family 
and friends, and is rarely apart from teachers and other 
pupils who may witness and protest any instances of 
mistreatment". Id., at 670. The Ingraham Court further 
pointed out that the "openness of the public school and 
its supervision by the community afford significant 
safeguards" against the violation of constitutional 
rights. Id., at 670. 
The special relationship between teacher and 
student also distinguishes the setting within which school 
children operate. Law enforcement officers function as 
adversaries of criminal suspects. These officers have the 
responsibility to investigate criminal activity, to locate 
and arrest those who violate our laws, and to charge and 
bring to trial persons thought to be guilty. Rarely does 
6. 
this type of adversarial relationship betwen school 
authorities and pupils. 2 Instead, there is a commonality 
of interests between teachers and their pupils. The 
attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal 
responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for 
his education. 
The primary duty of school officials and 
teachers, as the Court states, is the education and 
training of young people. A state has a compelling 
interest in assuring that the schools meet this 
responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and 
2unlike police officers, school authorities 
have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any 
obligatioin to be familiar with the criminal laws. Of 
course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities 
have a layman's familiarity with the types of crimes that 
occur frequently in our schools: the distribution and use 
of drugs, theft, and even violence against teachers as 
well as fellow students. 
7. 
maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their 
students. And apart from education, the school has the 
obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other 
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from 
violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years 
has prompted national concern. For me, it would be 
unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the 
full panoply of constitutional rules apply in the with the 
same force and effect in the schoolhouse as it does in the 
enforcement of criminal laws. 3 
In sum, although I agree with much of the 
Court's opinion and its holding, 4 my emphasis is somewhat 
3As noted above, decisions of this Court 
have never held to the contrary. The law recognizes a 
host of constitutional distinctions between the rights and 
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. 
Lopez, supra, at 591 (Powell, J., dissenting.) 




4The Court 1 s holding is that "when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a] search will 
turn up evidence that the student has violated or is 
violating either the law or the rules of the school", a 
search of the student or his person or belongings is 
justified. Ante, at 15. This is in acord with the 
Court 1 s summary of the views of a majority of the state 
and federal courts that have addressed this issue. See 
ante, n. 2, p. 6. 
. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much 
of its opinion. I would place greater emphasis, however, 
on the special characteristics of elementary and secondary 
schools which make i~essary to afford students the 
same constitutional protections granted adults and 
juveniles in a non-school setting. 
Within the school environment, pupils have a 
lesser expectation of privacy than members of the 
population generally. They spend the school hours in 
close association with each other, both in the classroom 
and during recreation periods. The students in a 
particular class often know each other and their teachers 
2. 
quite well. Of necessity, teachers have a degree of 
familiarity with, and authority over their students thatis 
unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between 
parent and child. It is simply unrealistic to think that 
students have the same subjective expectation of privacy 
~population generally. 1 But for purposes of deciding 
this case, I can assume that children in school have - no 
less than adults - privacy interests that society is 
prepared to recognize as legitimate •• Cf. supra, n. 1. 
However one may characterize their privacy 
expectations, students properly are afforded some 
constitutional protections. In an often quoted statement, 
~e Court said that students do not "shed their 
constitutional rights ••• at the schoolhouse gate". 
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 u.s. 503, 506 
3. 
(1969). Nevertheless, the Court also has "emphasized the 
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
states and of school officials ••• to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools." Id., at 507. See also 
EPPerson v. Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97, 104 (1968). The Court 
has balanced the interests of the student against the 
school officials' need to maintain discipline by 
recognizing qualitative differences between the 
constitutional remedies to which students and adults are 
entitled. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 u.s. 565 (1975), the Court 
recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet 
was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a 
student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The 
only process found to be "due" was notice and a hearing 
4. 
described as "rudimentary"~ it · amounted to no more than 
"the disciplinarian * * * informally discuss[ing] the 
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has 
occurred". Id., at 581-582. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
u.s. 651 (1977}, we declined to extend the Eighth 
Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment of 
school children as authorized by Florida law. We 
emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in 
the school, and also in the community, provide substantial 
protection against the violation of constitutional rights 
by school authorities. "At the end of the school day, the 
child is invariably free to return home. Even while at 
~hool, the child brings with him the support of family 
and friends, and is rarely apart from teachers and other 
pupils who may witness and protest any instances of 
5. 
mistreatment". Id., at 670. The Ingraham Court further 
pointed out that the "openness of the public school and 
its supervision by the community afford significant 
safeguards" against the violation of constitutional 
rights. Id., at 670. 
The special relationship between teacher and 
student also distinguishes the setting within which school 
children operate. Law enforcement officers function as 
adversaries of criminal suspects. These officers have the 
responsibility to investigate criminal activity, to locate 
and arrest those who violate our laws, and to charge and 
bring to trial persons thought to be guilty. Rarely does 
this type of adversarial relationship exit between school 
authorities and pupils. 2 Instead, there is a commonality 
of interests between teachers and their pupils. The 
6. 
attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal 
responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for 
his education. 
The primary duty of school officials and 
teachers, as the Court states, is the education and 
training of young people. A state has a compelling 
interest in assuring that the schools meet this 
responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and 
maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their 
students. And apart from education, the school has the 
obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other 
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from 
violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years 
has prompted national concern. For me, it would be 
unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the 
7. 
full panoply of constitutional rules apply with the same 
force and effect in the schoolhouse as it does in the 
enforcement of criminal laws. 3 
In sum, although I agree with much of the 
Cburt's opinion and its holding, 4 my emphasis is somewhat 
different. 
1The Court's opinion states that "[a] search 
of a [school] child's person or of a closed purse or of a 
bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search 
carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation 
of subjective expectations of privacy". Ante, at 10, 11. --
'!his expectation also is said to be "legitimate". Ante, 
at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation of privacy 
is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me 
how the Court can conclude that a standard less stringent 
than probable cause is appropriate. An adult - even one 
visiting in a schoolhouse - hardly could be detained 
forcibly and his pockets searched in the absence of 
probable cause. 
2. 
2unlike police officers, school authorities 
have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any 
obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws. Of 
course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities 
have a layman's familiarity with the types of crimes that 
occur frequently in our schools: the distribution and use 
of drugs, theft, and even violence against teachers as 
well as fellow students. 
3As noted above, decisions of this Court have 
never held to the contrary. The law recognizes a host of 
distinctions between the rights and duties of children and 
those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591 
(Powell, J., dissenting.) 
3. 
4The Court's holding is that "when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a] search will 
turn up evidence that the student has violated or is 
violating either the law or the rules of the school", a 
search of the student or his person or belongings is 
justified. Ante, at 15. This is in acord with the 
Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state 
and federal courts that have addressed this issue. See 
ante, n. 2, p. 6. 
ADDITION TO CONCURRENCE IN 
NEW JERSEY v. T.L.O., NO. 83-712 
~ ~~ ~lc..JSt 
~ ~ ~ ~~ I also find the Court's reference to the 
potential liability of public school teachers under 42 
u.s.c. §1983 unnecessary and disturbing. There is no 
§1983 claim at issue here. Moreover, I think that it is 
important to emphasize that school officials must be given 
great discretion in their efforts to maintain order and 
discipline in the unique enviornment of the schoolground 
and the classroom. For this reason, the conduct of school 
officials in enforcing school rules should not be held to 
the same high standards applicable to law enforcement 
officials under the Fourth Amendment. While §1983 
remedies may be available against school officials in the 
,, 
2. 
appropriate case, I suspect that conduct that would 
support a claim under §1983 against a police official 
rarely will support a claim under §1983 against a school 
official. 
..,., - -- -
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From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-712 
NEW JERSEY, PETITIONER v. T. L. 0. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
NEW JERSEY 
[May -, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL concurring. 
I agree with the de n reached by the Court and with 
most of its reasoning. I do not agree, however, with the lan-
guage in the opinion that suggests that exclusion of evidence 
from school disciplinary proceedings may provide a deter-
rent to Fourth Amendment violations by school officials. 
This suggestion has no support in the record and is unnec-
essary to a decision of the question before us. 
As the Court states, ante, at 9, the only question presented 
is whether evidence unlawfully seized by school officials dur-
ing the course of an in-school search must be excluded in ju-
venile delinquency proceedings. I agree with the Court's 
conclusion that the exclusionary rule is not applicable. The 
school officials, in searching respondent's purse, were acting 
pursuant to their duty to enforce school regulations and 
maintain a safe and drug-free learning environment. They 
had no responsibility for enforcing the criminal laws. Appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule, as the Court correctly rea-
sons, would be unlikely to result in appreciable deterrence. 1 
'The courts below found an absence of probable cause for the search 
that revealed the drugs and evidence that T. L. 0. was selling drugs to her 
youthful schoolmates. Determination of what constitutes "probable 
cause" is a question on which lawyers and judges, as well as police officials, 
frequently differ. It would be unrealistic to extend the subtleties of the 
Fourth Amendment the school classroom. I therefore do not agree with 





2 NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0. 
My difficulty concerns the portion of the Court's opinion, see 
ante, at 10-11, that goes on to consider the likely deterrent 
effect of excluding evidence seized by school officials in school 
disciplinary proceedings as distinguished from delinquency 
proceedings. The basis for the Court's speculation in this re-
spect is the decision by the New Jersey Superior Court, in 
the disciplinary proceedings, that the evidence found in 
T. L. O.'s purse must be excluded. 
The Court is careful to state in a footnote that the "propri-
ety of that decision is not before us in this case." Ante, at 
10, n. 6. This disclaimer, however, is undermined by the 
Court's subsequent statement to the effect that "illegal sei-
zures and searches by school officials will be adequately de-
terred" by the exclusion of evidence from disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Ante, at 11. This statement is unsupported in 
the record, and it suggests or implies an answer to a question 
not before us. Moreover, it suggests an answer that is con-
trary to our decisions concerning the exclusionary rule-deci-
sions that consistently have refused to extend the rule to civil 
proceedings. See, e. g., United States v. Janis, 428 U. Sn 
433 (1976). t::::_ 
___ __t:.uw.uJ.U~-+-;:·J-V"· ~~I"'· ~~~ and the greater part of the 
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Amendment violations and applications of the exclusionary rule. Keeping _ !. ~ >t~ 
abreast of, and understanding, these developments has been a problem for -...-~ ~ . . J _ 
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law enforcement officials who are briefed regularly on Court decisions. ' 1 ~ tl. 1-u-.... 
School officials rarely possess legal training, and few schools could provide n.A... • 
adequate briefing. It would be unreasonable on its face to suggest that r Jl. t:A-4.L ~"D 
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that the judgment of that court should be reversed. There is no evidence 
of overreaching conduct on the part of the school officials, and the seven-
day suspension of T. L. 0. for selling drugs to 14-year-old children in 
school, was a singularly modest penalty. 
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Circulated: _________ _ 
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lst~AFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-712 
NEW JERSEY, PETITIONER v. T. L. 0. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
NEW JERSEY 
[May-, 1984] 
e;: ?.w-J- t:U\-d. .i... ~s :_,_ ~ ~ j 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring'[ () . 
I agree with the decision reached by the Court and with 
most of its reasoning. I do not agree, however, with the lan-
guage in the opinion that suggests that exclusion of evidence 
from school disciplinary proceedings may provide a deter-
rent to Fourth Amendment violations by school officials. 
This suggestion has no support in the record and is unnec-
essary to a decision of the question before us. 
As the Court states, ante, at 9, the only question presented 
is whether evidence unlawfully seized by school officials dur-
ing the course of an in-school search must be excluded in ju-
venile delinquency proceedings. I agree with the Court's 
conclusion that the exclusionary rule is not applicable. The 
school officials, in searching respondent's purse, were acting 
pursuant to their duty to enforce school regulations and 
maintain a safe and drug-free learning environment. They 
had no responsibility for enforcing the criminal laws. Appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule, as the Court correctly rea-
sons, would be unlikely to result in appreciable deterrence. 1 
1 The courts below found an absence of probable cause for the search 
that revealed the drugs and evidence that T. L. 0. was selling drugs to her 
youthful schoolmates. Determination of what constitutes "probable 
cause" is a question on which lawyers and judges, as well as police officials, 
uentl differ. It would be unrealistic to extend the subtleties of the 
Fourth Amendment the school classroom. I therefore do not agree with 
the statement in the Court's opinion that "school boards may and should 
83-712-CONCUR 
2 NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0. 
My difficulty concerns the portion of the Court's opinion, see 
ante, at 10-11, that goes on to consider the likely deterrent 
effect of excluding evidence seized by school officials in school 
disciplinary proceedings as distinguished from delinquency 
proceedings. The basis for the Court's speculation in this re-
spect is the decision by the New Jersey Superior Court, in 
the disciplinary proceedings, that the evidence found in 
T. L. O.'s purse must be excluded. 
The Court is careful to state in a footnote that the "propri-
ety of that decision is not before us in this case." Ante, at 
10, n. 6. This disclaimer, however, is undermined by the 
Court's subsequent statement to the effect that "illegal sei-
zures and searches by school officials will be adequately de-
terred" by the exclusion of evidence from disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Ante, at 11. This statement is unsupported in 
the record, and it suggests or implies an answer to a question 
not before us. Moreover, it suggests an answer that is con-
trary to our decisions concerning the exclusionary rule-deci-
sions that consistently have refused to extend the rule to civil 
proceedings. See, e. g., United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 
433 (1976). 
Although I join the judgm~t and the greater part of the 
Court's opinion, I dis~ent f1 o 
11 
that portion of it that specu-
lates unnecessarily as to a deterrent effect of the rule in situ-
ations that are not before us._.-L. 
have both the incentive and the means to foster an understanding [of fed-
eral constitutional standards]." See, ante, at 10. Decisions of the courts, 
including this Court, frequently decide close questions of alleged Fourth 
Amendment violations and applications of the exclusionary rule. Keeping 
abreast of, and understanding, these developments has been a problem for 
law enforcement officials who are briefed regularly on Court decisions. 
School officials rarely possess legal training, and few schools could provide 
adequate briefing. It would be unreasonable on its face to suggest that 
they should be held to the same standards that the law expects of police 
officials. 
, m eed, the decision of the Ne r10r ourt were before 
J 
83-712-CONCUR 
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that the judgment of that court should versed. There is no evidence 
of overreaching conduct o art of the school officials, and the seven-
day suspen · . L. 0. for selling drugs to 14-year-old children in 
, was a singularly modest penalty. 
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From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-712 
NEW JERSEY, PETITIONER v. T. L. 0. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
NEW JERSEY 
[May -, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and concurring in the 
result. 
I agree with the decision reached by the Court and with 
most of its reasoning. I do not agree, however, with the lan-
guage in the opinion that suggests that exclusion of evidence 
from school disciplinary proceedings may provide a deter-
rent to Fourth Amendment violations by school officials. 
This suggestion has no support in the record and is unnec-
essary to a deeisiori of the question before us. ~ 
As the Court state"s, ante, at 9, the only question presented ,...,_ 
is whether evidence unlawfully seized by school officials dur-
ing the course of an in-school search must be excluded in ju-
venile delinquency proceedings. I agree with the Court's 
conclusion that the exclusionary rule is not applicable. The 
school officials, in searching respondent's purse, were acting 
pursuant to their duty to enforce school regulations and 
maintain a safe and drug-free learning environment. They 
had no responsibility for enforcing the criminal laws. Appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule, as the Court correctly rea-
sons, would be unlikely to result in appreciable deterrence.* 
*The courts below found an absence of probable cause for the search 
that revealed the drugs and evidence that T. L. 0. was selling drugs to her 
youthful schoolmates. Determination of what constitutes "probable 
cause" is a question on which lawyers and judges, as well as police officials, 
frequently differ. It would be unrealistic to extend the subtleties of the 
Fourth Amendment to the school classroom. I therefore do not agree 
83-712-CONCUR 
2 NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0. 
My difficulty concerns the portion of the Court's opinion, see 
ante, at 10-11, that goes on to consider the likely deterrent 
effect of excluding evidence seized by school officials in school 
disciplinary proceedings as distinguished from delinquency 
proceedings. The basis for the Court's speculation in this re-
spect is the decision by the New Jersey Superior Court, in 
the disciplinary proceedings, that the evidence found in 
T. L. O.'s purse must be excluded. 
The Court is careful to state in a footnote that the "propri-
ety of that decision is not before us in this case." Ante, at 
10, n. 6. This disclaimer, however, is undermined by the 
Court's subsequent statement to the effect that "illegal sei-
zures and searches by school officials will be adequately de-
terred" by the exclusion of evidence from disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Ante, at 11. This statement is unsupported in 
the record, and it suggests or implies an answer to a question 
not before us. Moreover, it suggests an answer that is con-
trary to our decisions concerning the exclusionary rule-deci-
sions that consistently have refused to extend the rule to civil 
proceedings. See, e. g., United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 
433 (1976). 
Although I join the judgment and the greater part of the 
Court's opinion, I disagree with that portion of it that specu-
lates unnecessarily as to a deterrent effect of the rule in situ-
ations that are not before us. 
with the statement in the Court's opinion that "school boards may and 
· should have both the incentive and the means to foster an understanding 
[of federal constitutional standards]." See, ante, at 10. Decisions of the 
courts, including this Court, frequently decide close questions of alleged 
Fourth Amendment violations and applications of the exclusionary rule. 
Keeping abreast of, and understanding, these developments has been a 
problem for law enforcement officials who are briefed regularly on Court 
decisions. School officials rarely possess legal training, and few schools 
could provide adequate briefing. It would be unreasonable on its face to 
suggest that they should be held to the same standards that the law ex-
pects of police officials. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and concurring in the 
result. 
I agree with the decision reached by the Court and with 
most of its reasoning. I do not agree, however, with the lan-
guage in the opinion that suggests that exclusion of evidence 
from school disciplinary proceedings may provide a deter-
rent to Fourth Amendment violations by school officials. 
This suggestion has no support in the record and is unnec-
essary to a deeisie..?"of the question before us. 
As the Court states, ante, at 9, the only question presented 
is whether evidence unlawfully seized by school officials dur-
ing the course of an in-school search must be excluded in ju-
venile delinquency proceedings. I agree with the Court's 
conclusion that the exclusionary rule is not applicable. The 
school officials, in searching respondent's purse, were acting 
pursuant to their duty to enforce school regulations and 
maintain a safe and drug-free learning environment. They 
had no responsibility for enforcing the criminal laws. Appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule, as the Court correctly rea-
sons, would be unlikely to result in appreciable deterrence.* 
· *The courts below found an absence of probable cause for the search 
that revealed the drugs and evidence that T. L. 0. was selling drugs to her 
youthful schoolmates. Determination of what constitutes "probable 
cause" is a question on which lawyers and judges, as well as police officials, 
frequently differ. It would be unrealistic to extend the subtleties of the 
Fourth Amendment to the school classroom. I therefore do not agree 
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My difficulty concerns the portion of the Court's opinion, see 
ante, at 10-11, that goes on to consider the likely deterrent 
effect of excluding evidence seized by school officials in school 
disciplinary proceedings as distinguished from delinquency 
proceedings. The basis for the Court's speculation in this re-
spect is the decision by the New Jersey Superior Court, in 
the disciplinary proceedings, that the evidence found in 
T. L. O.'s purse must be excluded. 
The Court is careful to state in a footnote that the "propri-
ety of that decision is not before us in this case." Ante, at 
10, n. 6. This disclaimer, however, is undermined by the 
Court's subsequent statement to the effect that "illegal sei-
zures and searches by school officials will be adequately de-
terred" by the exclusion of evidence from disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Ante, at 11. This statement is unsupported in 
the record, and it suggests or implies an answer to a question 
not before us. Moreover, it suggests an answer that is con-
trary to our decisions concerning the exclusionary rule-deci-
sions that consistently have refused to extend the rule to civil 
proceedings. See, e. g., United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 
433 (1976). 
Although I join the judgment and the greater part of the 
Court's opinion, I disagree with that portion of it that specu-
lates unnecessarily as to ~deterrent effect of the rule in situ-
ations that are not before us. 
with the statement in the Court's opinion that "school boards may and 
should have both the incentive and the means to foster an understanding 
[of federal constitutional standards]." See, ante, at 10. Decisions of the 
courts, including this Court, frequently decide close questions of alleged 
Fourth Amendment violations and applications of the exclusionary rule. 
Keeping abreast of, and understanding, these developments has been a 
problem for law enforcement officials who are briefed regularly on Court 
decisions. School officials rarely possess legal training, and few schools 
could provide adequate briefing. It would be unreasonable on its face to 
suggest that they should be held to the same standards that the law ex-
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and concurring in the 
result. · 
I agree with the decision reached by the Court and with 
most of its reasoning. I do not agree, however, with the lan-
guage in the opinion that suggests that exclusion of evidence 
from school disciplinary proceedings may provide a deter-
rent to Fourth Amendment violations by school officials. 
This suggestion has no support in the record and is unnec-
essary to a decision of the question before us. 
As the Court states, ante, at 9, the only question presented 
is whether evidence unlawfully seized by school officials dur-
ing the course of an in-school search must be excluded in ju-
venile delinquency proceedings. I agree with the Court's 
conclusion that the exclusionary rule is not applicable. The 
school officials, in searching respondent's purse, were acting 
pursuant to their duty to enforce school regulations and 
maintain a safe and drug-free learning environment. They 
had no responsibility for enforcing the criminal laws. Appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule, as the Court correctly rea-
sons, would be unlikely to result in appreciable deterrence.* 
*The courts below found an absence of probable cause for the search 
that revealed the drugs and evidence that T. L. 0. was selling drugs to her 
youthful schoolmates. Determination of what constitutes "probable 
cause" is a question on which lawyers and judges, as well as police officials, 
frequently differ. It would be unrealistic to extend the subtleties of the 
Fourth Amendment to the school classroom. I therefore do not agree 
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My difficulty concerns the portion of the Court's opinion, see 
ante, at 10-11, that goes on to consider the likely deterrent 
effect of excluding evidence seized by school officials in school 
disciplinary proceedings as distinguished from delinquency 
proceedings. The basis for the Court's speculation in this re-
spect is the decision by the New Jersey Superior Court, in 
the disciplinary proceedings, that the evidence found in 
T. L. O.'s purse must be excluded. 
The Court is careful to state in a footnote that the "propri-
ety of that decision is not before us in this case." Ante, at 
10, n. 6. This disclaimer, however, is undermined by the 
Court's subsequent statement to the effect that "illegal sei-
zures and searches by school officials will be adequately de-
terred" by the exclusion of evidence from disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Ante, at 11. This statement is unsupported in 
the record, and it suggests or implies an answer to a question 
not before us. Moreover, it suggests an answer that is con-
trary to our decisions concerning the exclusionary rule---deci-
sions that consistently have refused to extend the rule to civil 
proceedings. See, e. g., United State3 v. Janis, 428 U. S. 
433 (1976). 
Although I join the judgment and the greater part of the 
Court's opinion, I disagree with that portion of it that specu-
lates unnecessarily as to a deterrent effect of the rule in situ-
ations that are not before us. 
with the statement in the Court's opinion that "school boards may and 
should have both the incentive and the means to foster an understanding 
[of federal constitutional standards]." See, ante, at 10. Decisions of the 
courts, including this Court, frequently decide close questions of alleged 
Fourth Amendment violations and applications of the exclusionary rule. 
Keeping abreast of, and understanding, these developments has been a 
problem for law enforcement officials who are briefed regularly on Court 
decisions. School officials rarely possess legal training, and few schools 
could provide adequate briefing. It would be unreasonable on its face to 
suggest that they should be held to the same standards that the law ex-
pects of police officials. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much of its 
op1mon. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the 
special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools 
-wftteh make it unecessary to afford students the same con-
~ stitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a non-
school setting. 
Within the school environment, pupils have a lesser expec-
tation of privacy than members of the population generally. 
They spend the school hours in close association with each 
other, both in the classroom and during recreation periods. 
The students in a particular class often know each other and 
their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers have a de-
gree of familiarity with, and authority over their students 
tha; s unparallele<Jsiexcept perhaps in the relationship be-
tween parent and1ii'ild. It is simply unrealistic to think that 
students have the same subjective expectation of privacy as 
population generally. ' But for purposes of deciding this 
1 The Court's opinion states that "[a] search of a [school] child's person or 
of a closed purse or of a bag carried on her person, no less than a similar 
search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjec-
tive expectations of privacy". Ante, at 10, 11. This expectation also is 
said to be "legitimate". Ante, at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation 
of privacy is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me how the 
Court can conclude that a standard less stringent than probable cause is 
appropriate. An adult-even one visiting in a schoolhouse-hardly could 
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case, I can assume that children in school have-no less than 
adults-privacy interests that society is prepared to recog-
nize as legitimate.# Cf. supra, n. 1. 
However one may characterize their privacy expectations, 
students properly are afforded some constitutional protec-
tions. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that stu-
dents do not "s ed their constitutional rights . . . at the 
schoolhouse gate . Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 
393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Nevertheless, the Court also has 
"emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive au-
thority of .the states and of school officials . . . to prescribe 
and control conduct in the schools." Id., at 507. See also 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court 
has balanced the interests of the student against the school 
officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing qualita-
tive differences between the constitutional remedies to which 
students and adults are entitled. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recog-
nized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was care-
ful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who chal-
lenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to 
be "due" was notice and a hearing described as "rudimen-
tary"; it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian '*-*-*-..... 
informally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the stu-
dent minutes after it has occurred . Id., at 581-582. In 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to ex-
tend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal 
punishment of school children as authorized by Florida law. 
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in 
the school, and also in the community, provide substantial 
protection against the violation of constitutional rights by 
school authorities. "At the end of the school day, the child is 
invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the 
child brings with him the support of family and friends, and is 
be detained forcibly and his pockets searched in the absence of probable 
cause. 
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rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness 
and protest any instances of mistreatmen I d., at 670. 
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness 
of the public school and its supervision by the community af-
ford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitu-
tional rights. Id., at 670. 
The special relationship between teacher and student also 
distinguishes the setting within which school children oper-
ate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of 
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to 
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who 
violate our laws, and to~n~ff:Ofii~:lliittJ p9l!S 
t · y. Rarely does this type of adversarial 
relationship e between school authorities and pupils. 2 In-
stead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers 
and their pupils. .The attitude of the typical teacher is one of 
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for 
his education. 
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the 
Court states, is the education and training of young people. 
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools 
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing disci-
pline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate 
their students. And apart from education, the school has 
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other 
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from vio-
lence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has 
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreason-
able and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of 
constitutional rules apply \vith the same force and effect in 
2 Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement 
responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal 
laws. Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a lay-
man's familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our 
schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against 
teachers as well as fellow students. 
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the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal 
laws.3 
In sum, although I agree with much of the Court's opinion 
and its holding,4 my emphasis is somewhat different. 
3 As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the con-
trary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and 
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591 
(POWELL, J., dissenting.) 
'The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has vio-
lated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school", a search of 
the student or his person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 15. This is 
in acord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state 
and federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, n. 2, p. 6. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much of its 
op1ruon. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the 
special characteristics of elementa and seconda schools 
JLJwl:Heh make it u cessary to afford students the same con-
stitutional protec wns granted adults and juveniles in a non-
school setting. 
~~Within the school environmen~ils have a lesser expec ..... - ""'"""-'<-~ 
tation of privacy than members of the population generall . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
They spend the school hours in close association with each 
other, both in the classroom and during recreation periods. 
The students in a particular class often know each other and 
their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers have a de-
gree of familiarity with, and authority over their students 
thaMs unparallele except perhaps in the relationship be-
tw~en parent and c ild. It is simply unrealistic to think that 
students have the same subjective expectation of privacy asA 
population generally. 1 But for purposes of deciding this 
1 The Court's opinion states that "[a] search of a [school] child's person or 
of a closed purse or of a bag carried on her person, no less than a similar 
search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjec-
tive expectations of P.:ivac~ Ante, at 10, 11. This expectation also is 
said to be "legitimate\7.\ Ante, at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation 
of privacy is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me how the 
Court can conclude that a standard less stringent than probable cause is 
appropriate. An adult---€ven one visiting in a schoolhouse-hardly could 
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case, I can assume that children in school have-no less than 
adults-privacy interests that society is prepared to recog-
nize as legitimate if Cf.(s~..!!: 1. 
However one may characterize their privacy expectations, 
students properly are afforded some constitutional protec-
tions. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that stu-
dents do not "sqed, their constitutional rights . . . at the 
schoolhouse gat~V Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 
393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Nevertheless, the Court also has 
"emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive au-
thority of the states and of school officials . . . to prescribe 
and control conduct in the schools." !d., at 507. See also 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court 
has balanced the interests of the student against the school 
officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing qualita-
tive differences between the constitutional remedies to which 
students and adults are entitled. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recog-
nized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was care-
ful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who chal-
lenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to 
be "due" was notice and a hearing{~ described as "rudimen-
tary''; it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian ·~ '1' • 
informally discuss[ing] the alleged Jllisconduct with the stu-
dent minutes after it has occurredl(/ Id., at 581-582. In 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to ex-
tend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal 
punishment of school children as authorized b~. Florida law. 
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar !Ji constraints in 
the school, and also in the community, provide substantial 
protection against the violation of constitutional rights by 
school authorities. "At the end of the school day, the child is 
invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the 
child brings with him the support of family and friends, and is 
be detained forcibly and his pockets searched in the absence of probable 
cause. 
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rarely apart from teachers and other pupils ho may witness 
and protest any instances of mistreatmen ' I d., at 670. 
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness 
of the public school and its supervision by the community af-
ford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitu-
tional rights. !d., at 670. 
The special relationship between teacher and student also 
distinguishes the setting within which school children oper-
ate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of 
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to 
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who 
violate our laws, and to eharge-and-bring:-tO---trial persons 
thoug:ht-W b guilty. Rarely does this type of adversarial 
relationship exft between school authorities and pupils. 2 In-
stead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers 
and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of 
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for 
his education. 
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the 
Court states, is the education and training of young people. 
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools 
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing disci-
pline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate 
their students. And apart from education, the school has 
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other 
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from vio-
lence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has 
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreason-
able and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of 
constitutional rules apply~th the same force and effect in 
2 Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement 
responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal 
laws. Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a lay-
man's familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our 
schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against 
teachers as well as fellow students. 
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the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal 
laws. 3 
In sum, although I agree with much of the Court's opinion 
and its holding/ my emphasis is somewhat different. 
3 As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the con-
trary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and 
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez,~, at 591 
(POWELL, J ., dissenting.) 
' The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has vio-
lated or is v!~:~ng either the law or the rules of the schoot '.lla search of 
the student · person or belongings is justified. Ante, at' 15. This is 
in a<i>rd with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state 
and ?Meral courts that have addressed this issue. ~. ~...6. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concuiTing. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much of its 
opmwn. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the 
special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools 
that make it unnecessary to afford students the same con-
stitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a non-
school setting. 
ithin the school environmen tudents have a lesser 
expectation of privacy than members of the population gener-
ally. They spend the school hours in close association with 
each other, both in the classroom and during recreation peri-
ods. The students in a particular class often know each 
other and their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teacher 
have a degree of familiarity with, and authority ove(,)t eir 
students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relation-
ship between parent and child. It is simply unrealistic to 
think that students have the same subjective expectation of 
privacy as the population generally.' But for purposes of 
1 The Court's opinion states that "[a] search of a [school] child's person or 
of a closed purse or of a bag carried on her person, no less than a similar 
search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjec-
tive expectations of privacy." Ante, at 10, 11. This expectation also is 
said to be "legitimate." Ante, at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation 
of privacy is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me how the 
Court can conclude that a standard less stringent than probable cause is 
appropriate. An adult-€ven one visiting in a schoolhouse-hardly could 
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deciding this case I can assume that children in school 
a~ . no less than adults-privacy interests that society is 
prepared to recognize as legitimate. Cf. n. 1, supra. 
However one may characterize their privacy expectations, 
students properly are afforded some constitutional protec-
tions. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that stu-
dents do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the 
schoolhouse gate". Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). N~hel~lis, i e Court also~ 
"emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive au-
thority of the states and of school officials . . . to prescribe 
and control conduct in the schools." I d., at 507. See also 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court 
has balanced the interests of the student against the school 
officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing qualita-
tive differences between the constitutional remedies to which 
students and adults are entitled. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recog-
nized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was care-
ful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who chal-
lenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to 
be "due" was notice and a hearing described as "rudimen-
tary"; it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian . . . in-
formally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the student 
minutes after it has occurred". !d. , at 581-582. In 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to ex-
tend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal 
punishment of school children as authorized by Florida law. 
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in the 
school, and also in the community, provide substantial pro-
tection against the violation of constitutional rights by school 
authorities. "At the end of the school day, the child is in-
variably free to return home. Even while at school, the 
child brings with him the support of family and friends , and is 




NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0. 3 
rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness 
and protest any instances of mistreatment." Id., at 670. 
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness 
of the public school and its supervision by the community af-
ford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitu-
tional rights. I d., at 670. 
The special relationship between teacher and student also 
distinguishes the setting within which school children oper-
ate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of 
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to 
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who 
violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of 
such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial 
relationship ex~ between school authorities and pupils. 2 In-
stead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers 
and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of 
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for 
his education. 
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the 
Court states, is the education and training of young people. 
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools 
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing disci-
pline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate 
their students. And apart from education, the school has 
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other 
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from vio-
lence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has 
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreason-
able and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of 
constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in 
2 Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement 
responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal 
laws. Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a lay-
man's familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our 
schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against 
teachers as well as fellow students. 
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the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal 
laws. 3 
In sum, although I agree with much of the Court's opinion 
and its holding,4 my emphasis is somewhat different. 
3 As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the con-
trary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and 
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591 
(POWELL, J., dissenting.) 
• The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has vio-
lated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school," a search of 
the student's person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 15. This is in 
acord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state and 
federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, at 6, n. 2. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much of its 
opm10n. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the 
special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools 
that make it unnecessary to afford students the same con-
stitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a non-
school sett · 
ithin the school environment tudents ,have a lesser 
expectation of privacy than members o e population gener-
ally. They spend the school hours in close association with 
each other, both in the classroom and during recreation peri-
ods. The students in a particular class often know each 
other and their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers 
have a degree of familiarity with, and authority oveypieir 
students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relation-
ship between parent and child. It is simply unrealistic to 
think that students have the same subjective expectation of 
privacy as the population generally.' But for purposes of 
'The Court's opinion states that "[a] search of a [school] child's person or 
of a closed purse or of a bag carried on her person, no Jess than a similar 
search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjec-
tive expectations of privacy." Ante, at 10, 11. This expectation also is 
said to be "legitimate." Ante, at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation 
of privacy is "no Jess" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me how the 
Court can conclude that a standard Jess stringent than probable cause is 
appropriate. An adult-even one visiting in a schoolhouse-hardly could 
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deciding this case, I can assume that children in school 
~no less than adults ~rivacy interests that society is 
prepared to recognize as legitimate. Cf. n. 1, supra. 
However one may characterize their privacy expectations, 
students properly are afforded some constitutional protec-
tions. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that stu-
dents do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the 
schoolhouse gate". Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 
393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Nn , •h !less.-;liie Court also has 
"emphasized the need for affinning the comprehensive au-
thority of the states and of school officials . . . to prescribe 
and control conduct in the schools." Id., at 507. See also 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court 
has balanced the interests of the student against the school 
officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing qualita-
tive differences between the constitutional remedies to which 
students and adults are entitled. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recog-
nized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was care-
ful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who chal-
lenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to 
be "due" was notice and a hearing described as "rudimen-
tary''; it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian ... in-
formally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the student 
minutes after it has occurred". Id., at 581-582. In 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to ex-
tend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal 
punishment of school children as authorized by Florida law. 
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in the 
school, and also in the community, provide substantial pro-
tection against the violation of constitutional rights by school 
authorities. "At the end of the school day, the child is in-
variably free to return home. Even while at school, the 
child brings with him the support of family and friends, and is 
be detained forcibly and his pockets searched in the absence of probable 
cause. 
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rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness 
and protest any instances of mistreatment." I d., at 670. 
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness 
of the public school and its supervision by the community af-
ford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitu-
tional rights. ld., at 670. 
The special relationship between teacher and student also 
distinguishes the setting within which school children oper-
ate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of 
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to 
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who 
violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of 
such persons ~ trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial 
relationship eXJ- between school authorities and pupils. 2 In-
stead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers 
and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of 
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for 
his education. 
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the 
Court states, is the education and training of young people. 
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools 
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing disci-
pline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate 
their students. And apart from education, the school has 
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other 
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from vio-
lence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has 
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreason-
able and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of 
constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in 
2 Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement 
responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal 
laws. Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a lay-
man's familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our 
schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against 
teachers as well as fellow students. 
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the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal 
laws. 3 
In sum, although I agree with much of the Court's opinion 
and its holding,4 my emphasis is somewhat different. 
3 As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the con-
trary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and 
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591 
(POWELL, J. , dissenting.) 
'The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has vio-
lated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school," a search of 
the student's person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 15. This is in 
acord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state and 
federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, at 6, n. 2. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much of its 
op1mon. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the 
special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools 
that make it unnecessary to afford students the same con-
stitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a non-
school setti 
ithin the school environment tudents ,have a lesser 
expectation of privacy than members o e population gener-
ally. They spend the school hours in close association with 
each other, both in the classroom and during recreation peri-
ods. The students in a particular class often know each 
other and their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers &A.J.d 
have a degree of familiarity with, and authority ove~ ~ 
students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relation-
ship between parent and child. It is simply unrealistic to 
think that students have the same subjective expectation of 
privacy as the population generally. 1 But for purposes of 
1 The Court's opinion states that "[a] search of a [school] child's person or 
of a closed purse or of a bag carried on her person, no less than a similar 
search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjec-
tive expectations of privacy." Ante, at 10, 11. This expectation also is 
said to be "legitimate." Ante, at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation 
of privacy is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me how the 
Court can conclude that a standard less stringent than probable cause is 
appropriate. An adult-even one visiting in a schoolhouse-hardly could 
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deciding this case, I can assume that children in school 
have=-no less than adults ~rivacy interests that society is 
prepared to recognize as legitimate. Cf. n. 1, supra. 
However one may characterize their privacy expectations, 
students properly are afforded some constitutional protec-
tions. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that stu-
dents do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the 
schoolhouse gate". Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 
393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Naurtheiess.:l'he Court also has 
"emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive au-
thority of the states and of school officials . . . to prescribe 
and control conduct in the schools." !d., at 507. See also 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court 
has balanced the interests of the student against the school 
officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing qualita-
tive differences between the constitutional remedies to which 
students and adults are entitled. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recog-
nized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was care-
ful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who chal-
lenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to 
be "due" was notice and a hearing described as "rudimen-
tary"; it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian ... in-
formally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the student 
minutes after it has occurred". Id., at 581-582. In 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to ex-
tend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal 
punishment of school children as authorized by Florida law. 
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in the 
school, and also in the community, provide substantial pro-
tection against the violation of constitutional rights by school 
authorities. "At the end of the school day, the child is in-
variably free to return home. Even while at school, the 
child brings with him the support of family and friends, and is 
~e detained forcibly and his pockets searched in the absence of probable 
cause. 
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rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness 
and protest any instances of mistreatment." I d., at 670. 
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness 
of the public school and its supervision by the community af-
ford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitu-
tional rights. I d., at 670. 
The special relationship between teacher and student also 
distinguishes the setting within which school children oper-
ate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of 
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to 
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who 
violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of 
such persons 1j> trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial 
relationship exf. between school authorities and pupils. 2 In-
stead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers 
and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of 
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for 
his education. 
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the 
Court states, is the education and training of young people. 
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools 
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing disci-
pline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate 
their students. And apart from education, the school has 
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other 
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from vio-
lence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has 
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreason-
able and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of 
constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in 
2 Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement 
responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal 
laws. Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a lay-
man's familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our 
schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against 
teachers as well as fellow students. 
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the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal 
laws.3 
In sum, although I agree with much of the Court's opinion 
and its holding, 4 my emphasis is somewhat different. 
3 As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the con-
trary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and 
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591 
(POWELL, J., dissenting.) 
• The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has vio-
lated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school," a search of 
the student's person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 15. This is in 
acord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state and 
federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, at 6, n. 2. 
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JUSTICE POWELL,)concurring. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much of its 
op1mon. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the 
special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools 
that make it unnecessary to afford students the same con-
stitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a non-
school setting. 
Students within the school environment have a lesser 
expectation of privacy than members of the population gener-
ally. They spend the school hours in close association with 
each other, both in the classroom and during recreation peri-
ods. The students in a particular class often know each 
other and their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers 
have a degree of familiarity with, and authority over, their 
students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relation-
ship between parent and child. It is simply unrealistic to 
think that students have the same subjective expectation of 
privacy as the population generally. 1 But for purposes of 
1 The Court's opinion states that "[a] search of a [school] child's person or 
of a closed purse or of a bag carried on her person, no less than a similar 
search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjec-
tive expectations of privacy." Ante, at 10, 11. This expectation also is 
said to be "legitimate." Ante, at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation 
of privacy is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me how the 
Court can conclude that a standard less stringent than probable cause is 
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deciding this case, I can assume that children in school-no 
less than adults-have privacy interests that society is pre-
pared to recognize as legitimate. Cf. n. 1, supra. 
However one may characterize their privacy expectations, 
students properly are afforded some constitutional protec-
tions. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that stu-
dents do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the 
schoolhouse gate". Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 
393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). The Court also has "emphasized 
the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
states and of school officials . .. to prescribe and control con-
duct in the schools." Id., at 507. See also Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court has balanced 
the interests of the student against the school officials' need 
to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative differences · 
between the constitutional remedies to which students and 
adults are entitled. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recog-
nized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was care-
ful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who chal-
lenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to 
be "due" was notice and a hearing described as "rudimen-
ta¢?it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian ... in-
formally discuss[ing] the alleged ptisconduct with the student 
minutes after it has occurre<!". Id., at 581-582. In 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to ex-
tend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal 
punishment of school children as authorized by Florida law. 
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in the 
school, and also in the community, provide substantial pro-
tection against the violation of constitutional rights by school 
authorities. "At the end of the school day, the child is in-
variably free to return home. Even while at school, the 
child brings with him the support of family and friends, and is 
be detained forcibly and his pockets searched in the absence of probable 
cause. 
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rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness 
and protest any instances of mistreatment." I d., at 670. 
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness 
of the public school and its supervision by the community af-
ford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitu- # 
tional rights. lid., at 670. 
The speciai'relationship between teacher and student also 
distinguishes the setting within which school children oper-
ate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of 
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to 
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who 
violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of 
such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial 
relationship exist between school authorities and pupils. 2 
Instead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers 
and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of 
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for 
his education. 
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the 
Court states, is the education and training of young people. 
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools 
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing disci-
pline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate 
their students. And apart from education, the school has 
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other 
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from vio-
lence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has 
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreason-
able and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of 
constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in 
2 Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement 
responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal 
la:ws. Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a lay-
man's familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our 
schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against 
teachers as well as fellow students. 
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the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal 
laws. 3 
In sum, although I agree with much of the Court's opinion 
and its holding, 4 my emphasis is somewhat different. 
3 As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the con-
trary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and 
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591 
(POWELL, J ., dissenting.) 
• The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has vio-
lated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school," a search of 
the student's person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 15. This is in 
acord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state and 
federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, at 6, n. 2. 
' 








From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-712 
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, 
concurring. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and generally with its 
opm10n. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the 
special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools 
that make it unnecessary to afford students the same con-
stitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a non-
school setting. 
In any realistic sense, students within the school environ-
ment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of 
the population generally. They spend the school hours in 
close association with each other, both in the classroom and 
during recreation periods. The students in a particular class 
often know each other and their teachers quite well. Of ne-
cessity, teachers have a degree of familiarity with, and au-
thority over, their students that is unparalleled except per-
haps in the relationship between parent and child. It is 
simply unrealistic to think that students have the same sub-
jective expectation of privacy as the population generally. 
But for purposes of deciding this case, I can assume that chil-
dren in school-no less than adults-have privacy interests 
that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate. CI. n.-
S'Wp'l"a. 
However one may characterize their privacy expectations, 
students properly are afforded some constitutional protec-
. tions. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that stu-
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dents do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the 
schoolhouse gate". Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 
393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). The Court also has "emphasized 
the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
states and of school officials . . . to prescribe and control 
conduct in the schools." Id., at 507. See also Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court has balanced 
the interests of the student against the school officials' need 
to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative differences 
between the constitutional remedies to which students and 
adults are entitled. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recog-
nized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was care-
ful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who chal-
lenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to 
be "due" was notice and a hearing described as "rudimen-
tary"; it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian ... in-
formally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the student 
minutes after it has occurred". Id., at 581-582. In 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to ex-
tend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal 
punishment of school children as authorized by Florida law. 
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in the 
school, and also in the community, provide substantial pro-.. 
tection against the violation of constitutional rights by school 
authorities. "At the end of the school day, the child is in-
variably free to return home. Even while at school, the 
child brings with him the support of family and friends, and is 
rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness 
and protest any instances of mistreatment." Id., at 670. 
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness 
of the public school and its supervision by the community af-
ford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitu-
tional rights. Id., at 670. 
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The special relationship between teacher and student also 
distinguishes the setting within which school children oper-
ate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of 
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to 
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who 
violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of 
such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial 
relationship exist between school authorities and pupils. 1 
Instead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers 
and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of 
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for 
his education. 
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the 
Court states, is the education and training of young people. 
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools 
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing disci-
pline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate 
their students. And apart from education, the school has 
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other 
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from vio-
lence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has 
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreason-
able and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of 
constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in 
the schoolhoase as it does in the enforcement of criminal 
laws. 2 
1 Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement re-
sponsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws. 
Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a layman's 
familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our schools: the 
distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against teachers as 
well as fellow students. 
'As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the con-
trary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and 
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591 
(POWELL, J., dissenting.) 
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In sum, although I join the Court's opinion and its hold-
ing,3 my emphasis is somewhat different . 
.. 
3 The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has vio-
lated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school," a search of 
the student's person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 15. This is in 
acord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state and 
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JusTICE POWELL, with whom JusTICE O'CONNOR joins, 
concurring. 
I agree with the Court's decision, and generally with its ll 
oplDlon. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the 
special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools 
that make it unnecessary to afford students the same con-
stitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a non-
school setting. 
In any reali~tic sense, students within the school environ- fl 
ment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of 
the population generally. They spend the school hours in 
close association with each other, both in the classroom and 
during recreation periods. The students in a particular class 
often know each other and their teachers quite well. Of ne-
cessity, teachers have a degree of familiarity with, and au-
thority over, their students that is unparalleled except per-
haps in the relationship between parent and child. It is 
simply unrealistic to think that students have the same sub-
jective expectation of privacy as the population generally. 
But for purposes of deciding this case, I can assume that chil-
dren in school-no less than adults-have privacy interests 
that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate. 
However one may characterize their privacy expectations, 
students properly are afforded some constitutional protec-
tions. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that stu-
dents do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the 
ll ~ 
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schoolhouse gate". Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 
393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). The Court also has "emphasized 
the need for affinning the comprehensive authority of the 
states and of school officials . . . to prescribe and control 
conduct in the schools." I d., at 507. See also Epperson v . 
. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court has balanced 
the interests of the student against the school officials' need 
to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative differences 
between the constitutional remedies to which students and 
adults are entitled. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recog-
nized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was care-
ful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who chal-
lenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to 
be "due" was notice and a hearing described as ''rudimen-
tary''; it amounted to no more than ''the disciplinarian ... in-
formally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the student 
minutes after it has occurred". Id., at 581-582. In 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to ex-
tend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal 
punishment of school children as authorized by Florida law. 
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in the 
school, and also in the community, provide substantial pro-
tection against the violation of constitutional rights by school 
authorities. ~At the end of the school day, the child is in-
variably free to return home. Even while at school, the 
child brings with him the support of family and friends, and is 
rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness 
and protest any instances of mistreatment." I d., at 670. 
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness 
of the public school and its supervision by the community af-
ford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitu-
tional rights. I d., at 670. 
The special relationship between teacher and student also 
distinguishes the setting within which school children oper-
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ate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of 
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to 
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who 
violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of 
such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial 
relationship exist between school authorities and pupils. 1 
Instead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers 
and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of 
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for 
his education. . 
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the 
Court states, is the education and training of young people. 
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools 
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing disci-
pline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate 
their students. And apart from education, the school has 
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other 
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from vio-
lence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has 
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreason-
able and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of 
constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in 
the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal 
laws.2 
In sum, altQough I join the Court's opinion and its hold- IJ 
ing, 3 my emphasis is somewhat different. 
1 Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement re-
sponsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws. 
Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a layman's 
familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our schools: the 
distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against teachers as 
well as fellow students. 
1 As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the con-
trary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and 
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591 
(POWELL, J., dissenting.) 
• The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for 
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suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has vio-
lated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school," a search of 
the student's person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 15. This is in 
acord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state and 
federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, at 6, n. 2. 
